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To my family

Theology has only one problem: God. We are theologians for God’s sake.
God is our dignity. God is our suffering. God is our hope.
Jürgen Moltmann, God for a Secular People

Iam extra Iesum quaerere deum est diabolus.
To seek God apart from Jesus—that is the devil.
Martin Luther, Commentary on Psalm 130, 1533
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PREFACE

This project is located within systematic theology, specifically in the area of Christian
eschatology. The twentieth century has been called the century of eschatology. Albert
Schweitzer’s The Quest for the Historical Jesus, first published in 1906, initiated a period of
renewed interest in the eschatological nature of the Gospel. In some ways, this rediscovery
culminated with Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology of Hope, translated into English in 1967. The
century of eschatology has now closed, but interest in the discussion has not run dry. Although,
as I argue in this dissertation, it is in danger of stagnating.
Here I propose a different approach to eschatology. This will entail asking different
questions than are typically asked in the field. I have not tried to answer standard questions, such
as, To what degree is the Reign of God inaugurated in Christ already realized, and what still
remains to be done? What is the nature of the interim state? How much continuity is there
between the original creation and the new creation? These are important questions for
appreciating the antinomous attributes contained within Christian hope—antinomies found in the
witness of the New Testament. There, the diverse accounts of the Paul, the Synoptic Gospels,
and John constitute a plurality of features that resist systemization. It is important for theological
reflection on Christian eschatology to appreciate the tension in this plurality. But, that is not the
focus of this project.
My approach is warranted by the question I want to answer. My question is: How is
Christian hope distinct as compared to other forms of life-organizing hope? The usual answers to
this question tend to emphasize the dialectic tension that is contained in Christian hope. Christian
eschatology is said to be distinct because of its balanced-tension between the “already” and “not
yet” of the Kingdom that has come in Jesus and the Spirit. This tension is, on the one hand,
contrasted against Modernity’s hope of progress, which is criticized for its “over-realized
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eschatology” or for how it diminishes the transcendent or “vertical dimension” in favor of what
is immanent and historical. On the other hand, the well-balanced, Christian hope is contrasted
against a pessimistic longing for escape, which is sometimes said to be noneschatological. This
form of life-organizing hope is criticized for how it expects too much discontinuity between this
life and the life to come or for the way it diminishes the non-human, spatial-material creation.
Christian hope, by contrast, is said to effectively avoid these extremes. Therefore, it is suited to
produce an ethic that can avoid triumphalism, on the one hand, and despair, on the other.
My contention is that these kinds of answers do not appreciate how other accounts of hope
actually do offer their own variation on a balanced-tension that avoids both presumption and
despair. I argue that the balanced-tension approach to Christian eschatology is not equipped to
recognize these other accounts, or stories-of-the-world, as true rivals. They are rival stories that
offer a persuasive, coherent vision for life and vigorously compete for the fear, love, and trust of
both the Church and the people to whom the Church bears witness. Failing to see these rival
hopes for what they are—failing to rightly size up the competition—diminishes the Church’s
ability to witness and cooperate without being co-opted by a more encompassing story.
To address this problem, my thesis is that Christian eschatology should be understood as
the resolution of conflict within and all-encompassing plot. This approach, which focuses on the
storied nature of Christian hope as a whole, will enable Christian eschatology to be compared
and contrasted with rival stories that also generate hope. Building on that definition of
eschatology, I will define the conflict in the plot as occurring between “good” and “evil.”
Therefore, eschatologies can be understood as theodicies, and vice versa.
I am using the term theodicy after the manner of contemporary philosopher Susan Neiman,
in her book Evil in Modern Thought. Theodicy, she argued, is not just a demand on theists. It is a
demand for anyone who wants the world to make sense, who wants the world to be intelligible.
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She related theodicy to the problem of evil, where “evil” is anything that threatens to make your
or my world unintelligible. So as not to despair, people make sense of evil by locating it within a
life-organizing story. These stories are eschatological because they anticipate an overcoming of
“evil” by the “good.” They elicit hope for a resolution of the conflict. They are at the same time
provisional theodicies because this hoped-for resolution will justify that story’s Author. The
resolution of the conflict will demonstrate that Author as trustworthy.
This intertwining of narrative, eschatology, and theodicy is, to the best of my knowledge,
what is original and significant about this project. Thus, chapters one through three are the most
important part of the dissertation. The typology of narrative theodicies explained and explored in
chapters four through six illustrates the thesis. The quadrants describe four model narratives by
the way they characterize “evil” and then by the strategies they take to overcome “evil” in hopes
to resolve the plot. As I argue in chapter seven, the difference of the Christian hope is the way
Christians characterize evil within the story of Jesus-in-Israel-and-the-Church. The conflict in
their story will resolve only when the God of Jesus brings the world to conform to the word of
the promise he made to Abraham.
The four model narrative theodicies are given to say what Christian hope is not. They are
presented to show that this approach to eschatology can yield something concrete. In this project,
I offer a conceptual map to help post-Constantinian Christians walk the narrow way as disciples
of Jesus. My appeal to fellow Christians is simply to “stay in the story.”
I would like to acknowledge the help of several people who contributed to this project.
First of all, I am grateful for my supervisor, Rev. Dr. Joel Okamoto, who tirelessly interrogated
my work and helped me formulate coherent answers to his questions, all while exemplifying
Christ-like longsuffering and pastoral concern. Also, I am grateful to my reading committee,
Rev. Dr. Charles Arand and Rev. Dr. Jeffrey Gibbs. They, along with the entire faculty of
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Concordia Seminary, have shaped my theological formation over the last eight years. I thank my
fellow graduate students for the many critical and constructive conversations, especially Rev.
Michael Fieberkorn, Dr. Beth Hoeltke, and Rev. Dr. Joel Meyer. Also, I thank Chaplain
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Robert Stroud for his gracious and meticulous efforts in helping me edit
the manuscript.
Several dear brothers and sisters in Christ financially supported my family during this time,
to include Mr. and Mrs. Douglas and Ann Marie Hamilton, Lieutenant Colonel and Mrs. Louis
and Christy Stewart, along with the baptized saints of the Peace Lutheran Church Guild of
Natoma, Kansas. Their concern, their devotion to the Lord of the Church, and their model of
sacrificial giving will be a source of lasting encouragement to me. Additionally, I thank God for
the provision he extended by means of his “left hand” through the education benefits offered in
the Veterans Administration’s Post-9/11 G. I. Bill.
I am deeply grateful to God’s people at Timothy Lutheran Church in St. Louis, Missouri,
where I serve as Assistant Pastor with Pastor Ron Rall and Pastor Bill Wilson. They have
graciously given me a place to begin learning and growing as a pastor. I also thank my parents,
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) and Mrs. Timothy and Bernice Zeigler, and my wife’s parents, Dr. and
Mrs. Rodney and Kristine Frieling, for their consistent and unconditional love. Most of all, I
thank my wife Amy, who not only read and helped edit the entire dissertation, but also, with our
four children, Josiah, Elise, Titus, and Jude, continually stood by me, encouraged, and cheered
me on during this project.
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ABSTRACT

Zeigler, Michael. W. “Christian Hope among Rivals: Life-Organizing Stories as Narrative
Theodicies.” Ph.D. diss., Concordia Seminary, 2014. 270 pp.
This dissertation answers the following: How is Christian hope distinct from others? The
answer given is that Christian hope is distinct from its rivals because it expects the God of Jesus
to bring the world to conform to the word of the promise he made to Abraham. This answer
arises from an approach to Christian eschatology that differs from what has become typical.
Current studies in eschatology focus on an internal use attributes, that is, a use fitted for
derivation and analysis of a complex whole. This study focuses on an external use, which is
fitted for comparing one whole with another. I argue that Christian eschatology should be
understood as discourse concerning the resolution of conflict within an all-encompassing plot.
To do so, I draw on the consensus that Christian faith and practice can be accounted for by the
notion of story.
The Christian hope arises from a life-organizing story. In a post-Constantinian context, the
Christian story is told among many rivals. As stories that seek to organize life for their
participants, they all begin with a declaration of what counts as “good” and what counts as
“evil.” They proceed with a strategy to overcome “evil.” This strategy involves issuing speech
acts which aim either to fit the word to the world or to fit the world to the word. The hoped-for
end of these stories is either a new state of mind or a new state of the world. Thus, they exhibit
an eschatology, understood as the resolution of conflict within a life-organizing plot. At the same
time, these stories seek to justify their Authors, or agents of emplotment. In this sense, they are
narrative theodicies. The storied hope of Christians arises from a peculiar narrative theodicy told
among rivals. It is distinguished by the way it characterizes its conflict, or storied evil, as trust in
authorities other than the God of Jesus. Furthermore, its difference is seen in how its story looks
for final resolution in the Advent of Jesus, who will finally fit the world to match God’s promise
to Abraham.
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CHAPTER ONE
COMPARATIVE ESCHATOLOGY
There is a question all doctoral students learn how to answer: What are you writing about?
Over the past few years, I have told many people, “I’m writing about how Christian hope
compares to other kinds of hope.” In the brief exchange that followed, I often learned my
conversation partner held one of two assumptions: (1) that Christian hope is beyond compare; or,
(2) that Christian hope is essentially like any other. Both assumptions work against what I will
argue in this dissertation. The problem is not that they are altogether false. The problem is that
each anticipates a resolution of conflict that has not yet occurred.
Constantinian Assumptions
Each of these assumptions was expressed by two opposing scholars who wrote something
significant about hope. The first was conveyed by Hans Schwarz, an accomplished Christian
scholar who had worked for more than forty years in international and inter-denominational
settings. For Schwarz, Christian hope was beyond compare. In this regard, he speaks for many
conservative, evangelical, and confessional Christians. The second assumption was conveyed by
Immanuel Kant. As one of the most influential prophets of the modern, secular world, he
speaks—in regard to this assumption—for many people who feel some aversion to words like
conservative, evangelical, and confessional.
Assumption 1: Christian Hope is Beyond Compare
“I can’t imagine living without hope.” That was often a sentiment expressed by those who
held the first assumption. They believed Christian hope was the true hope. Everything else was
hopeless. This was almost never said in a pompous, arrogant tone. Most often, it was an
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expression of heart-felt pity for those who either did not know or did not accept the hope offered
in Jesus Christ. Many of these conversations occurred on the campus of a theologically
conservative Christian institution. But it would be a mistake, I think, to suppose this perspective
is confined within the monastic-style walls of Concordia Seminary.
In the introduction to his Eschatology,1 Hans Schwarz, an internationally respected
ecumenical, Lutheran theologian,2 exhibited the same assumption. When Schwarz says he finds
it “impossible to dispense with the eschatological expectations of the Christian faith and still
maintain a meaningful hope in the future,”3 I hear him speaking in a tone of heart-felt pity for
those who live without the hope of Christ. Schwarz argued that Christian eschatology “is crucial
for our time” because it alone offers the hope of a meaningful and certain future.4 Christian hope,
as “proleptic anticipation,”5 has no rival and therefore it is beyond compare. Present-day
“obsession with the present” and ancient pessimism, which was typically “confined to a cyclical
understanding of time,” are both noneschatological because they offer no “meaningful goal.”
And even though a modern, linear view of time promises the possibility of progress, it offers no
certainty because it exchanged “God-confidence” for “self-confidence.” Since self-reliance is
uncertain, it yields “no ultimate hope.”6 In the rest of the book, Schwarz developed this argument
1

Hans Schwarz, Eschatology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000).

2

See Hans Schwarz, The Theological Autobiography of Hans Schwarz: A Multi-cultural and Multidenominational Christian Ministry (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009).
3

Schwarz, Eschatology, 369.

4

Ibid., 21.

5

Ibid., 370. Two definitions of prolepsis are the “representation or assumption of a future act or development
as if presently existing or accomplished” or “the application of an adjective to a noun in anticipation of the result of
the action of the verb (as in ‘while yon slow oxen turn the furrowed plain’).” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, on-line
ed., s.v. “Prolepsis”).
6

Ibid., 2–20.
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in great detail, but his core assumption was constant throughout: the only choices are Christian
hope or hopelessness.
This assumption is closely related to those held by the Apostle Paul. He wrote to the
Ephesian converts: “Remember that you were [once] separated from Christ, alienated from the
commonwealth of Israel and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without
God in the world.”7 Although, Paul probably recognized the questionable status of his professed
hope, assuming he wrote this letter “in chains” (Eph. 6:20) and under Roman custody. As Luke
reported, Paul had previously declared, “I stand here on trial because of my hope in the promise
made by God to our fathers” (Acts 26:6).8 After explaining himself, Paul urged the visiting King
Agrippa to endorse his claim. Agrippa responded: “In a short time would you persuade me to be
a Christian?” (Acts 26:28). Paul boldly asserted that the true hope of all people, both Jew and
Gentile, commoner and king, is found only in this crucified and resurrected Jesus of Nazareth.
But the fact that he was rejected by many of his own people and was in the custody of the empire
raised questions about the reliability of his testimony. “Paul, you are out of your mind,” said
Governor Festus (Acts 26:24). Paul’s claim was not “certain” in the sense that it could be
demonstrated to any rational and good-willed person. It was contested and required vindication.
From the governor’s seat, Paul appeared to be the one without hope.
Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder criticized Christians in the West for forgetting
the contestable and controversial nature of their claims. Ever since Christianity became the
favorite of the established political and social system, the church began to assume that the
7

Eph. 2:12 (English Standard Version). Unless otherwise noted, all citations of the Bible are from the ESV.

8

Cf. Thomas Long, “The Life to Come: Preaching with Hope,” Concordia Journal 22 (October 1996): 352–
69. “Paul knew that the real nature of his offense … was not sedition or blasphemy or even militating against the
temple but preaching hope … It is on the matter of hope that the Gospel most confronts the powers that hold sway”
(357–58).
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Christian worldview was, more or less, common sense. Yoder’s initial point is not contentious:
there occurred in western history a “deep shift in the relation of church and world for which
Constantine soon became the symbol.”9 By the end of the fourth century, Paul’s first century
context was reversed. Not only was the emperor a Christian, but so was every citizen, nominally,
at least.
Yoder continued to argue that this reversal was not without cost. To some degree, the hope
that Paul so confidently confessed was compromised in the effort to cooperate with the dominant
powers. To hope for something better—a more noble Ruler and superior way of Life—could be
interpreted as a threat to the establishment. This was because the Christianized Roman Empire
began to be identified with the reign of God on earth. Constantinian Christians were encouraged
to spiritualize, privatize, and individualize their hope since their earthly, political future seemed
secure.10 But, Christians today no longer enjoy this favored status. Yoder’s concern was not
Christianity’s loss of cultural privilege. Instead, he was alarmed at how the dissolution of the
Constantinian synthesis had left modern Christians ill-equipped to stand on trial for the apostolic
hope they had received.
Christians in the first century were a minority in a hostile world. Their ethical views
were attuned to that context. In the twentieth century, Christians—especially if by
that noun we refer to people voluntarily committing themselves, at some cost, to
living in the light of their confession of Christ—are also a minority in a world
committed to other loyalties, yet we do not reason as the early Christians did.11
9

John Howard Yoder, “The Constantinian Sources of Western Social Ethics,” in The Priestly Kingdom: Social
Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 135.
10

Ibid., 136–41. Although, it is worth noting that while King Agrippa and Governor Festus may have thought
Paul was “out of his mind,” they agreed that he was no threat to the common good: “this man is doing nothing to
deserve death or imprisonment” (Acts 26:24–32).
11

Ibid., 135.
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Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon described the problem of sharing the context but
not the reasoning of the first-century church as the “post-Constantinian situation.”12 This
situation, they claimed, began for American Christians sometime between 1960 and 1980. And if
Constantine served as the symbol for the beginning of the synthesis, then the Greenville South
Carolina Fox Theater’s showing of a John Wayne film on a Sunday in 1963 signaled the close.
“On that night … the last pocket of resistance to secularity in the Western world … served notice
that it would no longer be a prop for the church.”13
I do not employ the analysis of Yoder, Hauerwas, and Willimon as an historical argument
to portray a homogenous state of affairs between AD 311 and 1963. They don’t either. Instead, I
use this analysis to describe a way of assuming the questions asked and answers offered by the
church are obvious to everyone. The “habit of Constantinian thinking is hard to break.”14 The
church has yet to adequately respond to her new context. Having grown accustomed to being the
only show in town, Christians have gotten out of the habit of confessing their hope among rivals.
We are now far removed from the setting that nurtured this assumption. To illustrate, I
offer a vignette from the life of Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). When he was
about 70 years old, Kant published his book Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. In a
letter to a friend, he explained that the purpose of the book was to answer but one question:
“What may I hope for?”15 In the book’s preface, Kant appealed for a dialogue between
philosophers and biblical theologians:
12

Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony (Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1989), 42.
13

Ibid., 15–16.

14

Ibid., 72.

15

Quoted in George di Giovanni, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational
Theory, trans. and ed. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 49.
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… whether the theologian agrees with the philosopher or believes himself obligated
to oppose him: let him just hear him out. For in this way alone can the theologian be
forearmed against all the difficulties that the philosopher may cause him.16
About five years earlier, in 1788, Kant’s government had updated the policy on the
regulation of materials printed in the Prussian realm. To ensure compliance, state-accredited
censors previewed proposed books. When Kant submitted a portion of the work mentioned
above, it was denied publication. However, Kant found a legal loop-hole and had the work
approved through an authorized university. About a year after it was published, he received a
letter from the king:
Our most high person has for a long time observed with great displeasure how you
misuse your philosophy to distort and disparage many of the cardinal and basic
teachings of the Holy Scriptures and of Christianity; how you have done this
particularly in your book Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason … We
demand that you give at once a most conscientious account of yourself, and expect
that in the future, to avoid our highest disfavor, you will be guilty of no such fault.17
Kant caught the king’s drift and agreed not to write any more on religion. He had desired a
dialogue to contest not only the dogmatic certainty of the orthodox theologians, but also that of
the deistic philosophers. But instead he was silenced by the highest authority in the land. Yet,
already in 1794, the Constantinian synthesis was in its twilight. A few years later, Kant reported
that the restrictions were lifted when the king died and “an enlightened statesman” was
appointed—one without “a one-sided predilection for a special branch of science (theology).”18
Now that Kant’s account of hope has been proleptically vindicated and our context today is
thoroughly post-Constantinian, what sort of “difficulties” might be made for the dogmatic
certainty of Christian hope?
16

Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. George di Giovanni, in ibid., 63.

17

This is Kant’s own report of the letter in The Conflict of the Faculties, trans. Mary Gregor and Robert
Anchor in ibid, 240.
18

Ibid., 243.
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Recall how Hans Schwarz asserted that Christian eschatology alone offers ultimate hope.
This was because, unlike a cyclic understanding of time, it presented a “meaningful goal” for the
future.19 Unlike modern, scientific hopes for progress, it provided “certainty.” As examples of a
cyclic view of time, Schwarz described the outlook of the Indian religions of Hinduism and
Buddhism along with the Greek philosophy of Plato. These, he said, are all “pessimistic” and
primarily look for an ultimate “release from this world.” For them, this world has “no actual
value.”20 In contrast, the Judeo-Christian worldview gave history “a goal worth living for”
because it looks to the “acting and active God who provided the beginning, who controls the
present, and who will provide the future.”21
But what difficulties are inherent in this argument? One is raised by the question, “On what
basis do you decide which outlook is meaningful and which is meaningless?” Seen from within
Buddhism, for example, “release from the world” is not pessimism. It is a goal that provides
direction and endurance through life’s darkest valleys:
Given that the ultimate goal is to bring rebirth to an end … some Western observers
have viewed early Buddhism as nihilistic, teaching a doctrine of self-annihilation. But
the texts are quite consistent in maintaining that what is annihilated is not one’s “self”
19

See also Christopher Hong, A History of the Future: A Study of the Four Major Eschatologies (Washington,
DC: University Press of America, 1981). Hong described the Judeo-Christian eschatological perspective in terms of
linear, non-terminal time. This view of time is said to be the distinctive feature of this outlook. The other three
eschatologies (historic-terminal, circular, and supernal) are pessimistic about future life in this world. Either they
regard “the present world … as the end in itself…. beyond which there is nothing to look for” (20), or they see it as
mere preparation for something greater. For the circular view, that greater something was “liberation of the hidden
real self.” For the supernal view, it was after-life “in the supernal realm.” (57). Both Hong and Schwarz drew on
Karl Löwith’s massively influential Meaning in History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). Löwith also
made the basic distinction between linear and non-linear time. In this dissertation, I will follow Susan Neiman by
maintaining that it is characterizations of evil, not of time, that are most crucial for making distinctions between rival
views. See Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002).
20

Schwarz, Eschatology, 8–9.

21

Ibid., 13.
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… [but] the elimination of desire and of ignorance about the nature of reality and, as
a result the suffering that is otherwise endemic to sentient life. 22
According to the Buddha, all his teaching “is impregnated with but one flavor…the taste of
deliverance.”23 In this regard, Buddhism provides a meaningful goal for the future.
Other questions that create difficulties for the assumed certainty of Christian hope are,
“Can you demonstrate that the Christian God will in fact bring history to a meaningful goal? And
how will this God justify the gratuitous suffering that took place along the way—especially when
it is confessed that he “controls” every present moment?” To voice this question, Kant put
forward not the arguments of a philosopher, but the laments of a theologian: Job. In Kant’s essay
from 1791, “On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy,” he noted how Job’s
acceptance of God’s sovereignty raised more questions than it answered.24 “God has worn me
out,” said Job,
He has torn me in his wrath and hated me … God gives me up to the ungodly and
casts me into the hands of the wicked … Why do the wicked live … and grow mighty
in power? Their offspring are established … Their houses are safe from fear … Why
are not times of judgment kept by the Almighty? (Job 16:7–11; 21:7–9; 24:1).
And what about the notion of “certainty” that was said to be present in “God-confidence,”
but lacking in humanistic “self-confidence”? On what basis should we place our confidence in
God? In light of Job’s complaints, God’s trustworthiness is precisely the matter in question.
When a Christian projects forward to the hope of the resurrection and to the new creation
inaugurated in the risen Christ, the problem of “certainty” is raised to an even higher pitch: why
are some promised an inheritance in this renewed world, while others remain under the threat of
22

Jan Nattier, “Buddhist Eschatology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, ed. Jerry Walls (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008), 161.
23

Cullavagga IX.i.4., quoted in ibid., 160.

24

Immanuel Kant, “On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy,” in Religion and Rational
Theology, 32–33.
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eternal loss? If the cause for exclusion is placed on humanity—even if the determining point is as
small as “making a decision for Christ”—God-confidence must give way to humanistic selfconfidence. What will prevent me from faltering on that decision and thereby excluding myself?
But, if the ultimate choice is God’s—if salvation is by grace alone—then doubt about his
trustworthiness remains. Why some and not others? Even if I did have the certainty that “God
knows his elect,” how can I entrust myself to a sovereign—to quote contemporary Kantian
philosopher, Susan Neiman—“who judges many of the forms of life He created to be sinful, then
tortures us eternally for our brief participation in them”? These “torments of the damned, even
without the doctrine of predestination, are the block on which reason stumbles.” And with
predestination (whether “double” or “single”), “we are led to a system choked with evil so
inscrutable that we turn to modern worldviews for relief.”25 On this scandal, we do not need a
philosopher to make problems for us. A theologian will do just fine. It “cannot be
comprehended,” Martin Luther lamented, “how this God can be merciful and just” when “he
saves so few and damns so many.”26
To be fair to Schwarz, he also admitted that answers to these questions are beyond our
comprehension: “We have to acknowledge the ultimate hiddenness of God, a God who is beyond
justice and love. At this point we can only hope without knowing for sure that his never-ending
grace will ultimately prevail.”27 Here he described “hope” as something we do when we do not
know “for sure.” That is, hope is operative when certainty is lacking. Or as Paul said, “Now hope
25

Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 19–20.

26
Martin Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” in Luther’s Works: Career of the Reformer, ed. Philip Watson
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 33: 62–63. One solution to this problem is the idea that God will ultimately
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that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see,
we wait for it with patience” (Rom. 8:24–25).
Schwarz did not explain how this insight coheres with his assumption that Christian hope is
unique because it alone gives meaningfulness and certainty. If the Christian God’s
trustworthiness is contested, then the goal set forward in his threats and promises is, for those
addressed by him, still uncertain. And with the goal in question, the meaning offered by the
Christian outlook is not a given, but a claim in need of validation. It makes more sense to say
that when Christians trust the God of Jesus, they anticipate that their God will demonstrate
himself to be trustworthy. Even Schwarz admitted, this “hoped-for and expected goal is not
unambiguously demonstrated in its anticipation.”28 Like Paul, Christians today bear witness to
contested claims that await final vindication. Christian hope—like all other forms of hope—does
not proceed from certainty but seeks certainty.29
This conclusion brings us back to the question of the dissertation: “How does Christian
hope compare with other forms of hope?” The assumption that Christian hope is beyond compare
because it alone provides meaningfulness and certainty has proven false. The problems inherent
in our post-Constantinian situation are aggravated when Christians continue to assume that ours
is the only show in town. There are powerful, coherent, and persuasive rivals. They complicate
the church’s efforts to offer a clear Christian witness while cooperating to seek a common good.
These rivals struggle to maintain their own constituency. They also compete for the confidence
and loyalty of Christian people. Not only are they still projected liturgically in theaters and
28
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stadiums every Sunday, they now can be streamed on-line, on-demand. This situation gives rise
to the need for a comparative eschatology.
Assumption 2: Christian Hope Is Essentially Like Others
If Christian hope is not beyond compare, then what about the other assumption? Is the
essence of Christian hope the same as human hope in general? Immanuel Kant thought so. He
offered his perspective in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Kant claimed that the
essence of all historical religions, including Christianity, is identical. If we compared Christian
hope with any other, we would find that they are essentially the same. When I described my
dissertation topic to a friend, he expressed his view that the Bible is a series of parables that
teach the same basic truths found in other religions. He and Kant are like-minded in this regard.
Kant asserted that he could
start from some alleged revelation or other … and see whether it does not lead back
to the same pure rational system of religion … If this is the case, then we shall be
able to say that between reason and Scripture there is, not only compatibility but also
unity, so that whoever follows the one (under the guidance of moral concepts) will
not fail to come across to the other as well.30
Kant described the Christian faith as containing both “natural religion” and “learned
religion.”31 Religion that needs to be learned cannot be deduced from human reason alone. It
must be supernaturally revealed (or else, invented). And if this revelation were not “publically
repeated,” it would “disappear from the world.” Therefore, learned, or word-of-mouth religion, is
“accidental”—contingent on particular historical events and actors. In contrast to this is “natural
religion, of which … every human being can be convinced through his reason.” One who holds
to natural religion does not necessarily deny the possibility of a true revelation from God (only a
30
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“naturalist” does that). He only denies that a revealed religion can be “universally
communicable.” Only natural religion holds a persuasive power that is effective on all people.
This is because any human being “could and ought to have arrived at it on their own through the
mere use of their reason.” Therefore, it is possible for a historical religion to contain both what is
natural and what is revealed. The former is essential, the latter is nonessential. Kant believes the
Christian faith is such a religion. This, of course, makes the particular man Jesus, who was called
Christ, dispensable. He is merely illustrative of a rational principle.
For Kant, the critical difference between natural and revealed religion—both of which
express human hope—is that “through the use of reason,” any human being “can be convinced”
of a hope that is “natural.” The same cannot be said for a hope that is revealed. However, a hope
that is revealed, that is, received word-of-mouth, need not be scrapped. It needs only to be
husked to harvest the essence.
Two questions must be asked of this argument: On what basis does Kant claim that his
account of hope can and ought to be accepted as true by any (reasonable) human being? And,
why go to the trouble of convincing everyone in the first place?
To answer the first, Kant argued his account of hope was “universally communicable”
because it was based on the ever-present, inner testimony of the moral law. The content of this
law is the categorical imperative, which is functionally equivalent to Jesus’ command: “whatever
you wish that others would do to you, do also to them” (Mat. 7:12—a kernel of natural religion
within the husk of the revealed). But what if this supposed inner testimony of the moral law is
merely an illusion? What if it is a contingent claim no more valid than a reported revelation from
God? It could be that we are motivated not by morals, but by mere survival: “Whatever we do is
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driven, one way or another, by the urge to perpetuate ourselves.”32 This is Susan Neiman’s
summary of “evolutionary psychology,” which works out the anthropological implications of
Charles Darwin’s conclusions in The Origin of Species.
If Kant once claimed that rationality is the essence of religious hope, what will stop
Darwinians from claiming that instinctive self-interest is the essence of so-called rational hope?
Neiman, a present-day proponent of Kantian hope, answered, “Nothing.” This is because both
explanations work, “and as Kant has taught us, nothing can decide between them.”33
Evolutionary psychologists assume that it is “natural” for people to be determined by an
unconscious urge to propagate the species. Kantians assume that altruistic behavior in
conformity to a higher moral law is “natural” (or at least proper) for humans. Appeals to
empirical data cannot decide between the two because “evidence” will be selected and
interpreted according to the interpreter’s assumptions. It “isn’t a matter of evidence,” said
Neiman, “for the evidence works both ways.”34 And so “What we are,” naturally, “is beside the
point, here … What most matters … is what we should be.”
Hence we ought to uphold whatever view of nature, and progress, best supports that.
What’s the minimum we need to believe about the goodness of the world in order to
contribute to making it better? … Reason tells you to work for ideals whether or not
you see your hopes take shape in reality. But if reality never answers, you will one
day resign … Should that threaten, reason permits not a leap, just a step toward a very
abstract faith … It’s a step, not a leap, because we know just enough: We are as good
as we need to be in order to act as if we are.35
32
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Kant’s hope is not blind optimism. He admitted that humanity has a “natural propensity to
evil.”36 He does not think progress is inevitable, but only possible. This does not prove, but
assumes humans, as free and rational beings, can rise above whatever hand nature has dealt. If
we refuse to believe we are determined by biology, then we can improve ourselves. And if we
can improve, then natural religion is our best bet for realizing this hope.37
To review, Kant’s answer to our first question regarding the basis for claiming the
universal communicability of his hope is this: morality-based hope can neither be proven nor
disproven. The hope that proceeds from morality is a demand of pure, practical reason. Everyone
in their right mind wants a world where people always treat others as they want to be treated.
This answer leads to the second question we put to Kant: why do you want to convince everyone
that this is the way things are?
Kant’s answer: for the sake of unity, justice, and peace. Historical religion inevitably leads
to “conflict.”38 Its demands are tribal and cannot create consensus. Kant’s story of revealed
religion is bleak: its “turmoil” has “wrecked the human race” and “still tears it apart.” In
Christianity’s early days, it rendered many people “useless to the world,” through asceticism.
Others it blinded with “superstition.” Then “the terrible voice of orthodoxy rose from the mouth
of self-appointed canonical expositors of scripture, and this voice split the Christian world into
bitter parties over opinions in matters of faith.” Controversies inevitably led to “foreign wars”
and “feuds among themselves.” Even now, at the dawn of the Enlightenment, this strife “is kept
from violent outbreaks only through political interest.”
36
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If this is the story of historical faith, then, clearly, our best hope is “the introduction of a
pure religious faith, over which there can be no dissension of opinions.”39 Such faith is “an
autonomous principle which is one and the same for all people.”40 The “moral predisposition in
us” is the “foundation and … interpreter of all religion.”41 Therefore “the sacred narrative” of an
historical religion like Christianity can be read as an extended parable, “a vivid representation”
of its true object: “virtue.” It should not be taught as a “profession of what God does or has done
for our salvation,” but only “in the interest of morality.”42 Biblical eschatology does not
anticipate historical events. Rather, it is
a beautiful ideal of the moral world-epoch brought about by the introduction of the
true universal religion and foreseen in faith in its completion—one which we do not
see directly in the manner of an empirical completion but have a glimpse of in the
continuous advance and approximation toward the highest possible good on earth.43
Neiman offered a summary of Kant’s hope: “progress is possible and it is up to individuals to
make it actual.”44 This is not a proof drawn from the world of experience. It is a demand that
reason places upon the world.
For Kant, religion is an account of human hope. It answers the question, “For what may I
hope?” Kant assumed that social and political unity is a project for which religion is a tool. And
if hope is instrumental for a strong polity, then competing accounts of hope will need to be
suppressed or subsumed in order to create unity. This insight was part of the rationale behind the
“Constantinian synthesis.” In one version of the “Constantinian synthesis,” the primary method
39
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was suppression of rivals. For example, affirmation of the Nicene Creed was required for
citizenship in the empire; state-accredited censors blocked publications that “distort and
disparage basic teachings of Christianity.” In other forms, what Yoder branded as “neoConstantinianism,”45 the primary method was to subsume rivals within a more-encompassing
account. For example, hopes based on historical contingencies (e.g., events surrounding a first
century Jew) can be reinterpreted and thereby co-opted to fit within an account that is supposedly
natural and necessary. Both methods are employed to overcome rivals in order to secure unity for
the body politic.
The two assumptions I’ve been addressing in this section are both at home within
Constantinian thinking. The statement: “Christian hope has no rivals” is better understood as a
social luxury often enjoyed by the Western Church between 311 and 1963. It is not, as Schwarz
assumed, a proposition established by Christianity’s superior ability to offer certainty and
meaning. Also, the statement “Christian hope is essentially like all others,” has not been
unquestionably demonstrated by empirical evidence or rational proof. Instead, it is a historically
contingent argument formulated in eighteenth-century Europe to build consensus and unite
competitors under a single vision. The first assumption is a luxury the post-Constantinian church
can no longer afford. The second assumption, while not a proven “fact,” did in fact produce an
argument that was successful enough to unseat traditional Western Christianity from its position
of social privilege and cultural authority. This reversal was effected by a gradual assimilation
into that beatific vision Kant anticipated: “the victory of the good principle over the evil
principle … in the founding of a Kingdom of God on earth.”46
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These factors contribute to making our situation today “post-Constantinian.” They make
the question “How does Christian hope compare to others?” an important question to ask, but a
difficult one to answer. The difficulty arises from how key features of Christian hope were
dissolved and recovered during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
As Kant predicted, the traditional Christian hope was dissolved during the “neoConstantinian” reversal that began after the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ so-called “wars
of religion.”47 Christian eschatology’s historical peculiarities—the return of Christ for final
judgment, the resurrection of the body, and the life of the age to come—were subsumed within
the optimism of the surrounding culture. For many, all that remained was the hope that things on
earth were gradually getting better and that people go to heaven when they die. This critique
about the dissolution of genuine Christian hope is common to current studies in Christian
eschatology.48
The second aspect of the challenge to answering our question is often overlooked. After the
peculiar features of Christian hope were rediscovered during the first half of the twentieth
century, Christian discussions about eschatology mostly remained an in-house affair. Christian
scholars have been less interested in comparing rival eschatologies and more interested in
deciding on what constituted their own. Even at the beginning of the twenty-first century, when
an accomplished scholar like Hans Schwarz examined other worldviews, he still assumed that
Christianity had no true rivals. The habit of Constantinian thinking is hard to break.
47
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Christian Eschatology in a Post-Constantinian Situation
In this dissertation, I will give an answer to how Christian eschatology compares to others.
Answering this question will require a conceptual approach that significantly differs from what
has become typical. I argue Christian eschatology should be understood as the resolution of
conflict within an all-encompassing plot. This approach will enable Christian eschatology to be
compared and contrasted with other eschatologies, whereas recent thinking in this field has been
conducted in a sphere secluded from rival accounts. In this next section, I will review how
present-day scholars have interpreted and contributed to the last 100 years of discussion on
Christian hope.49 I intend to describe a consensus and demonstrate a pattern. In terms of
answering my question, I will frame the consensus as a gain and the pattern as a deficiency. In
the second section, I will examine the work of several scholars who break with the pattern. Their
insights will serve as a bridge to the dissertation’s goal of overcoming the deficiency.
A Consensus and a Pattern
The consensus about Christian eschatology is that hope is integrated into all of the church’s
doctrine and practice. Furthermore, hope is held together in a tension, which has been
inaugurated in the person and work of Jesus and the giving of his Spirit.50 The pattern is that
current studies in Christian eschatology tend to linger on the internal use of attributes.
49
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Uses of Attributes. Here I am making the kind of distinction Immanuel Kant made in his
Introduction to Logic. Kant reflected on how we are able to derive a picture of an object in our
minds by conceptualizing its distinct features. Inversely, we can identify that object in front of us
by recognizing those features. Kant referred to this practice as the “internal use of attributes.”51
The difference between internal and external does not denote two sets of attributes. It is the same
plurality of features, but seen from a different perspective and identified for a different use.
According to Kant, a “clear idea” is also a distinct idea when we are conscious “of the plurality”
of attributes contained in it.52 He considered attributes from the perspective of a “twofold use,
either internal or external.” The “internal use consists in derivation,” which conceptualizes a
thing itself “by means of attributes as ground of cognition.” But, the external use “consists in
comparison, inasmuch as by means of attributes we can compare one thing to another,” that is,
whole to whole.53
The following is an illustration of this distinction. I will say some features of an object and
you picture it in your mind: “grip, barrel, trigger, clip, spring.” Let’s say you imagined a 9mm,
Beretta Pistol. If so, you would have done it by considering a plurality of features in order to
derive a clear conception of the particular object that consists of those features. That was an
internal use of attributes. However, when I said, “grip, barrel, trigger, clip, spring,” someone else
may have imagined a spray nozzle attachment for a power washer.
Let’s say we mentally place these two objects side by side to compare them. We have now
moved into the external use of attributes. As we compare one thing to another, whole to whole, it
is more helpful to ask, “What problem does this object aim to solve as compared to that one?
51
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What kind of solution does it offer in contrast to that one? It is less helpful to ask, “How are their
various parts compared?” When mentally comparing a pistol with a spray nozzle, it does not add
much conceptual clarity to list features. Features alone might even lead you to confuse the one
with the other. It would be more productive to compare the distinct problems each is offered to
address: “violent crime” vs. “dirty car”; or, the solutions that each anticipates: “deterrent-bylethal-force” vs. “grease-removal-by-pressurized-water-stream.” When making an external use of
attributes, we think of how each object fits into a different setting and sequence of events that
begins with a problem and moves toward a solution.
Internal Use of Attributes. This distinction is helpful for understanding the current story
told about Christian eschatology. Scholars today generally interpret the eschatological reflection
that began with Albert Schweitzer’s The Quest for the Historical Jesus and continued through
Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology of Hope as one-dimensional or unbalanced. In the last 40 years,
effort was devoted to two tasks: synthesizing the various dimensions of Christian eschatology in
order to derive a balanced whole; and analyzing the constituent parts in relation to the whole.
The purpose for studying these internal attributes was to bring a balanced hope to bear on the
life of the church. But as the church continues to find herself in a post-Constantinian situation,
more work of a different kind is required.
Current studies in Christian eschatology focus on internal rather than external features—
that is, on derivation, rather than comparison. Geoffrey Wainwright and Christoph Schwöbel are
two authors who follow this pattern. Although Schwöbel wrote his essay 30 years after
Wainwright, he essentially duplicates his method and conclusions. Schwöbel stated that the
twentieth century was the “century of eschatology.”54 He used this phrase in the title of his essay,
54
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which served as a conclusion to a selection of proceedings from the conference of the “Society
for the Study of Theology held at the University of Edinburgh in April, 1999.”55 Schwöbel’s
article is representative of many turn-of-the-century overviews of Christian eschatology.
The story Schwöbel and many others tell transpires in at least three stages: dissolution,
discovery, and derivation. The period of dissolution occurred mostly during the nineteenth
century. During this time, the distinctive Christian hope was gradually lost amid the optimistic
cultural outlook of enlightened Europeans and North Americans. This stage is significant
because “Twentieth-century reflection on eschatology cannot be understood without the
background of nineteenth-century views on the actualisation of the ultimate state of everything in
an open future which is to be filled with content through the means of human selfactualisation.”56
The beginning of the second stage commenced around 1906, when Albert Schweitzer first
published The Quest for the Historical Jesus.57 This period of (re)discovery continued through
the publication of Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology of Hope in 1967. Various dimensions of the
peculiar eschatology of the Christian faith were re-learned in this period but not yet fully
synthesized into a complete whole. Schweitzer reminded us of the future and transcendent
features of Jesus’ apocalyptic message of the imminent Kingdom of God. Karl Barth, Rudolph
Bultmann and C. H. Dodd, each in their particular ways, rediscovered the present-tense
dimension—whether in the eternity of God, the ultimacy of the human consciousness or in the
2000), 217.
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already-accomplished ministry and deeds of the historical Jesus. Next, Oscar Cullmann, A. T.
Robinson, and Walter Kreck synthesized the present and future aspects into a now-and-not-yet
tension in the person of Jesus and in the completed, yet still future action of the Christ-event.
Finally Teilhard de Chardin, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and Jürgen Moltmann balanced out an undue
focus on the vertical or supra-historical dimension with their horizontal or historical emphasis on
the transcendent power of the “future as the unifying perspective for all dimensions of reality.”58
After the widespread impact of Moltmann’s early writings, others began to work out the
implications of this “turn to the future.” Eschatology “after Moltmann”59 initiated the third
segment of the story: derivation. Schwöbel places himself in this stage by surveying the
discoveries and selecting “lessons” in the interest of deriving the whole by keeping these
antinomous attributes in a balanced-tension.60 The synthesis is said to hold together in “the
matrix of the Christ event.”61 Maintaining it will keep twenty-first century theologians from
coming out of balance by succumbing to the fallacy of “one-dimensional eschatologies.”62
Schwöbel’s essay follows a widespread pattern of critiquing the twentieth century’s
discoveries for how they singled out one feature of Christian hope, thus isolating it from the
whole. Scholars in the last 40 years have generally understood their task either as synthesis
(drawing these co-ordinate features into an aggregate) or as analysis (clarifying each constituent
58
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part in relation to the whole). Whether as a synthesis to re-construct a distinctly Christian hope or
as an analysis of what was constructed, the focus has been on internal attributes. These are
attributes employed for the derivation and maintenance of a complex whole.
Thirty years before Schwöbel authored his essay, Geoffrey Wainwright presented an
overview of the period of eschatological rediscovery from Schweitzer to Moltmann.63 The
likeness between Wainwright’s and Schwöbel’s interpretations is striking. If the division
between the periods of discovery and derivation is accepted as an apt description of twentiethcentury reflection on hope, then Wainwright’s Eucharist and Eschatology represents the turn to
derivation in its early stages. Various forms of his balanced-tension approach are assumed by
most scholars working to derive a distinct Christian eschatology.
In his preface Wainwright stated, “This book is one man’s answer to the call at Aarhus in
1964 by the World Council of Churches…for a study of the eucharist in the eschatological
perspective.”64 In part, the task was inspired by Western Theology’s “rediscovery of the
eschatological dimension of the gospel” in both “biblical and systematic theology.”65 He wanted
to bring this eschatological awareness to bear on the church’s understanding of the Eucharist. At
the same time, he believed that reflection on the Eucharist could help balance out eschatology.
temporalisation” and “moralisation” of eschatology), all of which he describes as “one-dimensional” in some way.
63
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Given the nature of his task, synthesizing and analyzing the findings during the period of
rediscovery was a necessary first step.
As Wainwright reviewed nearly all of the authors mentioned by Schwöbel (and many
others not mentioned), he developed some constitutive concepts. First, there was the idea of
“realization,” which addresses the question: to what extent did Jesus’ first advent, ministry,
death, and resurrection establish and fulfill the promised reign of God?66 One answer to this
question was offered by Oscar Cullmann, with the concept of Heilsgeschichte, or “salvation
history.”67 This approach described the Reign of God as arriving over the course of time and
moving progressively from a foundational, but contestable status (in Israel, Jesus and the
Church) to a manifestly incontestable status (in the second advent of Jesus).
Wainwright referred to Cullmann’s approach as the “horizontal” model because it presents
“a purely linear conception of the relation between present and future.” He claims that it needs to
be off-set by “the more ‘spatial’ image of an eternal heavenly kingdom on high,” that is, by the
“vertical” model. In the vertical model, the dialectic between divine eternity and creaturely
temporality is dominant. In the horizontal model, the dialectic is mainly between the “alreadynow” and the “not yet.” Both dimensions are needed: “The eternal invades time in a moment, the
supernatural breaks into the natural, the heavenly bursts upon the earthly scene” (vertical).
Nevertheless, “time goes on: the parousia of Christ is still awaited, we are not yet in our
resurrection bodies, the perfect community does not yet rejoice together in the unclouded vision
66
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of God” (horizontal).68 By way of conclusion, Wainwright advocated a dynamic tension between
the two: “‘Vertical’ categories … are a necessary aid to expressing the eschatological tension,
but they must not be allowed to displace the ‘horizontal’ from the picture.”69
Wainwright’s work to derive a well-balanced eschatology has become paradigmatic.
Analysis of the constituent parts gleaned from the period of rediscovery aimed to recognize the
synthesized whole and apply it to all facets of life. Gerhard Sauter’s research in What Dare We
Hope? reproduced the approach of both Wainwright and Schwöbel, but with increased intensity.
Sauter discussed three “storms” during the twentieth century rediscovery. The first was
konsquente (or consistent) Eschatologie, which Schweitzer attributed to the immediate
apocalyptic (and from Schweitzer’s perspective, failed) expectation of the historical Jesus. The
second began after the First World War with Barth and Bultmann’s radical eschatology, which
had no expectation for the future, but looked only to the eternal present. The third began after
World War II, with Moltmann and Pannenberg’s theology of history, which appealed to the
meaning of Jesus’ resurrection as the key for reinterpreting history along the lines of proleptic
hope.70 A central contention of konsequent Eschatologie is that hope manifests itself by ethical
action within history.71 Central for the radical type is that Christian hope comes from beyond
history—from the eternal God, who is qualitatively (vertically) distant and close to all times.72
And for eschatology as theology-of-history, it is that Christian hope for history means Christians
can identify God’s work of renewal within history (horizontally). Looking to the future of the
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risen Christ, they can help it along the way.73 Faced with irreconcilable differences between these
accounts of Christian hope, Sauter resolved to keep them in tension by placing them in dialogue.
This is because “they do not rule each other out. Each has a corrective effect on the others.”74
Hans Schwarz’s Eschatology also reproduces the derivation-through-balanced-tension
approach, with no less rigor than Sauter. Accounting for all of the contentions in Sauter’s three
“storms,” Schwarz first assumes the connection between hope and ethical action; second, he
maintains that Christian hope springs from the eternal God; and third, that Christians have been
freed to participate in God’s work within history.75 As he surveys a dozen approaches to
eschatology, he strives to be “neither exclusively individualistic nor exclusively otherworldly in
orientation.” This is achieved only “in continuous tension between concern for the individual and
the community … between this world and the world to come.”76
The pattern in Schwöbel, Wainwright, Sauter, and Schwarz can be observed throughout the
various quarters of Christian theology. Here are six examples: (1) From a German-speaking
Roman Catholic perspective in 1977, (pope-emeritus) Joseph Ratzinger stated that “the task of
contemporary eschatology” is “to marry perspectives, so that the person and the community,
present and future, are seen in their unity.”77 This means that “we need to integrate the opposing
elements in the light of the Christian center, to strike a fair balance.”78 (2) From a Black
American perspective in 1982, Gayraud Wilmore likewise advocated a “balancing viewpoint,”
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which brings these contrasting perspectives “together in a mutually corrective way.”79 Then he
offered “the central paradox of black eschatology” as instructive for maintaining this view: “The
authentic faith of the black folk community brought together this world and the next in a creative
tension … the ecstasy of a vision of paradise at one moment, and in the next it drove believers
into the streets to give that vision material actuality.”80 (3) From a French-speaking Eastern
Orthodox perspective in 1986, Boris Bobrinskoy spoke of an “inaugurated” eschatological
perspective in the liturgy and the Eucharist, citing Alexander Schmemann and John Zizioulas to
his point, saying, “The eucharistic liturgy actualizes this eschatological presence of Christ.”
Bobrinskoy viewed the eschaton in both its “qualitative as well as its linear content.”81 These
mirror Wainwright’s vertical and horizontal models. These two dimensions of the eschaton are
held in tension in the Church “through the blessed and painful alternations of [Christ’s] absence,
His expectation, His coming, His presence in the Eucharist.”82 Thus, the ancient Eucharistic
prayer Maranatha (1 Cor. 16:22) is simultaneously “expectation,” “announcement,” and
“realization.”83 (4) From a Hispanic perspective in 1996, Justo González echoed Bobrinskoy’s
eschatological insights on Christian worship: “Latino worship is a fiesta. It is a celebration of the
mighty deeds of God … Our people … celebrate God’s future in the midst of an oppressive and
alienating present.”84 (5) From a Confessional Lutheran perspective in 1993, John Stephenson
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argued that the “Book of Concord does justice to the themes of both inaugurated and realized
eschatology.”85 (6) From a Reformed-Evangelical perspective in 2004, Russell Moore examined
the “new eschatological consensus … reflected in systematic projects that span the ideological
fissures of contemporary evangelical theology.” This comes from the general agreement on an
“inaugurated eschatology” grounded in an “already/not yet” view of the reign of Christ.86
Examples of this “eschatological consensus” mentioned by Moore could be cited ad
nauseam.87 This holds not only for systematic theology, but is also a theme in New Testament
exegetical studies.88 After the “century of eschatology,” just about everything that could be said
has been said. For eschatology “after Moltmann,” during the period of derivation, the goal was
to keep everything in balance—making room for the vertical dimension without crowding out
the horizontal; embracing a realized hope, but not over-realized, with both continuity and
discontinuity; neither succumbing to premillennial despair nor postmillennial presumption;
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keeping one eye on personal implications and the other on ecological and cosmic implications;
emphasizing God’s action as well as human participation. And the list goes on.
The strength of the balanced-tension approach is its comprehensive coverage. It is wellsuited for appreciating the plurality within Christian hope and maintaining this complex whole.
But, in terms of answering my question (What is distinct about Christian hope as compared to
others?), it is deficient. Listing features does not help compare and contrast Christian hope with
its rivals. A different approach—one that focuses on the external use of attributes—is needed.
Consensus. To construct this approach, I will draw on a consensus about two critical
internal attributes highlighted from the period of derivation. Both are mentioned by Richard
Bauckham in his interpretation of Moltmann’s eschatology.89 More recently, Bauckham restated
these in the conclusion to the Oxford Handbook of Eschatology. Any “Christian eschatology in
the twenty-first century that aims at faithfulness to the theological heart of the gospel … is likely
to show these characteristics.”90 They are “Christological” and “integrative” eschatology. The
first has to do with the “Christological foundation and criterion of Christian hope,” which is
“contested by few who write intentionally Christian eschatology.”91 The second has to do with
the “holistic vision of redemption and transfiguration for the whole of God’s creation.”92 This
integration of creation, Christology, and final redemption is what makes the Christian account of
the world “a comprehensive story, encompassing all other stories, with an ending that will be the
common ending of all stories.”93 In the sense of being integrative, eschatology is no longer seen
89
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as the loosely-attached appendix of Christian doctrine, but as its medium or character.94 This
aspect of the consensus can be detected by taking note of how often contemporary scholars in all
fields use the adjective “eschatological” to describe Christian homiletics,95 sacraments,96 ethics,97
politics,98 and nearly everything else.99
A Bridge to Overcome the Deficiency
I offered the preceding discussion on the state of Christian eschatology to demonstrate a
consensus and illustrate a pattern. By claiming that recent scholarship has settled into a pattern of
applying the internal use of attributes, I am not claiming that all scholars limit their inquiries in
this way. In fact, the external use of attributes in the study of Christian hope is a minor theme
along with the major emphasis of deriving and maintaining the balanced whole.100 This minor
theme would be both the logical and timely candidate for initiating the next stage in the story of
94
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Christian eschatology since the nineteenth century: dissolution, discovery, derivation,
comparison.
The dissolution of Christian hope within the currents of nineteenth century optimism can
be understood in relation to the larger flow of the “Constantinian synthesis.” When it ran dry,
Christians labored to re-conceptualize the distinctive features of biblical hope. This was and
remains an important task. But now this re-conceptualized hope must find its way amid a
plurality of other views. An internal focus, which simply poses Christian questions and offers
Christian answers, will not help the church respond to the “post-Constantinian situation.” An
external perspective, which places one hope-generating account alongside another, is more likely
to yield the conceptual resources needed for our present context. The work of several scholars
has touched on the task of comparative eschatology. Their insights will form a bridge to
overcome the deficiency.
Toward an External Use. There is a common but too often passing reference to the
external use of attributes in discussions of Christian eschatology. The hope of Christianity is
regularly contrasted against the hope of “escape” and the hope of “progress.”101 Another common
reference, which we noted in Schwarz’s account, is the “cyclical” versus “linear” view of time
and the worldviews with which they coordinate.102 These comparisons are frequently made, but
not explored in depth. At times they simply serve as another segue into more statements about
the need to maintain an internal tension. And so it is said that the idea of escape contains too
much “vertical dimension” and “discontinuity.” Or, that the idea of progress is “over-realized”
101
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eschatology and doesn’t leave enough room for the “transcendent” dimension.103 Less often are
these ideas perceived as representing incommensurate, conflicting accounts of the world.
Eschatological Rationalities. As mentioned in the prior section, Gerhard Sauter was a
major figure during the period of derivation after Moltmann’s Theology of Hope. His book What
Dare We Hope? is a well-rounded synthesis of the “three waves” of (re)discovery during the
outset of the twentieth century. It is an in-depth analysis of the plurality of features found in
Christian hope. While this work mainly employs internal attributes, his book Eschatological
Rationality, especially the last chapter, makes a nod toward the external use of those attributes.
Reflecting the consensus on “integrative eschatology,” Sauter links hope with the
theological enterprise as a whole. Eschatology is discourse about the final future God has
decided to give in Christ. It “provides an exemplary opportunity for extracting basic
determinations of what theology is from the inner structure of theological statements.”104 One
such vital statement is from 2 Corinthians 1:20: “For all the promises of God find their Yes in
[Jesus]. That is why it is through him that we utter our Amen to God for his glory.” Sauter
believes that this is “a key proposition … in Christian theology.” It is so because it states that all
faithful orientation toward God is directed toward his promises fulfilled in Jesus. The church
responds, “Amen”—“this is the way it is and no other.” 105 The concept “promise” is not merely
God’s future-oriented word, but God’s “Christ-oriented word.” And “promise” becomes “the
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basic category of faith.”106 The hope of faith is oriented towards God’s past, present, and future
action in Jesus. Therefore, while Christian theology does indeed have eschatology as but one of
its many loci, even more so, the basic rhythm of all Christian prayer and belief (lex orandi – lex
credendi)107 is itself eschatological:
To exist theologically is to be a person under the promise and in expectation of new
life. Under this promise one is called, one is inserted into the situation before God
that is opened up by God’s condemning and saving judgment. One is inserted into the
hidden history of Jesus Christ in the world. That is the living space in which our
being human is “located” and “takes place.” “For you died, and your life is hidden
with Christ in God” (Colossians 3:3).108
This new eschatological situation before God means that Christians think and speak with a
“special semantic incommensurability (Gebrochenheit) peculiar to [their] hope.” Therefore
“translation” of Christian “promissory concepts” (e.g., justice, peace, life) will not seek to make
Christian thought and speech “plausible” to other culturally developed forms of thought and
speech.109 In his conclusion, Sauter briefly gestured toward the external use of this plurality of
features. Because of its “semantic incommensurability,” Christian theology “has stood from the
beginning in the middle of other religions, other ways of believing, other hopes. Thus it cannot
be understood as one … stage of development in the history of religion, or as an … optimal …
realization of the possibilities of ‘religion’ in general.” All of this is because of the “contingency
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of God’s act in Jesus Christ.”110 Once more we see the consensus about Christian hope’s unique,
internal attributes: it is integrated and Christological. God’s plan for creation is centered on this
first century Jew. He is indispensable. These same attributes have external implications. They
constitute a unique and holistic way of being human—a peculiar, “eschatological rationality”
that is fundamentally incommensurate with other rationalities.
Where Sauter glanced, Moltmann had turned and explored. In his ground-breaking
Theology of Hope, I find a clear departure from the patterned use of internal attributes in
Christian eschatology. Unfortunately, Moltmann is too quickly dismissed by recent synthesizing
scholarship as one-dimensional. His early work is placed in its 1960s historical context with the
challenge posed by neo-Marxism in post-war Europe. His theology is said to diminish the
transcendent or vertical dimension in service to what is immanent, horizontal, and historical.111
While this may be true to some degree, his work can also serve as a good example of the external
use of attributes to compare Christian hope with other forms of hope.
Incompatible Modes of Experience. In Theology of Hope, Moltmann contrasts between
the “god” of the “eternal present” and the “God of promise.”112 These claimants for deity draw
their followers into a “process of struggle between two mutually incompatible forms of faith.”113
The first offers security through contact with the transcendent ground of reality-as-is. It is
derived “entirely” from the “thought forms of the Greek mind” and is manifested in the
“transcendental eschatology” of Kant, Barth, and Bultmann. This thinking, according to
Moltmann, is not a balancing agent on behalf of the vertical realm. Rather, it is at total odds with
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the “language of promise.”114 The God of promise is the God of exodus and resurrection, who
“announces the coming of a not yet existing reality” from the future of the crucified and risen
Jesus of Nazareth.115
For Moltmann, transcendental eschatology, which offers no “goal of history,” but only the
“goal of the individual human being,” is not merely a one-sided, incomplete exposition of
Christian hope. Instead, it is the “self-surrender of the faith.”116 The same can be said for the
“scientific and technological millenarianism” of the “modern age (Neuzeit),” which “seeks the
end of history in history.” Theses rivals generate a distinct kind of hope that “could either regard
this world as itself the fulfillment, or else in gnostic fashion transcend [it] into the supra-worldly
realm.”117 This is because “world-picture and faith are inseparable”—the “very mode of our
experience of the world is not adiaphorous.”118
Even if some of Moltmann’s arguments are questioned by scholars who have interpreted
his work, his external use of the distinctive features of Christian hope is instructive for the task of
comparative eschatology. His contrast between Greek or gnostic “escapist” eschatology and
Modernity’s “progressive” eschatology—each differentiated from Christian eschatology—helps
us conceptualize a line between derivation and comparison. At some point, we can no longer
hold antinomous attributes in tension. Recognizing this line, it makes little sense to take the
“vertical” and “discontinuity” elements in the hope for escape along with the “horizontal” and
“continuity” elements in hope for progress and then synthesize them into an amalgam called
“Christian hope.” Moltmann’s difference in Theology of Hope is evident in the distinction
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between the internal and external use of attributes—that is, in the difference between deriving
the whole versus comparing one whole to another.
The Provisional Nature of Truth. Pannenberg is another important exception to the
pattern. As seen in Schwöbel’s essay, Moltmann and Pannenberg are often grouped together
under the category of “theology of history” or future-directed eschatology.119 Pannenberg’s use of
eschatology’s external attributes will complete the bridge from the current focus on deriving a
balanced, internal tension to a comparison of rival eschatologies. When Moltmann compared
attributes of rival eschatologies in Theology of Hope, he contrasted finding hope in the structures,
resources, and powers already discernibly present in reality (a feature common to both escapist
and progressive hopes) against finding hope in the promise of the still-outstanding future of the
crucified and risen Jesus (the distinctive feature of Christian hope, according to Moltmann).
Pannenberg, in his Systematic Theology, likewise contrasted the Christian God of promise
against the Greek notion of an “eternal present behind the flux of time.” The latter seeks the
“true” behind or above the transience of historical life. The former waits for it in spite of the
contingency of time. Both are peculiar forms of hopeful faith.120
Drawing on Luther’s notion as to how “faith in the heart” makes either God or an idol,
Pannenberg described the necessity of faith as the “ec-centric form of human life.” This means
that we all must come to “rest on something outside ourselves. We have no choice. We can only
choose on what to rest.”121 And, because all people experience reality as a ceaseless flow of
118
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events, we continually live in “anticipation of the totality of the truth which will be complete
only in the future.”122 Even those who seek an eternal present beyond time must wait for the truth
of this orientation to be validated in the course of time. Every form of ec-centric resting is always
historical and provisional. History becomes the field of religious rivalry as “the gods of the
religions must show in our experience … that they are the powers which they claim to be.”123
According to Pannenberg, all truth claims are eschatological, not just Christianity’s.124 This
is the case in the sense that every account of the world is subject to a “not yet.” An over-arching
eschatological proviso gives rise to the preliminary and provisional character of all truth.125 What
Christian hope has in common with other forms of hope is that it must await either its ultimate
disappointment or vindication.126 This “Not Yet … implies a brokenness of the knowledge of
revelation in the context of ongoing debatability and the power of doubt that constantly assails
believers.”127 The difference of Christian hope is that it is based on the expectation that “the God
of the Bible will prove himself to be the one God of all people.” This is identical to the
confession that he “has already shown himself to be this one God in Jesus Christ.”128
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Pannenberg’s external use of attributes reaches further than Sauter’s and Moltmann’s. His work
exemplifies how Christian hope can be compared and contrasted with others.
A Case for Comparative Eschatology
Why compare Christian hope with others? Moltmann’s comment that “world-picture and
faith are inseparable” helps say why. Our era is marked by a “conflict of interpretations” about
the way things go in the world.129 To accept a particular interpretation, to allow this account to
become a source of meaning and hope, is “to have a god.” This is how Luther explained faith in
The Large Catechism.130 Or, as Moltmann said, the “very mode of our experience of the world” is
not a matter indifferent to the Christian faith.
To compare eschatologies is to get at the heart of what differentiates rival accounts. Our
ability to grasp the coherence and meaning offered in them is obscured by the Constantinian
kinds of assumptions I discussed in the first part of this chapter. Pannenberg’s point about the
provisional nature of all truth addresses the assumption that the Christian hope is unrivaled. All
claims about what is true in the present have implications for what can be said about the future.
Regardless of whether someone calls these claims “optimistic” or “pessimistic,” they are
eschatological because they make truth claims that presently reside within conflict of
interpretations and await either vindication or disappointment.
be finally made with the fulfillment of the kingdom of God in God’s creation. It is provisionally made in human
hearts by the convicting ministry of the Spirit of God” (ibid., 56).
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Oswald Bayer, “Theology in the Conflict of Interpretations—Before the Text,” Modern Theology 16:4
(October, 2000), 495, “Whoever confronts the actual conflicts that exist cannot fail to realize that there are only
divided and opposing theories, no universal criteria and no ultimate philosophical foundation.”
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“Therefore, to have a god is nothing else than to trust and believe in that one with your whole heart … To
cling to him with your heart is nothing else to entrust yourself to him” (The Book of Concord: The Confessions of
the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 386,
388.
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In this sense, Christian hope is not unique. It is like all others. However, to admit a
common provisional status is not the same as assuming a common, essential content or
character. Sauter’s concept of “eschatological rationality” makes this point against the second
assumption. It is not that Christian hope contains rational elements common to all and irrational
elements unique to its tradition. It is not that the Enlightenment sorted out the truly rational
hopes from the irrational, arbitrary ones. Rather, Christianity has its own sort of rationality, just
as Kant had his peculiar eschatological rationality. “It is not ‘the’ pure reason that comes to an
understanding of itself in the Critique of Pure Reason, but Immanuel Kant from Königsberg who
writes and evaluates.”131
Constantinian thinking keeps us from seeing these matters clearly. It can lead Christians to
presume theirs is the only show in town, while at the same time leaving them ignorant of how
rival accounts lay claim to their loyalty. The internal/external attributes distinction was a rather
technical way of distinguishing between Constantinian conceptions and the conceptual demands
of a post-Constantinian situation. One does not respond properly to these demands by an
exclusive use of attributes internal to Christianity. This is because it gives the impression that a
“balanced tension” (e.g., now/not yet) is what distinguishes Christian hope. When this
impression becomes a default position, it will always yield the same formal diagnosis of
opposing eschatologies: they are “unbalanced.”
Comparative eschatology can illuminate the distinctive, external attributes of these other
accounts of hope. It will neither identify them as Christian heresies to be corrected, nor as
complementary dimensions to be synthesized. Instead, it will present them as coherent,
131
Oswald Bayer, A Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as a Radical Enlighteneer, trans. Roy
Harrisville and Mark Mattes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012). This is Bayer’s interpretation of Hamann’s response
to Kant’s work. Hamann was a friend and critic of Kant. See also, Ronald Smith, J. G. Hamann: 1730–1788: A
Study in Christian Existence with Selections from His Writings (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960).
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competing accounts. Doing so, it enters into a critical and respectful dialogue with those who
offer them. This will introduce new challenges for eschatologies constructed primarily to answer
Christian questions. At the same time, the dialogue can equip Christians to bear witness to Christ
when called to stand on trial for their hope.
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CHAPTER TWO
ESCHATOLOGY AND STORY
In the first chapter I made a case for Christians to engage in comparative eschatology. The
Constantinian synthesis has dissolved. Christians daily encounter other forms of hope—whether
that of traditional religions, secular philosophies, or the amalgam that is Western spirituality.
Lingering Constantinian assumptions can lead Christians to dismiss other hopes outright (our
hope is beyond compare). Or they might allow for Christian hope to be dissolved into a general
optimism (our hope is like any other). Against the first assumption, I argued that Christian hope
is not beyond compare, because it shares a common provisional status. Like others, its claims are
not certain, but await vindication. Against the second, I framed Kant’s account of a common
rational core of hope as part of a “neo-Constantinian” strategy aimed to achieve social unity and
political peace without biblical, creedal, and confessional Christianity. This project was not
based on case-closed “facts” about human nature. But it was a persuasive argument, which
contributed to the dissolution of a distinctly Christian hope during the nineteenth century. Studies
in the field of Christian eschatology have since focused on the rediscovery and derivation of this
peculiar Christian hope. However, more needs to be said about how it compares and contrasts
with others. Kant stated that the whole of Religion is concerned with answering the question,
“What may I hope?”1 My approach to eschatology assumes post-Constantinian Christians must
also ask another question “How does our hope compare with others?”
1
Immanuel Kant, Logik – ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen. (Königsberg, 1800), Einleitung, III.
http://www.textlog.de/kant-logik-philosophie-0.html (accessed March 8, 2013), “Was darf ich hoffen?”
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In this chapter, I argue that comparing hopes entails comparing stories. Not just any stories,
but the stories that shape human lives. I assume that every person, in as much as he or she lives
in a society and wants to make some sense of the world, inhabits a life-organizing story. People
grow to interpret their lives in terms of what they come to find ultimately desirable and
undesirable. They evaluate experiences by how these come into conflict or approach harmony
with their desires. A life-organizing story offers a plotline projected toward a future in which
resolution is expected. Hope for resolution of conflict in a life story is the kind of hope I intend
to analyze. I will do so by comparing the Christian story with other stories of the world. To
compare Christian eschatology with other eschatologies is to compare how the conflict resolves
within a given life-organizing story.2 Narratively defined, eschatology is discourse on how the
conflict resolves within an all-encompassing plot. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to
present and defend “story” as a notion for comparing eschatologies. Along the way, I take up the
notion of a “speech act” both to characterize the storied hope of Christians and to distinguish
between rival stories.
In my defense of “story” as means to compare eschatological hopes, I address two
objections, one from within the Christian tradition and one from without. The first objection is
voiced by German-born, New Testament scholar and historian, Rudolph Bultmann (1884–
1976). Bultmann would argue that my approach to comparing Christian eschatology with others
is mistaken. From his perspective, the essence of Christianity does not depend on any particular
story or worldview. Therefore, the key to understanding the Christian hope is not the Christian
2

This thesis could be located within “comparative theology.” See Francis Clooney, “Comparative Theology,”
in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 654, who defined it as the “practice of rethinking aspects of one’s own faith
tradition through the study of aspects of another faith tradition.” See also, Terrence Tilley, Story Theology
(Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 1985), xix, who argued for story as a mode of comparison: “By comparing and
contrasting the stories that shape the lives of Christians with those that shape the lives of others in our culture,
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story as narrated in the Bible. The key is present-moment proclamation in the name of Christ.
The story must be “demythologized” for the sake of meaningful proclamation today.
My method for responding to Bultmann will be to show that his notion of proclamation still
assumes some life-organizing story. It’s just not the plotline given by the narratives of the New
Testament. This response follows from my basic assumption that where human hope is
concerned, story is inescapable. I will conclude that Bultmann takes up a different hope by
inhabiting a different story. Since I am following my assumption to its conclusion, this will not
be a direct argument against Bultmann. But, by engaging the issues that occupy him as a
theologian, I intend to show that his concern for proclamation can be met from within the
Christian story, thus making his demythologizing program unnecessary.
After addressing Bultmann’s objection, I consider another attempt to transcend stories.
This objection to my approach comes from the Enlightenment tradition. Like the Christian one,
this tradition is diverse and contains conflicting schools of thought. This will become clear as the
dissertation progresses. For now, I simplistically account for the tradition as a whole by the way
it tried to transcend the stories and myths of pre-modern peoples. My response to this tradition
will parallel my response to Bultmann. The Enlightenment did indeed transcend the stories of
pre-modern peoples. But, it did so by telling another story—one that was thought to be better
because it discarded “self-imposed immaturity”3 in favor of real hope.
I reframe Bultmann and the Enlightenment in terms of the stories they tell in order to show
how they offer hope to those who inhabit them. These hopes are different from Christian hope
not because they are more or less meaningful, factual, or certain. They are different because they
[Christian] distinctiveness can be shown.”
3

Immanuel Kant, “Was ist Aufklärung?” in Sämmtliche Werke, vol. 7, ed. Friedrich Schubert (Leipzig: 1838),
145, “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit.”
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arise out of rival life-organizing stories. They can be compared to the Christian hope, because it
too is a storied hope. It arises from the resolution anticipated by the Christian story.
Life-and-World-Organizing Stories
What, if anything, does Christian hope have in common with other forms of hope? I will
employ the notion of a life-organizing story4 to answer this question. Story is an appropriate
concept not only for understanding the external character of Christian hope, but also for
comparing it with the eschatological hope of those who are not Christian. Inasmuch as people
inhabit a life-organizing story, they take up an eschatological hope. Therefore, to compare the
Christian hope with others is at the same time to compare the story of Jesus-in-Israel-and-theChurch5 with other stories of the world.
The Narrative Character of Christian Faith
Recall the consensus about the internal features of Christian eschatology. It was said to be
both “Christological” and “integrative.” This means that the Christian convictions about the
sequence of events from creation to the eschaton are integrated together in the person of Jesus.
As Richard Bauckham said, the Christian account is treated as “a comprehensive story,
encompassing all other stories.” Its anticipated ending is held to “be the common ending of all
stories.”6 This observation is also at home in what has come to be called “narrative theology.”
4

I follow Richard Hays’s distinction between “story” and “narrative” in The Faith of Jesus Christ: The
Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). The noun “Narrative” will
be used for an actual narration, as in the narrative of Matthew’s Gospel. “Story” will be used in a general sense as
“the ordered series of events which forms the basis for various narrations.” However, since the adjective form
“storied” is somewhat unconventional, I will also use “narrative” as an adjective to characterize an account generally
as an ordered sequence of events. As Hays said, “Paul’s gospel is a story, and it has a narrative structure, but it is not
a narrative except when it is actually narrated, as in Phil 2:6–11.” (18–19).
5

I have adapted this summary of the Christian gospel from Robert Jenson, Story and Promise: A Brief
Theology of the Gospel about Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 3–12.
6

Richard Bauckham, “Conclusion: Emerging Issues in Eschatology in the Twenty-First Century,” The Oxford
Handbook of Eschatology, ed. Jerry Walls (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 679.
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Robert Robinson called it “a broad and disparate movement” marked by a “unifying appreciation
for the ability of narrative to present the relationship between God and man” in a “fitting” way.7
What is meant by “narrative” is a set of events organized along a temporal frame and a spatial
setting. These events are linked together in a “plot.” A narrative moves forward with the
intertwining of plot and character so that action reveals character and character advances plot.
Characters and plot move forward until the conflict is resolved. It is this resolution of conflict
that finally makes the story.8
In addition to the narrative features of setting, character, and plot, Gabriel Fackre noted the
role of author or narrator. It is the “narrator,” who “self-consciously” controls the vision “in
which the flow of events becomes a plot, and participants become characters in a storyline made
by conflict and moving toward resolution.” In the Christian account of the world, the author, and
narrator, who “gives this overall signification is, finally God.”9 Fackre also observed that “the
hope theologies of Moltmann and Schillebeeckx” are “variations on the narrative theme of
biblical faith.”10 And so another way to perceive the twentieth century’s insights on Christian
hope is to see them within a broader consensus about the narrative character of the Christian
faith.11 Christian doctrine contains the locus eschatology and is itself eschatological because
7

Robert Robinson, “Narrative Theology,” The Encyclopedia of Christianity, vol. 3, ed. Erwin Fahlbusch et al.
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 689–93.
8

Cf. James McClendon, Ethics, vol. 1 of Systematic Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986), 328–56,
“Why Narrative Ethics?”
9

Gabriel Fackre, The Christian Story: A Narrative Interpretation of Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1984), 5. Surprisingly, many accounts of narrative theology do not deal with the notion of “God as
Author.” For example, in The Encyclopedia of Christianity entry cited above, Robinson observed that the term
narrative theology could broadly be assigned to any story that included God as a character (690). But he does not
mention the Christian or simply monotheistic belief that God is the “Author of all things.” This conviction will be
central to how the dissertation will describe the problem of evil especially in light of God’s status as Author.
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Fackre, The Christian Story, 6.
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See David Ford, “System, Story, Performance: A Proposal about the Role of Narrative in Christian
Systematic Theology,” in Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory
Jones (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 191–215. Ford argued that the proper understanding of Christianity’s
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Christians tell a story which anticipates a resolution. They claim it as the story. Its world-plot is
moving toward an eschaton that has proleptically occurred in the crucified and risen Jesus.12
The Narrative Quality of Experience
The influence of the concept of “story” has reached beyond the bounds of Christianity. A
cross-disciplinary consensus on the “narrative quality of experience”13 in general recommends
story as a suitable mode of comparison between Christian hope and other forms of hope. In 1981,
Alasdair MacIntyre, in his well-known book After Virtue, argued philosophically for a narrative
understanding of human life in general. A “central thesis” of his book is that man—“in his
actions and practice, as well as in his fictions”— is “essentially a story-telling animal.”
MacIntyre intended this as a descriptive observation, not as a metaphysical statement about the
essence of humanity. Man “is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories
that aspire to truth.”14
MacIntyre introduced three important ideas to argue his point. He claimed that if someone
wants to understand the complexity of human behavior, one must consider intelligibility,
accountability, and setting. The three ideas are interrelated. The first concerns the most basic
conception of human action: “The concept of an intelligible action is a more fundamental
concept than that of an action as such. Unintelligible actions are failed candidates for the status
doctrinal loci (commonplaces) is to regard them as elements or turning points within the Christian story.
12

See Robert Jenson, Story and Promise, 110–13, who argued that the “gospel” is a story, the narrative content
of which functions as the unconditional promise that the self-giving love of the crucified and risen Jesus will finally
triumph. Gospel-eschatology is the vision that expects and awaits the triumph of Jesus’ self-giving way of life. The
paradigm of this triumph is Jesus’ own death and resurrection. Jenson assumes (with his teacher Karl Barth) that this
vision is contrary to all forms of “usual” or “normal religion.”
13

Stephen Crites, “The Narrative Quality of Experience,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 39
(1971), 291–311. Also published in Hauerwas and Jones, eds., Why Narrative? 65–88.
14
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2007), 216. See also John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Cambridge, MA:
Basil Blackwell, 1991), 259, who argued that “human interaction in all its variety can only be narrated and not
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of intelligible action.” Part of what is generally understood about what it means to be human is
that humans act with intentions (both primary and secondary; either fulfilled or frustrated); that
they act in a sequence and from a social role. Awareness of intent, timing, and setting is what
makes action intelligible as human action. Human beings “can be held to account for that of
which they are the authors; other beings cannot.” Therefore, “to understand an action as
something for which someone is accountable” means that “it is always appropriate to ask the
agent [of that action] to give an intelligible account.”15
When something occurs which appears to be the action of an accountable human being and
we can’t identity an intention, sequence, or social setting—we are baffled (e.g., when
encountering a foreign culture). Bafflement comes with the assumption that there are reasons,
routines, and roles present, but hidden from our view. In order to be successful in “identifying
and understanding what someone else is doing, always move towards placing a particular
episode in the context of a set of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals … and in
the settings in which they act and suffer.” This is because “we all live out narratives in our lives
and because we understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live.” The form of
narrative, then, “is appropriate for understanding the actions of others.”16
I now develop MacIntyre’s argument to employ the notion of a life-organizing story in the
task of comparative eschatology. Consider the common sentiment: “This isn’t how things ought
to be.” Whether it’s because of something trivial like your computer crashing, or something
horrifying, like Elie Wiesel’s account of the crematoriums in Auschwitz17—the lament that
explained/understood after the manner of natural science.”
15

Ibid., 208–9.
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Ibid., 212.
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Elie Wiesel, Night, trans. Marion Wiesel (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 32, “Not far from us, flames,
huge flames, were rising from a ditch. Something was being burned there. A truck drew close and unloaded its hold:
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things are not right is as universal as you can find. People generally have a keen sense of conflict
between what they imagine life ought to be and what life actually is.
Susan Neiman, in her book Evil in Modern Thought, argued that this sentiment is one way
of talking about the problem of evil.18 Facing this conflict between is and ought, people
commonly deal with misfortunes by locating their lives within a larger story. These stories have
been handed down at dinner tables, sanctuaries, and lecture halls. They encourage us to see
ourselves and others as real-life characters who interact within a setting or context, whose
cumulative interactions form a definite plotline, which we see leading to some hoped-for
resolution. A critical element of this perceived plot is conflict. Our sense of conflict in the stories
of our lives surfaces every time we say, “This isn’t how it’s supposed to be.” Sensing a conflict
between is and ought, we direct our thoughts and actions towards rectifying it on some scale. In
doing so, we conceive ourselves as following a storyline and making progress toward a goal,
eschaton, or telos. Here is how MacIntyre said it:
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, in
the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which certain
possibilities beckon us forward and others repel us, some seem already foreclosed
and others perhaps inevitable. There is no present which is not informed by some
image of some future and an image of the future which always presents itself in the
form of a telos … toward which we are either moving or failing to move … like
characters in a fictional narrative we do not know what will happen next, but
nonetheless our lives have a certain form which projects itself toward our future.19
Though these observations are not earth-shattering, they are compelling. They are an
attempt at “scrutinizing some of our most taken-for-granted, but clearly correct conceptual
insights about human actions and selfhood in order to show how natural it is to think of the self
small children. Babies! Yes, I did see this, with my own eyes … children thrown into the flames. (Is it any wonder
that ever since then, sleep tends to elude me?).”
18

Susan Neiman. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002).
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in a narrative mode.”20 We make sense of our lives by means of a story. This story has a goal,
which is desired, believed to be possible, but as yet unattained and therefore uncertain.21
Inhabiting such a story defends against despair by offering hope. The story makes hope possible.
Inversely, hope implies a story. Thus, where intelligibility, meaningfulness, and hope are
concerned, the notion of story is inescapable. According to MacIntyre, “Mythology, in its
original sense, is at the heart of things.”22
Bultmann’s Attempt to Transcend Stories-of-the-World
MacIntyre believed that “mythology,” in the sense of making sense of the world through a
life-organizing story, is at the heart of being human. To some extent, Rudolph Bultmann would
agree. But, he would clarify by saying that it is at the heart of human being enslaved to “the
anxiety in which we seek to hold on to ourselves and what is ours in the secret feeling that
everything, including our own life, is slipping away from us.”23 In short, mythologizing
represents sin—inauthentic existence, which is opposed to faith. Therefore, the purpose of
Christian proclamation is to transcend the need for any story of the world, including the one
given in the New Testament. The “significance of [the] story lies in what God wants to say to us
through it.”24 Demythologizing is a method for determining what God wants to say. Thus,
19

MacIntrye, After Virtue, 215–16.
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Ibid., 206.
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See John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), 35, for a definition of hope as an “intentional state,” which presupposes a belief about the possibility of
what is hoped for, a desire for it to be the case, but with some uncertainty whether or not it is or will be so.
22
Ibid., 216. Cf. Wolfhardt Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. Geoffrey Bromiley (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1991), 185–88, who contrasted “mythical orientation” with “eschatological expectation.” The former
construes deity as a means to control the present, while the latter looks to deity with openness toward the future.
MacIntyre is working with a broader notion of myth that could include either orientation.
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Rudolph Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology: The Problem of Demythologizing the New Testament
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Bultmann would object to comparing Christian eschatology to others by means of their stories.
This is because the distinctiveness of Christian hope is that it needs no story to support it.
Instead, it rests solely on the proclamation of the gospel—God’s personal address in Christ.
I have drawn the preceding points from Bultmann’s 1941 essay, “New Testament and
Mythology.” Shubert Ogden thought it was “perhaps the single most discussed and controversial
theological writing of the [twentieth] century.”25 Richard Hays called its author the “great
adversary” and the “unnamed elephant in the room.”26 His shadow looms over each of the three
eschatological theologians in my bridge from chapter one (Sauter, Moltmann, and Pannenberg).
“The task of theology,” according to Bultmann, is “to demythologize the Christian
proclamation”27; or as Hays called it: to “de-narrativize.”28
By choosing to describe Christian hope in narrative terms, my method is in conflict with
Butlmann’s. After considering the deep concerns of his demythologizing program, I will respond
by analyzing his notion of proclamation and the form of hope it inspires. By appropriating some
elements of John Searle’s philosophy of language, mind, and society, I will show how
Bultmann’s account of Christian proclamation nonetheless assumes a certain life-organizing
story—one that is in conflict with the story to which the biblical narratives bear witness. Though
I will eventually reject Bultmann’s “de-narrativizing” program, his emphasis on proclamation
rightly challenges Christian expositors of narrative theology to describe Christian hope not
simply as an aspect of a certain worldview, but as a response to God’s personal address in Jesus.
25

Schubert Ogden, preface, in Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology, vii.
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Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ, xxv–xvi.
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Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in New Testament and Mythology, 3.
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Stories in Conflict
In that controversial essay from 1941, Bultmann maintained that it would be both pointless
and impossible to ask modern men and women to accept the New Testament myth—that is, the
characters, setting, and plot of the story as presented in the text. This is especially the case with
the plot’s resolution. Bultmann explained that in the New Testament, the resurrection of God’s
Son is said to be
the beginning of the cosmic catastrophe through which the death brought into the
world by Adam is annihilated … demonic powers of the world have lost their power
… The risen one has been exalted to heaven … He will return … in order to complete
the work of salvation; then will take place the resurrection of the dead and the last
judgment … finally sin, death, and all suffering will be done away … And this will
happen at any moment.29
Bultmann thought this “mythical eschatology is finished” because “world history continues
and—as every competent judge is convinced—will continue.” It is pointless to cling to this story
because there is nothing specifically Christian about it. It is simply an artifact of “a time now
past,” which “was not yet formed by scientific thinking.” And it is impossible to demand its
acceptance, because “no one can appropriate a world picture by sheer resolve, since it is already
given with one’s particular historical situation.”30 Modern people know too much: “a corpse
cannot come back to life or rise from the grave … there are no demons and no magic causality.”31
“We cannot use electric lights and radios and, in the event of illness, avail ourselves of modern
medical and clinical means and at the same time believe in the spirit and wonder world of the
New Testament.”32
29
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Whether or not we accept Bultmann’s pronouncements about what can or cannot be
believed, his description of the clash between the New Testament “myth” and the “myth” of
Modernity is apt. If we are concerned with the question, “Which story discloses the real world?”
then we must acknowledge the persuasive power of the story about scientific-technological
progress. Now, you might say, this was 1941—before the wonders of quantum physics, the
horrors of Auschwitz, and the failures of the environmental crisis shattered the modern myth.
Bultmann responded to this sort of argument in a 1952 essay. He agreed that recent
breakthroughs “with respect to atomic processes” have “relativized” the “law of causality.” But it
is naïve to think that this “opened the door to the intervention of transcendent powers! Has
natural science today given up experimentation?”33
Sixty years later, the same could be said. Let it be granted that the unpredictability of
matter and the environmental crisis have now become features of Modernity’s story.
Nevertheless, the basic assumptions of the modern scientific method still hold: the universe is
naturally determined and closed to “supernatural” intervention. And the proprietors of this
method are still authorities in the eyes of the public. As for Auschwitz, it only reinforced the idea
that human progress was not inevitable, but only possible, and sometimes deceptive. All of
which Kant knew well. Besides, the horror of war and genocide during the twentieth century
pose just as many problems for the Christian story, with its confession that God is the Author,
who consciously creates the flow of events that become a plot. If the Christian and modern
stories do have anything in common, it is the way they continue to be plagued by the problem of
evil. I will explore this connection in the next chapter.
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Transcending Story through Proclamation
Even though our path will lead us to part ways with Bultmann, he had deeper concern that
should give us pause. It begins with a common accusation against him: demythologizing tries to
make the gospel scientifically respectable “by trimming the traditional Biblical texts.” Bultmann
answered: on the contrary, it makes “clearer to modern man what the Christian faith is.” It
removes a false stumbling block in order to make way for the real scandal: God’s personal
“summons to man,” which “entails the sacrifice of all security attainable by his own unaided
efforts.”34 The scandal is being confronted with “God speaking directly to me.” The offense is
not the mythology, but “the claim of the Christian faith to absoluteness.” Bultmann does not
want the Christian kerygma to be domesticated as something valuable to culture. Rather, it must
be received as the exclusive word “that is concretely addressed to me.”35
The debate with Karl Jaspers brings out the character of Bultmann’s concern especially
well. Conservative theologians often brand Bultmann a “liberal.” Jaspers thought otherwise: “In
Bultmann I find nothing of a Lessing, a Kant, a Goethe, none of the liberal spirit, but something
of their opponents.”36 Liberal faith “strives to keep itself open, ready to recognize the language of
the godhead in everything that is real.” Bultmann’s assertion that God speaks openly through
Christ does violence to this. Freedom “forbids absolute obedience to the words of sacred text …
because [according to liberal faith] every man can be in direct relation to the godhead in his
freedom and reason, which constitute a higher authority.”37 Against this, Bultmann claimed the
absoluteness of God’s act in Christ. He believed that demythologizing served this claim.
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Another objection is that demythologization makes God completely subjective—no longer
having any reality outside of believers. Not true, said Bultmann. The point is that “God’s act is
hidden from all eyes other than the eyes of faith.”38 “God is not visible outside of faith,” but this
“does not mean that God is not real outside of faith.” Consider the experience of being loved by
another person. The true character of this relationship cannot be scrutinized from the outside. It
can only be perceived “by me myself as the one affected by it.”39 In the same way, Christian faith
“is not knowledge possessed once and for all, not a ‘world view.’ It can only be an event.”40
I am not talking merely about an idea of God, but am at pains to talk about the living
God in whose hands our time is held and who encounters each of us in our time …
God encounters us in the word, namely, in a specific word, in the proclamation
established with Jesus Christ … not as a possession that we can secure for ourselves
by knowledge but only as the address that encounters us again and again.41
All this must be believed against objective occurrences in the world. Demythologizing “destroys
every false security.” Those who “believe in God as their God need to know that they have
nothing in hand on the basis of which they could believe.”42
According to Bultmann, the problem with any myth—New Testament or otherwise—is that
it objectifies God. Myth aims to objectify ultimate reality in order to gain control over it. Myth
enables “action calculated to influence the attitude of the deity by averting its wrath and winning
its favor.”43 Likewise, science calculates to manipulate the world for human purposes. But
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“demythologizing wants an understanding of scripture free of every world picture projected by
objectifying thinking, whether it is that of myth or that of science.”44
Bultmann’s critique raises important questions about the suitability of a life-organizing
story to account for Christian hope. Is the Christian story simply about disclosing the real world?
Is Christian faith primarily assent to one account of the world over and against others? Some
narrative theologians seem to present it as such. David Ford’s essay on “System, Story,
Performance” says much about “the primary perspective on reality,” in terms of “the right
assessment of [Jesus].”45 This “demands the labor of a plausible ontology as part of the testimony
to the Gospel,” plus “performance in line with the content … of the gospel story.”46 But I do not
hear about the role of kerygma as personal address from God. Likewise, in an essay from the
same volume on narrative theology, Hauerwas and Burrell describe Christian faith as “assent”
which involves accepting “a story as normative by allowing it to shape one’s own story.”47 But
again, no attention is given to how first-person discourse from God elicits faith, hope, and love,
thereby creating Christian identity. Recall Bultmann’s point: Christian faith is not properly
knowledge “about.” It is not a “worldview.” This reminds me of the Epistle of James: “You
believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe—and shudder!” (James 2:19).
The living faith that is the Christian life is more than knowledge.
Bultmann has brought something important to our attention. Drawing from his Lutheran
tradition, he has recalled the Reformation’s distinction between faith’s content or articles and the
faith which trusts the God of Jesus. In The Apology to the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon
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clarified what he and the Wittenberg theologians meant by justifying faith: “Our opponents
imagine that faith is only historical knowledge” (even the demons have this). But, the “faith that
justifies … is no mere historical knowledge, but the firm acceptance of God’s offer promising
forgiveness of sins and justification.”48 Bultmann’s demythologizing has this distinction in mind.
He thought it was the application of “justification through faith alone without works of the law”
applied to “the field of knowledge.”49 While I reject Bultmann’s attempt to sever faith as
personal trust from any particular worldview, his objection calls for an account of the Christian
story that grounds faith and hope in God’s personal address through Jesus.
Response to Bultmann: Speech Acts in Context
I am arguing that a notion of life-organizing story is appropriate for comparing the
Christian hope with others. However, Bultmann has challenged me to say more clearly how story
can do justice to the centrality of Christian proclamation. Christian hope is not simply a matter of
having a different description of reality. Rather, it is a response to definite speech acts received
from God. Therefore, I will correlate speech act theory with the concept of a life-organizing
story, thus responding to Bultmann’s objection without his “de-narratizing” program.50
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How Words Do Work
Speaking, in normal usage, does not merely provide information and dispel ignorance. It
does inform, but that’s not all it does. The point of speaking is to have an effect on the
hearer(s)—to elicit in them a response (e.g., assent, trust, anticipation, intention to obey or to
cooperate). This sort of language is what John Searle calls “speech acts.”51 His teacher, J. L.
Austin, called them “illocutionary acts.”52 They argued that the point of language, in everydayusage, is a way of doing something. They called this the “illocutionary point.” It is how the
utterance “counts as” an act.
The illocutionary act needs to be distinguished from the “perlocutionary act.”53 The latter is
the actual result or consequence of the speech act. For example, if my favorite on-line store
promised they would deliver the book I purchased, that would be a speech act, or illocutionary
act. My having hope would be the perlocutionary act, or effect. The bookseller’s communication
with me “counts as” a promise whether I respond in hope or not. All that is required is that it
registers with me as a promise—as a commitment to make the world fit with their intention,
which also happens to be my desire. Such a speech act carries with it the intention of eliciting my
trust and hope. Similarly, the illocutionary point of making an assertion is to elicit belief. The
illocutionary point of a command is to elicit intention to obey.
Speech acts aim to elicit certain states of mind (hope, belief, intention to act). Thus,
language and mind are interrelated. “What we have,” said Searle, “is not just the mind on one
side and language on the other, but mind and language enriching each other until, for adult
51

John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969.)
52

John Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).

53

See Searle, Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (New York: Basic Books, 1998),
136–39.

57

human beings, the mind is linguistically structured.”54 And the linguistically structured mind is
related to the outside world. Searle argued that language and mind are connected to the world in
one of two ways: either as description or prescription. With this distinction, he employed the
phrase, “direction of fit.”
Directions of Fit. The notion of direction of fit will be immensely important for the
structure of my entire project, so I will invest some time developing it. Both the “intentionality”
of mind and the “point” of language have some direction of fit. With language, it either
describes, thus fitting (conforming) the spoken word to match the world; or it prescribes, thus
fitting (intending to change) the world to match what was spoken.
To illustrate, Searle told a parable about two men, each with a list.55 The first man received
a list from his wife. This list prescribed to him what groceries to buy. The second man also had a
list. He was a private investigator hired to spy on the first man. The detective went to the market
and marked on his list the items the first man had bought: “butter, bacon, beer.” His list
described a certain state of affairs in the world. It had a “list-to-world direction of fit.” But the
husband’s had a “world-to-list direction of fit.” To see the importance of this difference, you
need only consider the following scenario: When the detective tailed the man into the store, he
initially put down “cheese” instead of butter. But, when he watched him check out, he realized
his mistake, crossed out cheese, and wrote “butter.” Later, the husband arrives home and has his
groceries inspected by his wife. She exclaims, “Honey, look at your list again. I wrote beets, not
beer!” Now, imagine his wife’s response if he were to “correct” his mistake by crossing out beets
and writing “beer.” This would not bode well for him because each list succeeds in different
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ways. They have different conditions of satisfaction. The detective’s list must match the world.
But the world must come to match the husband’s list.
A Taxonomy of Speech Acts. From these two “directions of fit,” Searle accounted for
five basic kinds of speech acts: (1) “assertives,” which always have a word-to-world direction of
fit (e.g., statements, explanations); (2) “directives,” which have a world-to-word direction of fit,
with the responsibility of “fit” imposed on the hearer (e.g., commands); (3) “commissives,”
which also have a world-to-word direction of fit, but with the responsibility of “fit” assumed by
the speaker (e.g., threats, promises).With commissives, the speaker prescribes to himself
responsibility to act. The last two categories are special. They have a more complex connection
to the world: (4) “Expressives” have a “null” direction of fit. These are a unique case because the
point of this kind of speech is not to relate to the world. The statement, “I love you,” neither
describes nor prescribes, but expresses. Such a statement is satisfied if it is sincere. There are no
states of affairs in the world that need to correspond with or bend to it. Yet, a connection to the
world is nevertheless assumed. When I say, “I love you,” I take for granted that there is, in fact, a
“you” to be loved. So, while the explicit connection to the world is “null,” an expressive assumes
a word-to-world direction of fit. Finally, (5) “declaratives” have a dual direction of fit. Here, the
“point is to bring about a change in the world by representing it as having been changed.”
Common examples are “I pronounce you man and wife” or, when an umpire declares, “You’re
out!” The direction is “double” because the world is made to match the word at the moment the
word matches the world. This kind of speech act generally requires some external institutional
support for it to “count as” a declaration (e.g., the institution of marriage, the game of baseball).56
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Mind, Language, and World. Like language, states of mind also have a direction of fit—
they have a connection to the external world: either a mind-to-world or a world-to-mind direction
of fit. Belief and desire are two fundamental “intentional states” of mind, according to Searle.
They are instances of consciousness called “intentionality.” This should not be associated with
the verb “to intend.” The appropriate verb is “to direct.” Intentionality does not always involve
intention to act. Intentionality is a more general description of the mind being “about” or directed
at something. 57 For example, belief, like the detective’s list, aims to make the mind correspond to
the external world. Desire, like the wife who wanted groceries, aims to make the world
correspond to the mind. Searle argued that these two directions of fit are given with the biology
of the human being—the sensory nervous system enables us to fit mind-to-world and the motor
nervous system empowers us to fit world-to-mind.58
Hope as an Intentional State. Hope is an instance of intentionality that includes both
belief and desire. It involves my desire that the world fit to the state of affairs I have in mind.
Thus, it has a world-to-mind direction of fit. It also presumes a belief (mind-to-world fit) that I
live in a world where such a state of affairs is possible. But, since it is yet unattained, it also
includes uncertainty as to whether the hoped for state of affairs will actually be the case.59
In some cases, the desire element in hope can be satisfied simply by my coming to see the
world in a new light. In other cases, I must take action to manipulate the external world to match
my desire. In other cases still, I must wait on the action of others. With regard to my on-line
book order, my hope was evoked by a promise. The speaker committed to make the world fit the
word of promise. As a recipient of the promise, I can anticipate its arrival, lament its delay, but
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must more or less patiently await its fulfillment. The Christian hope has a similar character. It is
an intentional state of mind directed at a particular state of affairs given in the last line of the
Nicene Creed: “we look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the age to come.”60
The Story about a Promise
To link speech acts and story, I will begin by returning to the trial of Paul depicted in the
book of Acts. When Paul made his final defense before the governor, the visiting king, and the
prominent crowd in the audience hall, he stated, “I now stand here on trial because of my hope.”
This was not hope in general, but the “intentional state” assumed by Paul in response to a
particular speech act committed by God and addressed to the Jewish people: “… my hope in the
promise made by God to our fathers” (Acts 26:6). For Paul, the focal point of both his hope and
God’s promise was “that God raises the dead”; more specifically, that the Messiah was “the first
to rise from the dead” (Acts 26:23). Robert Tannehill explained:
the hope and promise of which Paul speaks in 26:6–7 is not merely a hope for
individual life after death but a hope for the Jewish people, to be realized through
resurrection … It is hope for the Messiah’s promised reign, which is established
through resurrection and characterized by a resurrection life corporately shared.61
The event of God’s ancient promise established Israel’s identity: “You are the sons … of
the covenant that God made with your fathers, saying to Abraham, ‘And in your offspring shall
all the families of the earth be blessed’” (Acts 3:25, Genesis 12:3). Elsewhere, Paul had
summarized the content of God’s speech act as “the promise to Abraham and his offspring that
he would be heir of the world” (Rom. 4:13). As a son of Abraham, Paul spoke to some of those
“families of the earth” in Athens. He pointed them toward the final fulfillment of the promise—
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toward the day when God “will judge the world in righteousness by a man whom he has
appointed; and of this he has given assurance to all by raising him from the dead” (Acts 17:31).
The keeping of God’s promise was still outstanding and yet at the same time vouchsafed
and guaranteed by the resurrection of Jesus. These words and deeds—remembered, recounted,
and still anticipated—gave Paul’s world a narrative shape by eliciting a concrete expectation of
how the story-of-everything would turn out. The still-unfinished plotline had been full of
disappointments, reversals, proleptic resolutions, and lingering uncertainties. Nevertheless, it
continued to structure life for Paul and his people. In other words, a life-organizing story
engendered by a particular speech act formed the basis of Paul’s hope. If no promise were made,
there would be no story to narrate. But because God did make a promise, because God did fulfill
it proleptically by raising Jesus from the dead, there is now a story to tell. At this point, Richard
Hays’s distinction between “story” and “narrative” becomes important. The story—the actions of
agents ordered in a sequence—is logically prior to any narration of that story. “Paul’s gospel is a
story, and it has a narrative structure, but it is not a narrative except when it is actually
narrated.”62 God and the sequence of God’s speech-actions preceded the narration of those
actions.63 The story occasions the narrative.
In Hays’s “Introduction to the Second Edition” of his influential book The Faith of Jesus,
he summarized his earlier work and gave an updated account of what he thought was Paul’s
“foundational story.” In its most basic form, Paul’s story is the story of Jesus: “In a mysterious
way, Jesus has enacted our destiny, and those who are in Christ are shaped by the pattern of his
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self-giving death. He is the prototype of redeemed humanity.” This means that “Jesus is not
merely a good moral example; rather, his story transforms and absorbs the world. The old world
has been crucified and new creation has broken in through Jesus’ death and resurrection.”64 But
how does this relate to the story of the promise God made to Abraham?
The Abraham story is for Paul taken up into the Christ-story, and the Christ-story is
understood, with the hindsight of narrative logic, as the fit sequel to the Abraham
story. Looking back upon the Abraham story from the world established by the
Christ-story, Paul perceives the proleptic character of Abraham as the recipient of a
promise that was inherently unfulfillable in Abraham’s own lifetime, a promise
destined for fulfillment only in his seed.65
The two are related as “prefiguration and fulfillment.”66 According to Hays, it is a story
about a promise. But in his polemic against Bultmann, Hays does not give a response to
Bultmann’s objection as I have presented it. A proper response to Bultmann would need to
explain how the story is both a world-establishing report about the faithfulness of Jesus and
God’s personal summons, which aims to elicit personal faith in Jesus, as the embodied voice of
God’s summons. To make an analogy to Searle’s comment on language and mind, it’s not that
we have promise on one side and story on the other. Rather, the two are interdependent. The
promise occasioned the story. And since the story recounts the promise, telling it becomes a form
of “narrated promise.”
The Story that Makes a Promise
Ronald Thiemann used the phrase “narrated promise” in his book Revelation and Theology.
He drew on Austin’s and Searle’s account to explain how narratives “can have a variety of
illocutionary forces.” For example, the story of “Little Red Riding Hood” has illocutionary force.
64

Hays, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” in Faith of Jesus Christ, xxix.

65

Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ, 197–98.

66

Ibid., 198.

63

The narrative functions as a warning. The story does something. 67 Next he used speech-act
theory to spell out the illocutionary force of a promise:
Promise is a relational category which requires both a speaker and a hearer but grants
primacy in that relation solely to the one who promises … The promiser specifies the
future act, expresses the intention to perform that act, undertakes the obligation
implied in the promise, exhibits the requisite trustworthy behavior, and alone can
perform the action which will fulfill the promise. The hearer, on the other hand,
though he or she would “prefer” that the promiser fulfill his obligation, cannot, if the
act is to remain a promise, compel the promiser so to act.68
Thiemann continued by linking promise and narrative in his notion of a “narrated promise.”
This term expressed his conviction about the illocutionary point of the biblical narrative. The
narrative continues to serve as a promise “to the readers of the text.”69 And since a promise
commits to accomplishing a state of affairs in the world—since it has a world-to-word direction
of fit—the narration of that promise necessarily makes a claim upon the world. Unlike the tale of
Little Red Hood, the biblical narrative establishes the world. It implicitly says to the reader:
“You live in this storied world. You live within the world that has been pledged to Abraham’s
family. You live within the world that will be judged by the crucified and risen Jesus, the heir of
Abraham.” The story discloses the world and continues to proclaim God’s vow to bring the
world into conformity with his word.
Thiemann supported his claims about the illocutionary force of the biblical narrative by
performing a literary and theological analysis of the New Testament book of Matthew:
67

Ronald Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1985), 103. See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Promise of Speech-act Theory for Biblical
Interpretation,” in After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation, eds. Craig Bartholomew, Colin Greene,
and Karl Möller (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 82, who described “authorial-discourse interpretation” as asking
what “illocutionary act” that author actually performed (distinct from what he “intended to” perform). Wolterstorff
claimed that this was the mode of interpretation “that most of us engage in most of the time.”
68

Ibid, 110.

69

Ibid., 69–70.

64

The word promise … never appears in the Gospel of Matthew. Yet the notion of
promise hovers like an enormous parenthesis surrounding the entire narrative …
[Matthew] associates Jesus, Son of God, with the Israelite heritage, thus identifying
him as Son of Abraham and Son of David, i.e., as inheritor of the two great
covenantal promises … Matthew constructs his narrative in such a way that his
readers are led to identify with the disciples … the narrative serves as both report and
proclamation … Matthew’s story appropriately ends with Jesus’ promise, for this
narrative, functions for its readers … as the narrated promise of Jesus of Nazareth.70
Jeff Gibbs, who offered a more rigorous narrative reading of this gospel, echoed Thiemann
in this respect: “Matthew … wants his readers/hearers to know that in Jesus, the ancient promises
of God … have found their fulfillment.”71 Thus, the story “aims to plant real faith in its reader
and to create faith’s response of committed discipleship.”72 Gibbs summarized how the narrative
pulls this off:
The Gospel of Matthew proclaims that the end-time reign of God has drawn near in
Jesus and that the time of the fulfillment of the Scriptures’ promises has begun. The
time that God ordains until the consummation of all things in Christ is the time for the
church to live and move out in mission. Matthew’s gospel leads every hearer/reader
… to ask how he can participate in that mission … 73
To lead the hearers in this way, the narrative aims to evoke two distinct but inseparable
intentional states: assent to the world of the narrative and trust in the God of the narrative.
Thiemann and Gibbs both acknowledged the reciprocity between these two states: “The gospel
narrative can be God’s promise to me if, and only if, he has [actually] raised Jesus from the
dead.”74 Likewise, trusting God’s promise means believing “that the ‘world’ presented in
Matthew’s narrative, along with its values and truths, is actually the real world.”75 The narrative
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evokes belief, which has a mind-to-narrated-world direction of fit. Within this narrated world, the
God of Jesus makes a promise, which elicits hope. This hope has a narrated-world-to-promiseformed-mind direction of fit. Jesus’ resurrection from the dead signals that the narrative lays
claim to the bodily-organic-social setting that has been claimed by rival stories. Other storiedworlds are false. They are under judgment. These too will eventually be “fit” to the promised
world—to the one over which Jesus has received “all authority” (Mat. 28:20).
Gibbs commented on this implicit narrated threat in Matthew’s Gospel. The God of Israel
makes his promise within his greater “work of reestablishing his kingship over his fallen
creation.” God’s kingly words and deeds include both promise and threat, both judgment and
salvation. The “coming of God’s reign in Jesus to a world in rebellion signifies that God is
committed fully to reclaiming his creation and restoring it, to removing the effects of satanic
power and human sin.”76 The narrative’s promise is always contrasted against its threat of
judgment—the condemnation of rival attempts to “story” God’s world. The hearer’s faith toward
the promise is continually paired with a turning from the threat of judgment.
Thiemann does not comment on this dual aspect of the narrative’s illocutionary stance.
Since Matthew’s gospel issues a threat and a promise, we must ask whether Thiemann’s term
“narrated promise” is still appropriate. Holding the two together, the narrative still functions as a
“commissive speech act,” to use Searle’s term. The God who speaks within and through the story
vows to make the world “fit” to his intentions. This includes God’s intention to “gather out of his
kingdom all causes of sin and all law-breakers” (Mat. 13:41). The hearer is thus confronted with
the threat of being sent “into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels” (Mat. 25:41).
their distinctive purpose of conveying the character of Jesus and appealing for faith in him, rather than attempting to
write a modern historical biography.”
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But since this day has not yet occurred, there is still room for the narrative to function as a
promise upon every new hearing—as “good news” for “all nations” (Mat. 24:14). The threat and
the promise intend to evoke the same intentional state: the hope that believes God’s promise has
found fulfillment in Jesus and desires it to come to fruition, even as it remains uncertain. The
story may prove to have two perlocutionary effects: judgment or salvation. But it has only one
illocutionary point. The point of the threat is not to evoke the unbelief that leads to final
condemnation, but the repentance, trust in Jesus, love for God and neighbor, and hope that lead
into the promised reign of God. In sum, the point of Matthew’s narrated threat-and-promise is
discipleship. Therefore, since the threat serves the promise, Thiemann’s designation “narrated
promise” is appropriate.
Kerygma Assumes a Story
Although others could be cited,77 the work of Thiemann and Gibbs illustrate how
Bultmann’s objection can be met without “de-narrativizing” the New Testament. Proclamation
and the story are inseparable. The narrative “counts as” a speech act. It establishes a world in
which the God of Jesus is an actor who continues to take on the rights and duties of a speaker
engaged in discourse. The commissive speech acts of threat and promise are critical because they
are not simply God’s “self-communication.” They do more than reveal God’s character as just
and loving. By them, God directly and personally addresses the hearers and commits himself to
future action. By threatening final judgment against evil and promising the renewal of creation,
God has pledged to “fit” the world disclosed in the biblical narrative to a yet outstanding state of
affairs—the “life of the age to come.”
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Now we are in the position to scrutinize Bultmann’s notion of “proclamation.” What he
meant by the “personal address” of God was not a commitment to future action. Bultmann’s
proclamation is an “expressive,” not a promise. It has a “null” direction of fit, analogous to the
statement, “I love you.” Its illocutionary point is not to evoke hope as belief and desire for the
speaker to carry out his stated intention. At most, it evokes a non-descript hopefulness or elation.
The important thing to remember about “expressives” is how they imply a word-to-world
direction of fit even if their explicit connection to the world is “null.” If God says, “I love you,”
the statement assumes there is a “you” to be loved. The question is, “Which you?” The “you”
identified and narrated by a story of Modernity or Postmodernity? Or the “you” inscribed by the
story of the crucified, risen, and returning Jesus?78 Bultmann’s proclamation can fit within either,
but it cannot float disconnected from all stories. Even if it derides every notion of a telos for
world history, it still assumes a personal telos. For Bultmann, this was plotted as the lonely and
courageous quest for personal authenticity.79 Therefore, any effort to “demythologize” the New
Testament kerygma always entails “remythologizing” it into another life-organizing story.
I have met Bultmann’s concern for the kerygma by correlating speech-act theory with a
narrative analysis of the story of Jesus told by Paul and Matthew. Now I will simply assert that
what goes for them goes for the whole biblical narrative.80 Bultmann can be answered as follows:
Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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The so-called “myth” of the New Testament is not a man-made attempt at self-justification by
fitting God into man’s world as an object to be manipulated. Rather, the story of Israel continued
and completed by the New Testament is the result of God’s self-chosen involvement within the
world he created. Because God’s involvement occurs in the form of threat and promise, God sets
and fulfills the conditions of his actions. God’s narrated promise elicits both the faith that he is
trustworthy and the hope that he will fulfill his commitment to act. Understanding the story in
this way enables the church to participate in the mission of Jesus by continuing to speak in his
name—issuing commands, threats, and promises on God’s behalf.81
However, since God has not yet fully realized his intentions to act, the story is still
unresolved. “The justifiability of one’s trust in the truthfulness of a promise is never fully
confirmed (or disconfirmed) until the promiser actually fulfills (or fails to fulfill) his …
promise.”82 Bultmann was right when he said that Christians have nothing “in hand” upon which
to base their belief that God will prove trustworthy. They only have a narrated promise in which
to hope. Until the promise is fulfilled, the conflict with rival stories cannot be ignored.
Enlightenment Attempts to Transcend all Stories-of-the-World
In a 1977 essay, Stanley Hauerwas and David Burrell made a striking claim: “All our
notions are narrative-dependent, including the notion of rationality.”83 Twenty years later, this
essay and others were collected by Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones into a single volume titled
Why Narrative? The purpose of this collection was to “suggest that narrative is neither just an
account of genre criticism nor a faddish appeal to the importance of telling stories; rather it is a
as God’s people, and a re-ordering of the whole world—in sum, that Israel’s God was becoming king (202–9).
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crucial conceptual category.” This point restated the claim from the 1977 essay: “what is
significant” about narrative is “that rationality, methods of argument, and historical explanation
have, at least to some extent, a fundamentally narrative form.” This was a use of “narrative
centered on epistemological issues.”84 That is to say, answers about how we know what we know
always assume and are filtered through a grand story. Whether we acknowledge it or not, we all
inhabit some “narrative to give our life coherence.”85
These claims conflict with other accounts of rationality that seek to transcend the
particularities of any given story and subjective points of view within those stories. In this
section I will address one such attempt to transcend stories: the Enlightenment tradition.
Following Hauerwas and Burrell, I will frame the Enlightenment as an attempt to transcend other
stories by telling a more encompassing, more persuasive story of the world. This point is less of
an argument against the Enlightenment and more of recognition that its story comes into conflict
with the Christian story. In doing so, it offers a rival hope by naming a different kind of conflict
in the world plot and anticipating its own sort of resolution.
The Enlightenment Vision
In their 1977 essay, Hauerwas and Burrell addressed the “narrative born of the
Enlightenment,” which has been presented as historical fact. They suggested that the “basic story
underlying the standard account” was “of more ancient lineage, namely, humankind’s quest for
certainty in a world of contingency.” Here is their summary of the Enlightenment story:
The plot was given in capsule by Auguste Comte: first came religion in the form of
stories, then philosophy in the form of metaphysical analysis, and then science with
its exact methods. The story he tells in outline is set within another elaborated by
Ethics,” in Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, eds., Why Narrative? 168.
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Hegel, to show us how each of these ages supplanted the other as a refinement in the
progressive development of reason. So stories are pre-scientific, according to the
story legitimizing the age which calls itself scientific. Yet if one overlooks that
budding contradiction, or fails to spell it out … then the subterfuge has been worked
and the exit blocked off.86
The Enlightenment vision, then, is a story that presents itself as historical truth. Every narration
of it could be introduced like this: “Here’s how we grew up and left behind superstition.”
In his book, Mind, Language, and Society, John Searle explained his philosophical starting
point: “I accept the Enlightenment vision,” which “assumed the universe was completely
intelligible and that we are capable of a systematic understanding of its nature … within the
limits set by our evolutionary endowments.”87 As a logical out-working of this starting point,
modern people have moved to a position that is “beyond atheism.”
For us, the educated members of society, the world has become demystified. Or
rather, to put the point more precisely, we no longer take the mysteries we see in the
world as expressions of supernatural meaning. We no longer think of odd occurrences
as cases of God performing speech acts in the language of miracles. Odd occurrences
are just occurrences we do not understand. The result of this demystification is that
we have gone beyond atheism to a point where the issue no longer matters in the way
it did to earlier generations.88
The key word in Searle’s story is “demystified.” This does not mean that “educated”
people know everything about the world that can be known. It’s not even that they know
everything they still want to know. Instead, it means that Searle’s community takes it for granted
that there are no aspects of reality that are utterly mysterious, that are formally beyond finding
out.89 We might not know about it now. Perhaps our limited evolutionary endowments will keep
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us from ever knowing. But this does not mean it cannot in principle be discovered.90 The vision
of the Enlightenment is to overcome the conflict created by ignorance, superstition, and illusion.
The hope for overcoming this conflict is realized through objective, impersonal knowledge.
Rival Stories of Enlightenment
Describing the Enlightenment vision as a story does not refute it. However, it does break its
spell of objectivity. It allows us to imagine rival accounts. The Christian story was its original
rival, but others have presented themselves. Many of these narrate different versions of a postmodern story. To understand the relation between Modernity and Postmodernity, think of how
Paul claimed that the story of Jesus encompassed and fulfilled the story of Abraham. This is
close to the relationship Postmodernity has with Modernity. The postmodern is not a rejection of
the modern story. It is a fulfillment via an unexpected twist in the plot. A narration of the
postmodern story might start like this: “Here’s how we grew up and left behind superstition and
then arrogance as well.”
Story and Reality. John Crossan, in his book The Dark Interval: Towards a Theology of
Story, narrated a version of the postmodern story. He claimed that “we live in story like fish in
the sea.”91 Crossan is an ex-Roman Catholic priest, a skeptical New Testament scholar, and a cofounder of the equally skeptical Jesus Seminar. According to N. T. Wright, Crossan “seems
world, and this understanding will, I hope, enable you to avoid being intimidated into thinking there is some deep
mystery about … intentionality that defies any natural explanation.”
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incapable … of thinking a boring thought or writing a dull paragraph.”92 Like many proponents
of the postmodern, he invokes names like Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Lévi-Strauss.
In Dark Interval, he posed the following question: “is story telling us about a world out
there objectively present before and apart from any story concerning it, or, does story create
world so that we live as human beings in, and only in … story?”93 Going with the latter, his main
adversary became the modern story of scientific progress. Assuming the argument of Kuhn’s The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Crossan aimed to debunk the mythical agents of this
progress: the all-seeing eye of reason and the totalizing intent of cumulative knowledge. With
these mythical agents vanquished, the game they hunted— Objective Reality — now looked to
be an illusion.
Crossan also defended against a common modernist charge that this loss of “objectivity”
leads to groundless, rudderless relativism, which knows nothing “true” but only “true for me.”
Crossan argued that the charge overlooked a third option: “relationalism.” “Reality is neither in
here in mind [idealism] nor out there in the world [realism]; it is the interplay of both mind and
world in language. Reality is relational and relationship. Even more simply, reality is
language.”94 Here Crossan is not too far from Searle’s position: “… it would be a
misunderstanding to suppose that there are separate, isolated classes of brute facts and
institutional facts. On the contrary, we have complex interpenetrations of brute and institutional
facts.”95 Crossan would simply say that the relations are so tight the two cannot be distinguished.
Whether we call them “institutional” or “brute,” all facts are storied facts.
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Searle and Crossan agree on the interrelation between language and the external world.
However, they represent two rival schools of thought within the Enlightenment tradition. Searle
contended against an “antirealist” perspective.96 He explained how attacks on external realism are
not new. They go back centuries. They all present themselves as a form of intellectual humility
(“Here’s how we left behind arrogance.”). For example, Crossan’s problem with Modernity’s
story was not that it was false, but presumptuous. It boasts “that we are capable of getting outside
story to an objective reality.”97 Searle thought this humility was a façade:
I do not think the various challenges to realism are motivated by the arguments
actually presented; I believe they are motivated by something much deeper and less
intellectual … many people find it repugnant that we, with our language, our
consciousness, and our creative powers should be subject to and answerable to a
dumb, stupid, inert material world. Why should we be answerable to the world? Why
shouldn’t we think of the “real world” as something we create, and therefore
something that is answerable to us? If all of reality is a “social construction,” then it
is we who are in power, not the world.98
Searle’s problem with antirealists is that they no longer see themselves as “answerable.” By
declaring—“No story can stand in judgment over another!”—they have given up on seeking a
“true” story. They have ceased to be accountable. Searle would not object to the notion of lifeorganizing story per se. He only rejects an unaccountable willfulness that has no concern for the
truth—for the way the world works independently of any story. Again, this is an aspect of the
Enlightenment Vision—to transcend conflicting stories by means of universal, impersonal truth.
Literary critic Stanley Fish offered an interesting take on this debate. He would tend to side
with Crossan, while also addressing Searle’s demand to be “answerable.” In 1976, Fish wrote a
fascinating essay titled, “How to Do Things with Austin and Searle: Speech Act Theory and
Literary Criticism.” In it, he began by using speech act theory to offer an interpretation of
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Shakespeare’s tragedy Coriolanus. To relay the force of his argument, I need to give a synopsis
of the play: Caius Martinius, a Roman general later named Coriolanus, returns home to be lauded
a war hero. His mother encourages him to run for office. He is not eager to do this, but bows to
her wishes. After he begrudgingly asks for the people’s vote of confidence and attains senatorial
support, he looks to be a shoe-in for the consulship. But his enemies stir up the people to oppose
him. Faced with the riotous crowd, he betrays his contempt for the procedure of attaining office
by popular vote. His enemies call for him to be exiled from Rome as a traitor to his words. Fish
explained what comes next: “In any production, [this] scene is the centerpiece, the climax to
which everything before it has been building.”99 The citizens shout, “Let him away: he’s
banish’d.” Then, breaking all established conventions, Coriolanus responds with a declarative
speech act: “I banish you … !”100 Astoundingly, he creates a new state of affairs. The world is
made to fit his words at the same moment his words fit the world.
The declarative of Coriolanus illustrates Fish’s central contention: Speech Act theory is
about “language and its power: the power to make the world rather than mirror it, to bring about
states of affairs rather than report them, to constitute institutions rather than (or as well as) serve
them.”101 Typically declaratives don’t work unless the speaker has the proper status within a
previously existing institutional reality (e.g., when a fan yells, “Strike three!”). But Coriolanus
turned the existing institution on its head. This suggests that it “is not that words are in force only
so long as long as the institutions are, but that institutions are in force only so long as the words
are ... institutions are no more than the (temporary) effects of speech act agreements.”
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Fish considered the ontological implications of this: “if declarative utterances … alter
states of affairs, what brings about the state of affairs in which a declarative … is endowed with
its intended force? The answer is, another declarative utterance.” And no matter how far back
you push the inquiry, this is the answer you will have to keep on giving.102 It’s speech acts all the
way down.
It might be objected that to reason in this way is to imply that one can constitute a
state simply by declaring it to exist. That of course is exactly what happens: a single
man plants a flag on a barren shore and claims everything his eye can see in the name
of a distant monarch … another man, hunted by police and soldiers, seeks refuge in a
cave, where, alone or in the company of one or two fellows, he proclaims the birth of
a revolutionary government.103
These declarations establish new storied worlds: “In the beginning there was a demystified
universe.” “In the beginning there were our stories.” “In the beginning, God …”
Coriolanus, after banishing the Roman state, said, “There is a world elsewhere.”104 He had
overturned the prior world and created a new one. Next, he finds an enemy of Rome, convinces
them to make him their general, and returns to Rome to seek revenge. He has become “what he
always wanted to be, a natural force whose movement through the world is independent of all
supports … He is complete and sufficient unto himself … His is the declarative of divine fiat, the
logos, the all-creating word.”105
As Coriolanus’s army lays siege to the imperial city, his mother, wife, and son are sent out
to beg for his mercy. Coriolanus is overcome by the power of their bids, settles for a peace
treaty, and leads his soldiers home. But on the way, they turn on him. For his betrayal, they kill
him. Fish comments on the play’s closing words spoken by the collective voice of Rome: “He
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shall have a noble memory.” “The irony is unrelenting. The man who scorned the word of the
community … now depends on that word … for the only life he has.” His speech act community
reclaims him “as inescapably its own when he provides the strongest possible evidence that he is
neither a God nor a machine. He dies.”106
The Standard Story. From Fish’s analysis, I will draw out some connections between the
rival versions of the Enlightenment Story I have represented with Crossan and Searle. Crossan
was concerned with intellectual humility in the sense of being honest with ourselves. All we have
is our stories and the hope that they won’t lead us too far astray. We do not have anything
beyond story to justify our positions. But Crossan also aims to transcend these other stories. He
admits that he has subsumed them by means of a new “master story.”107 This plot advances by
overcoming arrogance and intolerance by ironizing and subverting all myths in a lonely and
courageous quest for authentic “transcendental experience.”108 Searle criticized this sort of selfmade story as a “will to power,” an unwillingness to be answerable.109 While this diagnosis may
be true, staying “unanswerable” is easier said than done. The case in point is General Caius
Martinius Coriolanus.
All facts are institutional facts because institutions stipulate what “counts as” fact—what is
“pickoutable.” And the “real world” is simply “a story that has been told about the real world.”110
However, no one person can pick out any story he or she pleases—at least not for long.
Some stories … are more prestigious than others; and only one story is always the
standard one, the one that presents itself as uniquely true … Other, non-standard,
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stories will of course continue to be told, but they will be regarded as non-factual,
when in fact, they will only be non-authorized.111
A standard story depends on a distinction between fact (authorized) and fantasy
(unauthorized). As the story that has the capacity to organize life for individuals and collectives,
this story generates hope and not mere wishful thinking. It can do so because it has the authority
to disclose the “real world.” The story establishes what counts as good (ultimately desirable) and
what counts as evil (ultimately undesirable). It determines what is truly possible and what is
illusion. Therefore, it creates the conditions for imagining, anticipating, and achieving the victory
of the good and the overcoming of evil. In this way, a life-organizing story gives rise to hope.
Because the standard story discloses what is real and possible and factual, it interprets all
things on its own terms. This includes other stories. Whether these stories are judged to be useful
or immoral, subversive or amusing—they will all be subsumed. They must be subsumed if the
Story is going to keep on organizing life and offering hope to its participants. Normally it takes
a collective intentionality, a communal “we” to author a standard story. Even Coriolanus, with
his all-creating, declarative utterance, was eventually rendered silent and returned to the standard
story authorized by his speech act community. An individual cannot impose his will without the
consent of the collective because he will eventually yield his voice to the assembly and be silent.
He will die.
But, if he were to rise from the dead—well, that would be another story.
Summary
Inasmuch as humans hold to a hope that defends against despair, they take up a lifeorganizing story. Part of what makes our situation post-Constantinian is the proliferation of
stories. Because of their nature, they do not simply co-exist. They also compete. They are either
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co-opting their rivals or being co-opted by a more persuasive, more encompassing account. For
this reason, Christians, if they are to continue to hold on to Christian hope, must understand
these other accounts. More specifically, they must understand them as rivals. My strategy in this
chapter has been to do just that. I have presented Bultmann, Searle, and Crossan not to defeat
them once and for all, but to acknowledge them as narrators of stories that are irreducibly at odds
with the Christian story. Each story internally defines conflict and establishes the plot on its own
terms. Each holds out the hope of ultimately resolving this conflict.
Just like any other potential life-organizing story, the Christian story interprets all things on
its terms. It understands rival accounts not simply as rivals, but as false accounts that will
ultimately be judged by the one true God and brought under his rule and reign in Jesus. At the
same time, the Christian account acknowledges that even these false stories are compelled to
bear witness to the truth in a fragmentary fashion. This is because they necessarily spin their
stories with the setting and characters supplied by the Christian story. And since they must use
God’s creation and creatures to offer their accounts, Christians will always have a basis for
conversation, cooperation, and opportunities to learn from those who inhabit other stories. But
this basis, or common ground, is not neutral in any way. It does not exist apart from a story.
Rather it is given with the Christian story. This story establishes the world. Within it, Christians
have also received a commission from their Lord to call everyone to align themselves to God’s
future—to “the common ending of all stories.”112 It is in the interest of this disciple-making
commission that Christians ought to ask, “How does our hope compare with others?”
The notion of a life-organizing story provides a means to compare Christian eschatology
with rivals. My aim is to help Christians compare and contrast their hope with others—to put
112
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forward the Christian story as both a coworker and competitor among other would-be standard
stories. This will involve conversing with proponents of those stories and seeking to understand
them in a way that respects their concerns.
Christians need not be hostile in this regard. These rival accounts typically afford some
overlap within which to seek cooperation. At the same time, they remain rivals. They claim to
disclose what is of ultimate significance—what is real as opposed to all illusion. Like the
Christian story, they make declarations that aim to evoke trust. They intend to establish where
our loyalty lies. All who place their faith in such declarations must anticipate their vindication
and thereby exercise eschatological hope. But now we must ask: “Is the authority that makes the
declaration reliable?” In other words, “Can the Author of the standard story be trusted?” I turn to
this question in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
NARRATIVE THEODICY
To compare forms of eschatological hope is to compare life-organizing stories. This thesis
challenges the assumption that non-Christian hopes are non-eschatological (and therefore
hopeless), or non-theological (and therefore uncertain), or unbalanced (and therefore overrealized or one-sided). Moving beyond this default use of attributes internal to Christianity, I
intend to compare Christian hope with others and not merely to dismiss them as “unchristian.” In
some sense, this is just good manners.1 More importantly, understanding rival stories of the
world is essential for both Christian discipleship and mission.
My thesis implies that human hope arises from a life-organizing or “standard”2 story. This
is the story that shapes the lives and establishes the loyalties of its participants. Eschatological
hope is given with and plotted by a life-organizing story, which establishes its own storied world.
Each of these versions of reality is established by declaration: “Let there be.” This utterance is
creative (or possibly fictive). It makes the world fit the spoken word at the same moment the
word fits the experienced world. History is narrative discourse about events which have occurred
within this storied world.
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As we move through life, certain experiences threaten to make the reigning story
unintelligible. Faced with unintelligibility, it can be revised, rejected, or reclaimed. If it is
rejected, a new story is told and the original is subsumed within it. But even these new versions
are faced with what plagued the original story: inexplicable occurrences that threaten to render
the story unintelligible. They may not be the same kinds of experiences that discredited the initial
story. Nevertheless, events will transpire that threaten the story’s viability. No matter how often
and on what scale they are re-written, the threat remains. This is the problem of evil. In order for
the story to be told and to retain its authority, its participants must already anticipate its
resolution. It must be told in hope. Therefore, eschatology can be defined as discourse on the
resolution of conflict within an all-encompassing plot.
The hoped-for resolution in every case is a kind of theodicy—a demonstration that the
implied Author of the standard story is trustworthy. The trustworthiness of the Author is attested
through the movement of the story. This is because the Author is the agent of “emplotment.”3
Here I am using the word Author with a theological force. This does not require a theos in the
sense of philosophical theism. Neither does it require a personal and providential Creator in the
sense of the Abrahamic faiths. It simply requires, as Martin Luther said, something “on which
your heart relies and depends.”4 The Author is the authority that presents the standard, worldestablishing story as uniquely true. This authority could be the God of Abraham, the scientific
academy, a postmodern narrated self, a pre-modern metaphysicist, or the Buddha. These
authorities emplot life stories that are expected to yield some hoped-for resolution to the human
predicament, however so defined. These stories are narrated to elicit faith, hope, and loyalty, if
3
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not love for their authors. To have hope is to participate in one of these stories, to anticipate its
resolution, and to proleptically accept that its author’s status is justified.
This is why it makes sense that eschatology should be understood as theodicy and vice
versa. Both are forms of discourse that assume, narrate, and defend a standard story told in spite
of the problem of evil. I relate the two in literary terms—after the manner of author and plot.
“Eschatology” speaks to the point in terms of the plot. “Theodicy” addresses it in terms of the
agent of emplotment. Both forms of discourse have the same purpose: justification of the author.
Eschatology and theodicy are two names for one kind of discourse. Thus, to compare
eschatological hopes is to compare competing narrative theodicies.
In this chapter, I intend to establish and elaborate on this claim. In the first half, I define
key terms and then give a hearing to the anti-theodicy appeal made by some contemporary
writers. In general, they characterize theodicy as oppressive discourse that ultimately masks evil
and silences the sufferer. Therefore, they call for theodicy to be abandoned. This appeal is a
challenge to my assumption that theodicy is inescapable where human hope is concerned. In
constructive and critical dialogue with the anti-theodicy appeal, I introduce some distinctions
between different forms of theodicy. In the second half of the chapter, I develop a method for
distinguishing between these different forms in terms of how they characterize conflict and
anticipate its resolution. My purpose is to say how the hope engendered by the Christian
narrative theodicy is different from its rivals.
Theodicy and Eschatology in Narrative Terms
I’ll begin by illustrating my thesis with a parable.5
5
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There was once a man who was a character within a story. One day—inexplicably—he
began to hear the voice of his Author narrating him in the omniscient third person—explaining
his actions, describing his feelings, foreshadowing his future. Then it began to dawn on him. His
life was in someone else’s hands. And not his life alone, but the existence of all the other people
around him—living, deceased, yet to be born—they were all characters of this author’s story.
The man shuddered as he thought back to the awful things he and his fellow characters had
endured. All the violence suffered and committed—in some awful way—appeared to flow from
this author. Then the man condemned the story as unfit to be told. No happy ending could justify
it. In his eyes, this Author had lost authority. Curiously, he began to wonder whether or not the
voice he was hearing wasn’t his own. Maybe he had imagined the whole thing? Perhaps there
was no Author in the first place.
Then he decided to author his own story. Whatever sense that might be made of his life was
up to him to create. But the question, “Can this story be justified?” did not go away. It simply
found a new target. Now he bore the burden. He considered passing the buck, but then realized
this burden would exist regardless of where authorial responsibility came to rest. Whether
shouldered by him, his community, his country, or humankind as a whole, the question of
justification was unavoidable.6 The meaningfulness of his life could not be maintained without a
story. And there can be no story without an author. But which Author to trust?

Definitions of Constitutive Features in a Narrative Theodicy
To answer that question is to begin the discourse of theodicy. This is narrative discourse
because it involves telling a story. “Story” in this case refers to a way to make sense of
6
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something, and so, in order for the story to be justified, it must intelligibly resolve the conflict
internal to its plot. That is to say, it must overcome its own peculiar problem of evil. Since the
final resolution makes the story, narrative discourse is also eschatological discourse.
Eschatology and theodicy speak to the same point: justifying the story, which is to render the
Author reliable.
In the prior paragraph I used italics to indicate the technical nature of these terms. I use
them in a somewhat novel way, but these same terms are applied in a variety of ways by other
writers. During the course of this chapter, I will align and offset my usage with theirs. For now, I
will define them in a preliminary way. I set the terms to fit the purpose of comparing Christian
hope as one theodicy among rivals.
Eschatology is discourse on the narrative logic of a life-organizing, hope-eliciting story.
Narrative logics are distinguished by how the conflict in the plot resolves. Resolution includes
first a characterization of the conflict and then a manner of overcoming it. Since these stories
establish the “real world,” they are still in progress and unfinished as long as that world endures.
Thus, every eschatology has a proleptic or now-and-not-yet character. The resolution can only be
anticipated. If the story is accepted, then it is assumed that the residual conflict in its plot will not
render it unintelligible. In this way, evil is expected to be overcome. Thus, the story’s Author
will be accepted as reliable.
Intelligibility is the quality of a story that allows it to be a story. An intelligible story is
more basic than a story as such. An unintelligible story is a failed candidate for the status of an
intelligible story.7 Because life-organizing stories are unfinished, because life goes on, no story
can indisputably claim to already possess intelligibility. All stories-of-the-world continue as
7
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candidates for an intelligible story. In time, they will either be condemned or vindicated.
Therefore intelligibility is only experienced proleptically. It remains for now an object of hope.
To narrate and participate in a story is to anticipate and await its vindication.
The Problem of Evil is the conflict resident in the plot of a life-organizing story. Not all
negative occurrences are experienced as “evil.” It is only those experiences that threaten to make
life unintelligible, thus unraveling the story which had until then made life meaningful. Also, not
all life-organizing stories will be problematized by the same negative experiences. Driven by
declarative speech acts, the story itself characterizes what counts as good and what counts as
evil. Whatever is characterized as evil is a threat in the story, but not necessarily a terminal
threat. Because it is a story of good overcoming evil, the participants within that story trust that
evil will not prevail. Good will triumph and thus hope is in order. Negative experience, or evil,
only becomes a problem when it undermines trust in the story’s implied Author and makes
participation in that story unsustainable.
Theodicy is discourse that seeks to demonstrate the author’s reliability. Spoken from within
a given life-organizing story, this discourse declares evil to be “evil” and good to be “good.”
Additionally, it describes (theoretically) or prescribes (pragmatically) how “evil” is to be
overcome. Thus, theodicy is always narrative discourse. It is identical to eschatology in the sense
that both argue for, speak of, reflect on, and anticipate the resolution of conflict within an allencompassing plot. Eschatology and theodicy both aim to elicit trust in the Author by telling the
story in the midst of conflict and anticipating its resolution.
To summarize, eschatology and theodicy are two ways to characterize one activity: telling,
inhabiting, critiquing, revising, and clinging to a life-organizing story. Such a story presumes a
trustworthy Author and an ultimate resolution to its plot. By defining theodicy like this, I am
expanding a widely accepted, but narrow definition of theodicy as a theoretical enterprise “to

86

give positive, plausible reasons for the existence of evil in a theistic universe.”8 In doing so, I am
following several scholars who have expanded the word to include non-theistic discourse. I will
briefly mention three: a theorist of literature and religion, a philosopher, and a sociologist.
Theodicy in the Broad Sense
Larry Bouchard explored how evil is portrayed in both drama and in religious thought. He
used the term “theodicy” broadly to express the human desire for coherence in the face of evil.
“Theodicy,” for his purposes, “refers not only to theological justifications of evil and the ‘ways
of God to man,’ but to any endeavor, theological or otherwise, to bring coherence to the problem
of evil and thereby justify humanity to itself.”9
Susan Neiman framed modern philosophy as an extended attempt at theodicy, which has a
narrow and a wide definition:
Theodicy, in the narrow sense, allows the believer to maintain faith in God in face of
the world’s evils. Theodicy, in the broad sense, is any way of giving meaning to evil
that helps us face despair. Theodicies place evils within structures that allow us to go
on in the world.10
After Neiman narrated her alternative history of philosophy, she noted how theodicy came to an
end, “over and over, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, only to reappear in other
forms. Its persistence in the face of attack testifies to the fact that theodicy meets some deep
human needs.”11 What keeps theodicy going is the “need to face evil in the world without giving
in to despair.”12 It is an expression of humanity’s refusal to live without hope.
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Writing more than thirty years before Neiman, sociologist Ernest Becker raised a similar
argument in his book The Structure of Evil. He stated that the “central problem” posed by the
modern scientific revolution, which “is still ours today,” is “the problem of a new theodicy.”
After Newton declared the world demystified, something “entirely different had to be done to
explain evil in the world.” Humanity “could not put the burden on God … The new theodicy had
to be a natural one, a ‘secular’ one … an ‘anthropodicy.’” 13 This theodicy no longer had to
account for all suffering. Instead, “it would limit itself to the use of human powers effecting
whatever they can to overcome avoidable evil.”14 Other forms of suffering were deemed
unavoidable and thereby vanquished in the very act of coming to see them in a new light. Death
by “natural” causes, earthquakes, the occasional illness—these could all be easily explained by a
people that no longer looked for divine intervention in the world. As natural disasters they no
longer formed a part of the conflict in the plot. They were just part of the narrative setting.
A commonality among these theodicies is that they offer a positive response to the
question: “Is this Author trustworthy?” For Enlightenment philosophers, the original Source of
the universe was no longer seen as the “Author of all things.” Whether it was a distant designer
or impersonal evolutionary forces, the Origin of life merely provided the setting. As David
Hume’s Philo concluded, the “original source of all things is entirely indifferent … and has no
more regard to good above ill than heat above cold.”15 If there was to be any emplotment, any
resolution, any hope, modern humanity would need to be its author. With the deity factored out,
the burden of authorship falls on mortals. But, as Luther said, this is exactly what it means to
13
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have a god. And since every storied world is still plagued by a proleptically-resolved problem of
evil, trust in any Author anticipates a successful theodicy.
Christian doctrine, especially in the Lutheran tradition, has recognized that alongside “the
true faith that corresponds to the one true God there is false faith, or trust in idols. Of both it is
true that whereon our heart hangs and relies is our God.” But to call one God “true” and another
“false” is itself a theodical claim that must await eschatological vindication. The claim itself
“does not decide who is the true God.”16 Hindus, humanists, evolutionary psychologists, and
Christians must, for the time being, “live with provisional answers.”17 They all inhabit standard
stories that are not yet complete. They experience conflict that is not yet resolved. They trust
authorities whose reliability is contested. Thus, comparing other forms of eschatological hope
with Christian hope involves comparing rival narrative theodicies.
The Anti-Theodicy Appeal
At first glance, the approach I have introduced is contrary to the work of several scholars.
These writers, both Christian and non-Christian, share a common objective: remove theodicy
from both every-day and academic discourse. Terrence Tilley, a Roman Catholic scholar, is
notable among them. In 1991, He presented a book-length argument to this point: “theodicy is a
discourse practice which ought to be abandoned.”18 Appeals such as Tilley’s typically begin with
a precise definition: “Theodicy refers to attempts to justify God when the logic of theism is at
risk: (a) God is omnipotent; (b) God is all good; (c) there is evil. Theodicy tries to hold all three
together and explain how a and b are still true even in the presence of c.”19 This is the definition
16
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Carol Lakey Hess used in an article from 2009, where she argued that realist and tragic literature
should play a prominent role in religious education. Though Hess did not reference Tilley’s
work, she was continuing his anti-theodicy agenda almost twenty years later. Hess did, however,
reference an author to whom Tilley was also indebted: Kenneth Surin, specifically his 1986 book
Theology and the Problem of Evil.20
Hess’s complaint against theodicy was that it “often seems like a mop up task when the
grime and grit of life leaves tracks all over our polished abstract theological presuppositions.”21
She thought tragic and realistic literature can counteract these abstractions because a “tragic
novel is frequently an experience that destabilizes theodicy, and it pressures us to re-ask the
questions that produced tidy justifications of God.”22 Later Hess related theodicy to “comedic
theologies,” which presume a “movement from the real world to the ideal” and thereby “obscure
the tragic nature of life.” This is because “they affirm God’s providence and abundance but then
‘punt’ to eschatology when it is clear that God’s abundance is too far in the distance.” Comedic
theologies are distinguished from a “tragically structured theology,” which “focuses more on
describing the world as it is and less on justifying God and projecting triumph.” 23 This implies
that realistic, tragic theologies reject theodicy and are essentially noneschatological. For tragic
theologians, questions like “Why do people suffer?” or “Where is God in suffering?” do not
simply go away. But unlike comedic theologians, tragic theologians, according to Hess, would
address these questions with the aim of keeping them open and morally productive.
Fitzgerald as Narrators of (Anti-)Theodicy,” in Religious Education 104 (2009), 354n1.
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Realist literature can lead the way from comedic to tragic theology. Hess explored works
by F. Scott Fitzgerald and Toni Morrison because both challenge “the peculiarly North American
theodical narrative—the ‘Rags to Riches’ Myth” and “its corollary the American Dream.” These
life-organizing stories “slide into theological triumphalism and become an implicit form of
justifying God—suggesting that those with enough discipline and determination will prosper …
and neither God nor social forces are to blame if they get lost in history’s waste.”24 This storied
theodicy teaches its hearers to avert their eyes from suffering. Hess critiqued the theologies
arising from it: “This religion of progress has produced triumphal theologies that lack a provision
for disillusionment and failure.”25 But tragic theologies can correct this.
Hess suggested that philosophy and theology were “starting to take clues from literature”
by moving away from “theorizing about evil” toward “telling stories” (fiction and nonfiction)
that recount experiences of suffering. “Such stories do not reduce evil to an abstract rationale or
calculation,” but rather “enlarge and increase our capacity for reflection about what constitutes
evil and suffering.”26 These stories are valuable because through struggling with them the readers
“gain a more honest gaze and an enlarged moral vision.” Hess applied this to reading biblical
narratives in the context of religious education. Stories from the Bible should be read “not to
decipher what the text ‘says’ as much as to consider what goes on in the readers as they engage
in the event of reading.”27
Drawing on Reader-Response Criticism, Hess focused on how Bible stories can be
employed in forming moral character. This is not radically different than Kant’s reading of the
24
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biblical narratives, which I noted in chapter one. In a Kantian reading, the biblical vision of
Israel’s God’s unilateral triumph over sin and suffering was, at best, a moral object lesson. At
worst, it was a charter for quietist resignation. Fearing the worst, Hess urged religious educators
not to “punt” to biblical eschatology.
However, Hess does not comment on what can be construed as an alternative eschatology
at work in tragic theology. This eschatology derives from a story about growing up, which
includes a different sort of triumph over evil. It is triumph through disillusionment. Its resolution
includes becoming “more human,” and having “theologies less convinced of their divinity.” It
begins by removing the “white lace doily of triumphalism.” Once stripped of these false
consolations, the protagonist is ready to face the real world. Tragic stories are employed to create
experiences within the reader that will result in an enlarged and fortified moral vision. Triumph
over evil does not occur in the renewal of the cosmos but in the renewal of the interpretive
community. The story’s ultimate resolution is proleptically experienced when tragic stories
“make us gaze at suffering,” and then, “by their pathos … make us want to make things
otherwise.”28
The life-organizing story invoked by a tragic theology can be read as a narrative theodicy.
It is, no doubt, different from the theoretical theodicy that resolves only after a conceptual quest
in search of a solution to a propositionally stated problem of evil. It would involve a different
form of discourse. The tragic narrative theodicy has the illocutionary point of a directive:
“Become a person who wants to make things otherwise.” It intends to overcome evil by ridding
the hearer of his or her idealistic illusions—to make the interpersonal world fit to the directive
word: “Grow up.” The classic form of theodicy tells a story with the illocutionary point of an
28
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assertive: “This is the best of all possible worlds and here is why.” It intends to overcome evil by
making the explanatory word fit to the world “as it really is” despite all appearances.
It is tempting to differentiate between the two by saying the tragic theodicy is “limited”
while the classic theodicy tries to be “comprehensive.” But this misses an important point. Both
are comprehensive within the context of the story they tell. The tragic story seems more limited
because it does not designate sin-and-suffering in general as “evil.” These are just matter-of-fact
features of the “real” world. The world “is what it is.” The problem of evil, for the tragic story, is
the illusion that these experiences can be explained or reconciled by reference to an ideal world.
Whichever way evil is defined, participants in both stories experience already-but-not-yet forms
of resolution. Both claim to establish reality by telling an intelligible, standard story—a story by
which all others should be judged. Both stories are backed by a particular authority, an implied
author. But the question remains, which Author to trust?
Like Hess, Terrence Tilley sought to counter theodicy as assertive, theoretical discourse.
They both relied on Surin’s Theology and the Problem of Evil, in which the writer contrasted
between “theodicies with a theoretical emphasis” and “theodicies with a practical emphasis.”29
Although this distinction is fundamental to Surin’s argument, neither Hess nor Tilley
incorporated it into theirs. Tilley restricted his project to campaigning against “theodicy proper,”
which emerged during the Enlightenment and constructed “the problem of evil as a problem to
be solved by a cool and detached explanation, not by a commitment to actions undertaken in
order to alleviate the various particular evils.”30 For Tilley, Surin’s “theodicies with a practical
29
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emphasis” is a misnomer. “Theodicy is a discourse practice which is ‘impractical.’”31 Tilley gave
a reason for his focused terminology. He thought broad, or “extended uses” of the term theodicy
blind one to the unique problems and power of the Enlightenment practice of
theodicy proper, a practice which serves to marginalize all other discourse about God
and evil. Indeed, once one stops collapsing all discourse about God and evil into one
form, the difference between dry, measured, cool, calm, abstract academic voices and
nonacademic voices are obvious. They sound in very different discourse practices.32
I intend to heed Tilley’s warning about collapsing all discourse into one form. At the same
time, I will pursue Surin’s insight that theodicies come in different forms. Unlike Tilley, I do not
assume the label “theodicy” only applies to one form of speaking about God and evil—the
theoretical kind. As I inferred with the tragic theology invoked by Hess, it is possible to organize
one’s life around a tragic theodicy. This story overcomes evil by accepting the tragic nature of
the world and then by resolving to become a kind of person who wants to make things different.
The evil overcome here is not the tragic world, but the false consolations that mask injustice and
silence sufferers. From Tilley’s perspective, this does not warrant the label “theodicy” because it
is not an Enlightenment theodicy “proper.” However, there is nothing in Tilley’s approach that
would formally dissuade a more “extended” use of the term, so long as theodicy is qualified in
some other sense. Tilley and other anti-theodicists like Hess might justifiably question such an
extension: Why drag the Christian tradition into an Enlightenment problem? I answer: the
biblical narrators are much too concerned about declaring Israel’s God’s righteousness for this to
merely to be an Enlightenment problem.
The Possibility of a Properly Christian Theodicy
The anti-theodicy appeal typically targets one specific mode of discourse. Theodicy, for
Tilley, was theoretical, impractical, assertive declaration. As indicated above, I am enlarging the
31

Ibid., 229.

94

term to include other forms of narrative discourse, especially forms that are appropriate for
telling, inhabiting, and enacting the Christian story. As a Christian, Tilley argued against the
theoretical form of theodicy because it is, in the first place, inappropriate for Christians. This is
because it promotes a rival life-organizing story. By saying that, I have reframed Tilley’s antitheodicy appeal. He is not against theodicy per se. He is against an Enlightenment story that set
up a world in which many forms of evil were concealed. To counter this story, he challenged
many of the Enlightenment’s categories for discourse on God and evil. But his narrow focus kept
him from addressing how a properly Christian theodicy would be different. In the next section, I
extend his approach as a means to compare rival narrative theodicies, with special reference to
the Christian narrative theodicy, which is the source of Christian hope.
A Speech Act Approach. In the first part of his book, Tilley applied Speech Act Theory to
discourse practices within religious traditions. He explained that a speech act approach can be
used to compare various forms of religious discourse. Such a comparison can be made without
assuming a universal religious experience, such as a “consciousness of being absolutely
dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.”33 Tilley believed that a
speech act approach “provides a way beyond the impasse between what Lindbeck has
categorized as the cultural-linguistic and experiential-expressivist approaches.”34 Like the
cultural-linguistic view, a speech act approach insists that religious language is used according to
intra-systematic rules. This intra-textual grammar is “neither reducible to nor justified by some
common religious experience.” But, like the experiential-expressivist, a speech act approach
32
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“presumes that religious practices are comparable.” But it “does not presume that a basic
experience, attitude, or entity is a foundation” for such practices.35 My approach, similar to
Tilley’s, presumes that analogous discourse practices (e.g., recounting, criticizing, defending,
and proclaiming a life-organizing story) can be found in various traditions and “provide a bridge
for comparisons.”36
Theodicy by Assertive Declaration. In the final chapter of his book, Tilley concluded:
“Theodicy proper, as a resolution to the problem of evil, is a discourse practice … which
emerges in the Enlightenment.”37 By “theodicy proper,” Tilley meant what Surin called
“theodicies with a theoretical emphasis.” Tilley’s account of the rise of theodicy “proper”
follows Surin, who argued that new forms of theoretical reflection during the Enlightenment
created a new problem of evil. With the “cognitional individualism” introduced by Descartes,
“the ‘project’ of theodicy” became “a work of solitary reflection,” something that could be
engaged in “by any individual who has the requisite capacity to judge.”38 As Becker said, the
problem of evil for an eighteenth-century European deist was how to reconcile suffering with the
existence of a “gentlemen God,” who “ran the universe in regular, lawful ways, not angry,
cataclysmic ones.”39 Tilley then summarized: “These theodicy projects make sense [for
Christians] only on the presumption that Enlightenment theism is the expression of belief in God
proper to Christianity.” But this is problematic if doctrines of the Trinity, Christology, and
soteriology are considered “auxiliary to basic theism, but as constitutive of Christian belief in
35
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God.” 40 And as Surin suggested, it is doubtful that the “Cosmic Actualizer” defended by modern
theodicists is “even telescopically identifiable as the Holy One who is the Father of Jesus
Christ.”41
Tilley identified modern theodicy discourse as “assertive declaration.” He assumed the
basics of John Searle’s taxonomy of speech acts I described in chapter two. Speech acts attain in
the form of assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives.42 Tilley classified
theodicy as a “hybrid” speech act, which has “multiple forces, depending upon their content,
context, and purpose.”43 At first glance, modern theodicy seems to have only an assertive
illocutionary point. Theodicists try to “show how things really are (despite appearances).”44 But,
theodicists do more than describe how evil is somehow necessary or beneficial to the bigger
picture. They declare a new reality in which good and evil can be identified and sorted out.
“Those who write theodicies declare what evil is.” Moreover, “the purpose of theodicists’
declarations is to find God not responsible for, not guilty of, what they declare evil … as if the
theodicist were rendering a verdict on God.” 45
Earlier in the book, Tilley noted that such a communicative act “requires a narrative
setting.”46 By doing so, he connected this insight to his prior work in narrative theology. He cited
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his 1985 book, Story Theology, where he discussed stories that “set up worlds” (myths), “upset
worlds” (parables), and “set in worlds” (actions, or realistic narratives).47 In The Evils of
Theodicy, he likened Enlightenment theodicy to a story that “sets up” a world. 48 This story began
with a declaration: “Let there be an absolute, impersonal ideal that governs the universe.” The
conflict in this storied-world is human ignorance as to how all things, even negative experiences,
fall in line with the ideal. The conflict in this plot is resolved via one’s conceptual journey to see
the world aright. The negativities would eventually be transcended and thus fit into an
increasingly clear view of the “divine plan” or the “big picture.”49
Tilley urged resistance to this assertive-declaration of the Enlightenment’s story. Its
evangelists mis-declare some evils and efface others in order to make all negative experiences fit
logically into a “systematic totalization.”50 “In the end, theodicy is a declaration which cannot but
be a falsifying declaration which is either destructive or incoherent.” It “effaces the difference
between the world that theodicists wish to be … and the world that is.”51 Theodicy itself is evil
because it silences the sufferers lest they disrupt the theodicist’s enjoyment of the view.
Therefore, it ought to be disrupted and abandoned.
Disrupting Theodical Assertions. Part of Tilley’s strategy to disrupt this myth was to reread several texts which have received canonical status among modern theodicists. Following the
accepted strategy of assertive-declaration to overcome evil, they tend to read these texts in that
47
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light. These texts are thought to assert the propositions that set the terms of the debate. I will
briefly review how Tilley used speech act analysis of the biblical book of Job, David Hume’s
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Augustine’s Enchiridion to contradict these
assertions.
Tilley observed that theodicists tend “silence Job’s voice” and “ignore the text.”52 This is
because it is a threat to logical, systematic totalization of how God relates to creatures. “The
Book of Job shows a God to whom human practices and concepts of justice are irrelevant.”53
Luther, in his preface to the book, lamented with Job at how “God torments even the righteous
without cause.”54 What is the illocutionary point of this? Some focus on Job’s restoration at the
end and take it as assertive declaration about the justice of God’s ways: All suffering is a test of
faith and all the faithful will eventually be rewarded. But Tilley reminded his reader,
God’s restoring Job is not a result of Job’s speaking or other actions … Both torment
and restoration are unrelated to anything Job does … The Book of Job, then, as a
speech act, cannot answer a reader’s questions about the meaning of suffering or
direct a reader to act in a specific way … In sum, “gratuitous restoration,” in
disconnecting crime from punishment, reward from merit, provides no positive
solutions to problems readers bring to it.55
Job should be heard as a negative directive. It is not prescriptive but proscriptive. It “warns
against neglecting suffering when trying to understand the way things really are or standing
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outside of the realm of suffering and telling the suffering how they could solve their problems.”56
The discourse of Job delivers a simple charge: Don’t try to justify God.57
Later Tilley turned to David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Within this
dialogue between Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes, it was Philo who posed the question that is
usually taken as the classic statement of the Enlightenment problem of evil:
Is [the Deity] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent.
Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?58
Most theodicists, according to Tilley, construe Hume as a skeptic challenging religious belief.
“Then they try to meet that challenge by constructing a theodicy.” But this is “inadequate and
irrelevant” to Hume’s real challenge.59 It is common to understand Hume as making twin
arguments against classical theism by invoking both the logical and evidential problem of evil.
The standard interpretation takes the skeptical Philo as Hume’s mouthpiece who defeats both a
metaphysical theist (Cleanthes) and a mystic (Demea). Tilley thought this was mistaken. He
heard Hume’s voice in the Dialogues as a whole. If this is the case, what communicative acts
did he perform? Clearly the work deconstructs both philosophical and religious certainty, but
there is more to it than that. Tilley found two points: first, a warning against building a claim for
God’s goodness upon a foundation of empirical evidence; second, a “challenge to the reader to
become aware of the weaknesses and strengths of nonfoundationalist faith.”60
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Reading the Dialogues has provoked many a theist to respond to what they took as a
generalized, propositional problem of evil. But the problem Hume raises is not merely for
philosophical theism, but for all claims about how the way things “really are,” including his own.
Hume portrayed the persistent rivalry among the three—foundationalist, skeptic, and
nonfoundationalist. Each tells his own tale with his own narrative logic, none of which is able
incontestably establish his claims against the others.
In a similar fashion, Tilley surveyed misappropriations of Augustine and again responded
with a speech act analysis. First he outlined what is generally accepted as an “Augustinian”
theodicy: The all-powerful, good God created rational, morally good beings with whom he could
relate. To do so, it was logically necessary for him to endow these beings with free will. But
some of them irrationally exercised their will and placed themselves, rather than God, at the
center of their affections. Through this sinful choice, their nature was distorted. These became
the devil and his demons. Then, through the satanically-inspired sin of Adam and Evil, this
corruption spread to all humanity. Having become sinful by nature, all deserve both temporal and
eternal punishment. But God chose to save some through a gift of unmerited grace.
Hence, all evil in the world is a result of sin. Natural evils, including much human
suffering, result from angelic sin, and moral and spiritual evils from human sin.
Those who are damned deserve eternal punishment because they sinned. Their
punishment restores order to the universe.61
By this explanation, God’s justice is said to have been demonstrated. But, according to Tilley,
this “is not Augustine’s theodicy; it is an amalgamation.”62 It has been constructed by theologians
who have mined Augustine’s writings for a means to exonerate God by the standard of
Enlightenment theodicy, which is foreign to Augustine’s thought.
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Tilley criticized the way modern theodicits extract and homogenize content from
Augustine’s varied works. They assume this content can be characterized as an explanation of
why there is evil in the world. They use it to assert the fundamental soundness of their theistic
system. Having reached the summit on a mental journey from ignorance to clarity, they bear
witness to the view: “Trust me,” they say, “the structure is sound. It’s not as bad as it seems. I
have seen the big picture. All evils are necessary evils. They serve a greater good.” Tilley
contended that this is not the form of Augustine’s discourse. He reviewed Augustine’s
Enchiridion to make his case. Though this work is often taken as an assertive declaration giving
an explanation for evil, Tilley regards it as an “instruction” to guide the catechumen’s intellect
and will. “Its point is to convey the essentials of the Christian creed.” Thus, it is an
“institutionally bound assertive.”63 Augustine assumed the world disclosed by the biblical
narrative(s) and aimed to make his words fit that storied world. Within the context of the
catechism, this world was not contested, and so no declaration was necessary. Unlike modern
theodicies, Augustine’s Enchiridion does not speak forth a new storied world where good and
evil enjoy a proper balance as greater good and necessary evil. As Surin argued, “For Augustine
… the solution of the ‘problem of evil’ must await God’s triune revelation of himself. It cannot
be sought anywhere else.”64
Augustine’s Enchiridion, according to Tilley, does not make, but assumes a declaration.
Within the world established by the biblical narrative(s), Augustine states “what should be
believed, what should be hoped for, what should be loved,”65 assuming the Christian story is the
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case. When this doctrine is challenged by a problem of evil (Why does God allow any evil? Why
are some saved, but not others?), Augustine asserts a defense, but not a theodicy.66 The difference
is the lack of declaration. A defense only disarms the challenger’s discourse by suggesting
possibilities for how the Christian story is not rendered incoherent by the challenge. A theodicy
goes further by declaring a new storied-system in which questions that were not answered within
the original story can now be answered. In contrast, the defense stays in its native story. It is
content to block the attack with a hypothetical explanation. It is “not the real solution of the
problem of evil. That solution lies elsewhere.”67
A Defense Implies a Narrative Theodicy. A theodicy aims to provide a basis for belief,
whereas a defense assumes another basis is already in place. The distinction between theodicy
and defense is important even if we are unsure whether or not it can hold under pressure. It is
important because of what it implies: if a defense is not supposed to be the basis of Christian
belief, then that basis must lie elsewhere. This raises a question critical for my project: Should
this basis be understood as a kind of theodicy? I think it should be, if theodicy is defined more
generally as discourse intended to elicit trust in the Author of a life-organizing story. In contrast
to Tilley, I argue that this more encompassing definition of theodicy is needed for two reasons:
first, because Christian faith is based on the trustworthiness68 of the God of Jesus; and second,
66

Tilley, Evils of Theodicy, 130–33.

67

Ibid., 125. For another explanation of a defense versus a theodicy, see Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil,
28, “A theodicist … attempts to tell us why God permits evil.” But a defense does “not say what God’s reason is, but
at most what God’s reason might possibly be.” Note how Plantinga locates both defense and theodicy in the realm of
theory. For debate on Plantinga’s (and Tilley’s) distinction between theodicy and defense, see Jerry Walls, “Why
Plantinga Must Move from Defense to Theodicy,” in Peterson, The Problem of Evil, 331–34.
68

My glossing of righteousness/justice (dikaiosynē) with “trustworthy” has precedent in N. T. Wright’s
interpretation of Romans in The New Interpreter’s Bible, vol. 10 (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 403–4, where he
claimed God’s Righteousness is “the theme of Romans,” assuming righteousness means God’s “faithfulness” to his
covenantal promises to Israel, which were “intended as the means of putting God’s world to rights.” This is also
Luther’s point in the Large Catechism, where he made trustworthiness God’s definitive attribute: “To have a God …
is nothing else than to entrust yourself to him completely” (Kolb-Wengert, The Book of Concord, 388).

103

since participation in other life-organizing stories is also based on the trustworthiness of their
implied authors, a broad notion of theodicy will be useful for comparing them with the Christian
story. With Tilley, I assume these theodicies should not be collapsed into one form of discourse.
How Theodicies Characterize Conflict and Anticipate Resolution
Life-organizing stories count as theodicies. They declare a conflict with evil and speak
toward the resolution of this conflict. But not all stories speak in the same manner. We can
discern that narrative theodicies seek to justify their authors in different ways, and it would be
helpful to have a method for sorting them out. Such a method would enable us to identify the
narrative logic by answering questions like, what is the conflict that drives this story? And, how
is this conflict supposed to be overcome? The method I begin to develop in this chapter is fitted
for answering these questions. It distinguishes between different forms of narrative theodicy by
how they characterize conflict and anticipate resolution. I will use these distinctions to construct
a typology of narrative theodicies in the following chapter. For now, I introduce them and
explain how they identify the narrative logic of a life-organizing story. To understand narrative
logic, at least two questions must be asked of the story: (1) How is evil characterized? (2) How is
the conflict with evil hoped to be resolved? For the sake of simplicity, I assume each question
has a binary set of answers. For the first, evil can be characterized either idealistically or
realistically. For the second, evil can be overcome either theoretically or pragmatically. To
elaborate these distinctions, I draw from the work of several scholars, most notably Susan
Neiman, Oswald Bayer, and Kenneth Surin.
As I construct this method, I continue to assume the basics of Tilley’s speech act approach.
I take a characterization of evil as a declarative speech act. Both idealists and realists make
creative declarations when they say what counts as evil and what counts as good. They make the
world fit the word at the moment the word fits the world. This discourse “sets up” a new storied
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world. But then this new world suffers conflict. In order for the world to hold together, the
conflict must be resolved. The strategy for overcoming conflict involves issuing more speech
acts. It can be overcome theoretically, by the participants fitting their words (and minds) to the
world as it “actually” is. Or the conflict can be overcome pragmatically, by participants making
the present world come to fit their words (and minds). The theoretic strategy intends to overcome
evil by making better assertions. The pragmatic strategy works to overcome evil by issuing
successful directives or commissives.
Characterizing Evil
Eschatology is discourse on how the conflict in the plot of a life-organizing story resolves.
Theodicy is discourse that attempts to justify the Author of such a story. Both speak to the
resolution of conflict within an all-encompassing plot. Both aim to elicit trust in the Author by
telling the story in spite of the conflict. Therefore, characterizing the conflict in a given story is
imperative for comparing its hope to Christian hope.
Conflict is created by a declarative speech act which calls a certain state of affairs “evil.”
According to Susan Neiman, “designating something as evil is a way of marking the fact that it
shatters our trust in the world.”69 The effect, not the term, is the crucial element. If something
“shatters trust” in a storied world, then it has the impact of “evil” whether or not the signifier
“evil” is used. The basic form of the response is: “This (evil) ought not be.”
Since the character of this declaration is a criterion for comparing theodicies, I place these
declarations into one of two general categories. If this generalization were not made, I would
need to treat the various declarations of each speech act community on their own terms. While
that might be interesting, it would not offer conceptual clarity as to how Christian hope is distinct
69
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from others. Therefore, I appropriate Susan Neiman’s generalizations for my purposes. Hers are
helpful because they make sense of many philosophical authorities in the modern western
tradition. Dialog with this tradition is critical for understanding a post-Constantinian situation.
Also, Neiman’s categories are broad enough to make sense of many pre-modern and non-western
traditions.
How does a given narrator characterize evil? Using Neiman’s classification, I assume two
formal possibilities: an idealist declaration or a realist declaration. The idealist declares, “Reality
is not what it seems.” The realist responds, “It is.”70 The prior speaker begins by trying to find
some hidden “order in addition to the miserable one presented by experience.” He continues with
the desire to transcend or transform our given reality in some way by making the self or the
world conform, in some mode or measure, to an ideal of the good. In contrast, the realist looks
for no such order. He begins with critique of the idealist and is inclined to “abandon every search
for ideals … along with every search for sense and a system.”71 He denies “the reality of
anything beyond brute appearances.”72
Imagine this as a divide in a conceptual road. Each path represents the tendency to head
toward one of two extremes when struck by the sentiment, “many things are possible, but this
ought not to have happened.”73 Go left, on the idealist path, and you agree with your gut and set
off on a quest to see the is be reconciled to the ought. Go right, on the realist path, and you
70
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dismiss that sentiment as wishful thinking and say—“it is what it is.” Of course, these are
simplified. In everyday life, most people live in the conflict between the two.
The terms “idealism” and “realism” are used in a variety of ways. Sometimes they are used
almost synonymously with “rationalism” and “empiricism.” This is not Neiman’s approach. She
admitted the tenacity of the historical narrative which tells how modern philosophy struggled to
secure the foundations of human knowledge. But she said this “narrative is flawed, for it lacks
what is central to dramatic movement anywhere: a compelling motive … it’s a narrative of
philosophers who act without intention.”74 Rather than reading eighteenth and nineteenth century
philosophers as consumed in a debate about how we know what we think we know, she claimed
the great philosophers of the canon were concerned with nothing more or less
gripping than the questions that move bright seventeen-year-olds to wonder, and
worry, about sense and meaning. These are the questions that unite moral and
metaphysical concerns and show why each of them matters … Growing up makes us
think more and not less often about whether history presents anything but grounds for
despair, or whether hopes for progress are based on anything but wishful thinking.75
It was not mere curiosity that motivated them, but a “demand that the world be intelligible.”76 It
was a need to live with hope and therefore a demand to tell an intelligible story about the world.
Idealist. Such a story begins with declarative speech that establishes what is good as
opposed to evil. This declaration gets the story going by designating the conflict in the plot. The
first kind of declarative is that of an idealist. Among the philosophers who judged between good
and evil based on a real, but hidden order, Neiman included Leibniz, Pope, Rousseau, Kant,
Hegel, and Marx. She admitted that most of these thinkers “would reject each other’s company.”
Nevertheless, “all are united by some form of hope for a better order than the one we
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experience.”77 In the conclusion of her chapter on these thinkers, she observed that they all
wished to displace God78—not in the sense of claiming design rights to the universe, but in the
sense of being authors of a meaningful story about the universe. As authors, they declared what
was evil based on their idea of what was ultimately good. For Leibniz, this good was knowledge
about the true order of things. For Kant it was the moral ought that stood over and against all
nature and contingency. For Hegel it was the idea of historical progress toward comprehensive
meaning. For Marx it was the creation of classless society. The details of their declarations were
diverse. But they are unified as a form of judgment against evil by the standard of an ideal good.
Realist. The realist declaration is, in the first place, a critique of the idealist. The writers
Neiman discussed here included Bayle, Voltaire, Hume, Sade, and Schopenhauer. She noted that
grouping philosophers by these categories “overlooks many crucial differences between them.
But it’s no cruder than the division of thinkers into rationalists and empiricists.” Generalizations
always preclude precision. But they do not rule out rough knowledge, fit to the task. This
generalization is appropriate here because it aligns these disparate voices into a single protest
against the perceived arrogance of the first group. The realists collectively criticized the idealists
for playing God by attempting to render judgment according to human standards. The realists
insisted “that things are indeed what they seem.” Appeals to a hidden order were either a form of
escape or egotism. The world must be faced “honestly,” for “experience is just what it seems.”79
The argument between the two groups is about “what to take more seriously: the stark and
painful awareness that we have for a moment when confronted with any form of evil; or the
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ideas and explanations that allow us to transcend it.”80 Neiman tends to classify the first group as
theodicists, while the second group she describes as anti-theodicits. As I argued above regarding
comedic and tragic theology, the division between theodicy and anti-theodicy does not hold.
They are simply two different kinds of theodicy driven by two differing declarations about what
counts as evil. For the comedic or idealist story, evil is the contrary of the ideal. For the tragic or
realist story, evil is the ideal itself. Clinging to ideals obscures the real world and prevents people
from facing it honestly. Each story projects a triumph over a different kind of evil, but both look
to this triumph as a source of ultimate or eschatological hope. Through that expected triumph,
the authority that plots the story will be justified. Therefore both the idealist (comedic) and the
realist (tragic) generate forms of narrative theodicy.
Overcoming Evil
Within Neiman’s division between idealists and realists, there is an additional, implicit
distinction. Her organization focused on how philosophers characterized evil. But this is only the
first part of the logic in a narrative theodicy. The declaration of evil sets up the conflict in the
storied world. But for that story to be intelligible, the conflict must resolve. Therefore we should
not only ask, “What counts as evil in this story?” but also, “How is evil overcome?” Again, I
assume two possibilities: evil is overcome either theoretically or pragmatically. I treated the
characterization of evil as a speech act. I do the same for the strategy to overcome evil. The
theoretic theodicy overcomes evil by making assertions, that is, by a process of fitting the
speaker’s words to the “true” world. The pragmatic theodicy overcomes evil by issuing
directives or commissives, that is, by a process of making the present world come to fit the
speaker’s word.
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This implicit division between theoretic and pragmatic strategies is present through
Neiman’s argument. In a brief summary of the idealists, she stated the following:
Chapter 1 examined philosophers who sought some reason or order behind the
world’s appearances that would explain or redeem or justify our experience. Whether
they sought to show that the world could be accepted or that it could be changed can
make all the difference in the world.81
I’ve italicized the key verbs which highlight the different strategies. The theoretic strategy
accepts the world. It can do so either from an idealist or a realist characterization. An idealist
would accept the world by trying to more precisely describe it according to its true, but hidden
order. Thus, she would transcend evil. But a realist would accept the world by trying to more
accurately describe the world according to face-value experiences. Thus, she would transcend
evil by scrapping illusions and facing the world honestly. In contrast, the pragmatic strategy
intends to change the world. It can do so either from an idealist or a realist starting point. An
idealist would change the world by directing others and/or herself to make the world measure up
to a universal ideal. A realist would change the world (or a small part of the world) by directing
others and/or herself to make the world more useful according to local custom and convention. In
both cases, evil is hoped to be overcome not through transcending it, but through transforming
the conditions that enabled the experience of evil. All four accounts work to justify the Author of
this story about the world.
Neiman briefly discussed this division when mentioning the differences between the
idealist Leibniz and the idealist Marx. Leibniz believed that humanity’s problem consisted in
blurred vision. If only we could see the world rightly, our problems would be solved. He held the
“right” to “consist in an order existing behind appearances that only God—at the moment—
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knows how to decode.” But Marx believed the problem was that we keep our heads in the
clouds. The ideal was not something to be decoded in a universe designed by a supernatural
being. Rather, it was to be realized in a future society designed by human beings. “Marx held the
right to consist in an order that humankind could establish.” Neiman summarized:
In practice, the difference between them could not be greater. In metaphysics, they
were closer than they seem, for each denied that appearances are final. Whether they
placed it in heaven or in history, each believed there was another court of appeal.82
In terms of how they judged evil against an ideal, Marx and Leibniz were similar. But their
strategies for overcoming evil and thus the narrative logic of their theodicies were quite different.
The former was theoretic. The latter was pragmatic.
Active vs. Passive. Other scholars have made Neiman’s second division explicit.
Sociologist Ernest Becker delineated between two forms of secular theodicy—one with a
“passive” strategy and another that was “active.” The first type was an effort to justify
humanity’s existence and status in the world by “trying to standardize and simplify life by
stressing conformity to what we find” in nature and reason, which were thought to be unified. In
contrast, the active type wanted to shape the world “to our own imaginative purposes.”
Advocates of the active type (e.g., Hume, Rousseau) criticized the former’s “naïve rationalist
trust in reading nature for moral precepts.”83 Recall how Neiman listed Hume among the realists
and Rousseau among the idealists. But Becker grouped them together in advocating an “active”
or a pragmatic, secular theodicy. They differ in their characterizations of evil, yet they are
aligned in their strategy to shape the world according to their purposes.
Contemplative vs. Active. More recently, German theologian Oswald Bayer made a
similar distinction. Bayer agreed with Neiman in saying that from “the time of Leibniz, the
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question of theodicy has become the key problem of our modern understanding of the world …
Now that the question of theodicy has become secularized, humanity is inescapably and totally
burdened with judgment.”84 As a Christian, Bayer felt that the “dispute of justifications reaches
its climax in the theodicy lawsuit about God.” The lack of answers continues to press on an old
wound: “Why do the just have to suffer? Why does God not restrain evil? Why does God not
intervene? Why does God not seem to care? Why does God evade us? ‘My God, my God, why
have you forsaken me?’” Bayer suggested that at least “two answers might be given that differ
from one another. The one involves contemplative thinking—let us call it ‘contemplative
theodicy.’ The other consists of action; we call it ‘active theodicy.’” Like Becker, Bayer split up
the philosophers that Neiman brought together as idealists. He listed the idealist Leibniz as a
contemplative theodicist and the idealist Marx as an active theodicist.85
Theoretical vs. Practical. Kenneth Surin also made the division. As mentioned above, his
argument in Theology and the Problem of Evil was centered on the contrast between “theodicies
with a theoretical emphasis” and “theodicies with a practical emphasis.”86 Neither Hess nor
Tilley found the division useful for their projects, but for mine it is essential. Surin observed that
a theoretical theodicy “has as its sole focus of investigation a range of arguments and judgments
… which their proponents hold to be true (or false) irrespective of time, place, and persons.”87
They give reasons that can be applied universally: evil exists because “the world is a vale of
soul-making;” “we are free beings;” “good is impossible without the possibility of evil.”88 In
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contrast, theodicies that approach the problem from an existential dimension have a “practical
emphasis.” Rather than giving answers that could be applied irrespective of persons, they speak
to specific situations. This evil exists because “I am imprisoned here;” “We are being tortured
now;” “You are indifferent to our hunger;” “God is an indifferent spectator.” The tools of
theoretical theodicy are critical doubt and discursive reasoning. The practical version does
theodicy with cries of outrage and action to right the wrong doing.
Summary. Neiman’s classification of idealists and realists is helpful because it recognizes
that the notion of evil is neither static nor timeless. Good and evil can only be recognized within
a storied world that has been “set up” by authoritative declaration. To say that some state of
affairs is “evil” says something about the effect it has on the participants of that story. Anything
that undermines trust in the Author of the story is experienced as “evil.” The story can either be
rejected or reclaimed in the face of it, but it cannot proceed uncontested and undisturbed.
However, Neiman’s account needs to be supplemented in order to derive a method for
analyzing the narrative logic of these stories. The declaration gets the story moving but not
resolved. Becker’s distinction between active and passive theodicies says something about
different strategies for overcoming evil, as does Bayer’s contrast between contemplative and
active. But pitting “active” against “passive” or “doing” against “thinking” obscures an
important point gleaned from Tilley’s speech act approach. Inasmuch as theodicy is discourse, it
is action. Those who sit and contemplate solutions to the problem of evil do not normally keep
these thoughts to themselves. They speak them to others. Whether it’s asserting theories or
directing plans for improvement, the theodicist is doing something. My use of the labels
“theoretic” and “pragmatic” assumes this speech act approach. The distinctive feature of the
of John Hick, the free-will defense of Alvin Plantinga, the natural law theodicy of Richard Swinburne. Also
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theoretic approach is not simply that it involves thinking, but that it issues assertive declarations.
These assertions are part of a story about a quest for better descriptions of the world. The
distinctive feature of the pragmatic approach is not that it involves action, but that it issues
directive or commissive declarations. These are part of a story about changing the world.
Summary
Wolfhart Pannenberg stated that there is “no theodicy without eschatology.”89 Michael
Peterson claimed “eschatology without theodicy is implausible; theodicy without eschatology is
incomplete.”90 These writers made those claims within the context of Christian theology. I aim to
refigure their terms for more extensive use. Where human hope is in question, eschatology and
theodicy are indispensable forms of discourse. To criticize and abandon one theodicy entails
being taken by a rival eschatology. To reject a particular eschatology involves being persuaded
by a competing theodicy. In order to be viable, the narrators of these rival stories must display
their intelligibility. They must assume the authority behind them will prove faithful in the end.
But, because of the continuing threat of “evil,” none of them offer certainty. Instead, they seek it.
They live by hope. All of this Christian eschatology has in common with other eschatologies.
Christians ought to engage in comparative eschatology because the Christian hope is ever
challenged by rivals. To compare eschatological hopes is at the same time to compare lifeorganizing stories. And because every story is threatened by some peculiar problem of evil,
because the implied author’s reliability is contested, the story itself constitutes a theodicy. That is
to say, theodicy is the author’s justification which is given with the anticipated resolution of the
plot. Therefore, to compare eschatological hopes is to compare narrative theodicies. In the next
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chapter, I will develop a typology for classifying four model narrative theodicies. The purpose of
this typology will be to communicate more clearly how Christian hope is distinct from its rivals.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 519.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A TYPOLOGY OF NARRATIVE THEODICIES—AFTER RICOEUR
Thus far I have been arguing for an alternate approach to studies in Christian eschatology.
The dominant approach maintains a balanced tension reflecting the plurality of attributes internal
to Christian hope. My approach does not reject this one, but supplements it. Moreover, it recalls
that these attributes are abstractions drawn from the Christian story. As abstractions, they can be
generally applied to many other life-organizing stories, not just the Christian one. Proleptic
anticipation or inaugurated eschatology is an aspect of every story that presents itself as the
standard one. These stories continue to be lived despite an on-going struggle with their own
peculiar forms of internal conflict. Each is told in the hope that the authority who presents it is
reliable, giving it a now-and-not-yet character. Therefore, what the dominant approach often
construes as unique to Christianity, is seen to be common when compared with its rivals.
This led us to return to the Christian story and ask how it is distinct as one narrative
theodicy among rivals. This is what I described as an external use of attributes—a use fitted for
comparison rather than derivation. The two attributes or narrative features I highlighted were the
conflict and resolution within the plot. I adapted Speech Act Theory as exposited by John Searle
to distinguish these features. Ronald Thiemann and Terrence Tilley’s work served as models for
how this might be done. The speech act approach enabled to me claim that all life-organizing
stories function as declarative speech acts. They attempt to disclose and establish the “real”
world. They also declare what counts as evil and what counts as good within that storied world.
Additionally, faced with a continuing conflict between good and evil, they speak of a resolution
in one of two “directions of fit”—either word-to-world or world-to-word.
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Thiemann helped me describe the Christian story as a narrated promise, which has a worldto-word direction of fit, with the responsibility of fit placed on the speaker, namely, the God of
Abraham speaking definitively in the voice of Jesus of Nazareth. Tilley helped me describe one
form of Modernity’s story as a narrated assertion, which has a word-to-world direction of fit.
Leibniz’s narration about how he came to see this as the best of all possible worlds was an
example of this story. However, conversation with Susan Neiman led me to conclude that there
are at least two competing stories of Modernity—one that characterized evil in realist terms
(according to appearances) and one in idealist terms (according to an order behind appearances).
Then Becker, Bayer, and Surin all suggested another dimension to the narrative logic: a strategy
for overcoming evil. Putting them together, I suggested four model narrative theodicies with
which the Christian story could be compared: idealist-theoretic, idealist-pragmatic, realisttheoretic, and realist-pragmatic.
To summarize my thesis: when comparing Christian hope with others, eschatology should
be understood as the resolution of conflict within an all-encompassing plot. Furthermore,
eschatology should be understood as theodicy and vice versa. I argued for this in the first three
chapters. The following four should show how this approach yields something concrete. My
purpose is inter-systematic1 critique. I exhort fellow Christians to “stay with the story.” Thus, I
will give an account of our story that is distinct from its rivals. My secondary purpose is extrasystematic understanding. Such an understanding may have a three-fold impact on the Christian
practice of hospitality towards outsiders: respectfulness in conversation, cooperation in doing
what is good, and coherent testimony when given a hearing to account for our hope (cf. 1 Peter
3:8–15).
1

See George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). “Intersystematic”
concerns the “truth of coherence” (64) within a “story” or “comprehensive interpretive medium” (80).
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A Tool for Understanding of Human Hope
To show how this approach can yield something concrete, I offer a typology of four model
narrative theodicies. In his 1967 book Symbolism of Evil, French philosopher Paul Ricoeur did
something similar, but for a different purpose and with a somewhat different method.2 I construct
mine having learned much from his. The principal difference between our projects is that
Ricoeur enlisted his typology in primary service to late modern culture, whereas I enlist mine in
primary service to the Christian Church striving to be faithful in a post-Constantinian situation.
Among his four types of “myths” about the origin and end of evil, Ricoeur did not include
a “myth of Modernity.” In part, this was because he, at the time, did not perceive Modernity in
storied terms comparable to a “myth,” that is, a “traditional narration,” which has the “purpose of
providing grounds for the ritual actions of men” and “establishing all the forms of action and
thought by which man understands himself in his world.”3 His purpose was not to interpret
modern configurations and projections of history. He wanted to reinvigorate modern culture by
re-reading these “myths.”4 As a confessing Christian, Ricoeur acknowledged the Judeo-Christian
“myth” as the place from which he viewed the others.5 But, as a professional philosopher
schooled in the Western tradition, he resolved to work according to that tradition’s standards.
Saying that he did this particular project on behalf of modern culture is no more an indictment of
2

Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, translated by Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

3

Ibid., 5. In contrast, Ricoeur’s later works encourage an interpretation of Modernity as a story analogous to
traditional religious myths. See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1, 2, 3, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin
(Blamey) and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 1985, 1988) and Paul Ricoeur, Oneself
as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
4

Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 347, “The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought.” See also Paul Ricoeur, Freud and
Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 38, for his
later interpretation of Symbolism of Evil as listening to and being nourished by the mythic symbols while continuing
the “tradition of rationality” of “our western philosophy.”
5

Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 306. He said “myth” should not be taken as “a false explanation by means of
images and fables” (5). Also, “we should not say, ‘The story of the ‘fall’ is only a myth’—that is, something less
than history—but, ‘The story of the fall has the greatness of myth’—[it] has more meaning than a true [modern,
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his Christian faith than saying that a Christian civil engineer designed a road for his city of
residence.6 But it does highlight a major difference between his typology and mine. As I develop
mine in light of his, it will become apparent that this difference makes the two mutually
enriching, yet distinct.
Unlike Ricoeur’s, my typology will scrutinize and learn from stories of Modernity and
Postmodernity. I do not locate the Christian story on my chart of narrative theodicies (Figure 2,
below) because my goal is to distinguish the Christian story from these. Ricoeur wanted his
analysis to speak to modern people and “recharge” their language. I offer mine as an appeal to
Christians to reclaim our story in the face of our particular problem of evil. In spite of this
significant difference, much of Ricoeur’s general approach is valid for my task. Especially
instructive are his explanation of the limits and benefits of typology and his rationale for
choosing stories of the origin and end of evil.
Limits and Benefits of Typology
Hans Frei, in his posthumously published book Types of Christian Theology, offered a
metaphor for making typologies:
They’re nothing to be particularly proud of, but they do have a limited use in
projecting innocent people into the author’s secret mountain retreat or underground
cave, so that if they want to get out and go on from there, they’ll have to use their
own compass and their own ingenuity.7
critical] history” (236).
6

For two accounts of Ricoeur’s philosophy as amenable to traditional (non-revisionist) Christian theology, see
Boyd Blundell, Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy: Detour and Return (Indianapolis: Indiana Press
University, 2010) and Dan Stiver, Theology after Ricoeur: New Directions in Hermeneutical Theology (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001). More commonly, Ricoeur’s work is employed by correlational (revisionist)
approaches, e.g., David Tracy, “Ricoeur’s Philosophical Journey: Its Import for Religion,” in Paul Ricoeur: The
Hermeneutics of Action, ed. Richard Kearney (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996).
7

Hans Frei, Types of Christian Theology, eds. George Hunsinger and William Placher (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1992), 19.
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The typology I offer is my attempt to more fully apprehend what it means to hope as a Christian.
It is part of my underground (often cluttered) conceptual lair within which I am trying to learn
how to think and speak of the God of Jesus in relation to everything else. Of course, I’m not the
only one seeking clarity in a mental cavern or a mountain retreat. Most of us tend to operate with
more typologies than we realize.8 Frei explained how typologies “help provide conceptual
orientation.” They keep us from getting lost in the data—whether it’s the data of historical
analysis (as in Frei’s project) or the conversations of everyday life. The trouble with typologies is
that they are often “general without testing or focusing on specific topics.” Second, they are
often “oversimplified and not sufficiently encompassing—for example, in calibrating a spectrum
from radical to liberal to conservative or fundamentalist thought.”9 Frei compared typologies to
navigational devices. Even when we take them for granted, they help us keep from losing our
bearings. For that reason, they need to be inspected, re-calibrated, and properly maintained.
In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur said much of the same and expanded the metaphor. Not
only are typologies good for staying on the path, they are also good for finding new ones. They
are heuristic devices, tools for discovery. Ricoeur did not want his typology “to be confined to an
attempt at classification,” a mere drawing of borders between territories. He wanted to “go
beyond the statics of a classification to a dynamics” that had “discovery” as its task.10 A
8

Cf. Bryan Magee, Karl Popper (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 8–9, “[W]e, all of us, take a number of
things for granted … we act on them in private life, in politics, in our work, and in every other sphere of our lives—
while some of these assumptions are no doubt true, it is likely that more are false and some are harmful. So the
critical examination of our presuppositions—which is a philosophical activity—is morally as well as intellectually
important.”
9

Frei, Types, 1.
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Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 174.
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“dynamic” use of the typology would make “manifest the struggle” among the concepts being
explored—how they often overlapped, opposed, subsumed, and re-invented each other.11
Ricoeur described in more detail how typological inquiry can be used to map and explore a
field of thought. The field in front of him in The Symbolism of Evil was the great variety of
stories ancient cultures handed down “concerning the origin and end of evil.”12 This was his
problem: if ancient peoples seemed to have similar expressions of evil, defilement, sin, and guilt,
but, at the same time, shared an innumerable number of stories, myths, and legends to account
for those experiences, “how shall we make our way between the One and the Many?” On the one
hand, he did not assume they were all expressing the same core religious consciousness.13 On the
other hand, he didn’t want to get lost “in an indefinitely diversified comparative mythology.” So,
to seek a “numbered multiplicity” between these two extremes, he constructed a “typology.” He
elaborated on this solution:
The “types” which we propose are at the same time a priori, permitting us to go to
the encounter with experience with a key for deciphering it in our hands and to orient
ourselves in the labyrinth of the mythologies of evil, and a posteriori, always subject
to correction and amendment through contact with experience.14
In asking how Christian hope compares with its twenty-first century rivals, I face a similar
dilemma. How are we to make sense of the plurality of life-organizing stories that have
proliferated within western culture? Like Ricoeur, I accept neither their essential sameness nor
their indefinite diversification. Therefore, I adopt his dialectic between applying formal (a priori)
distinctions with a readiness to adjust (a posteriori) in conversation with particular people.
11

Ibid., 309.

12

Ibid., 170.

13
Ricoeur distinguished his approach from the “phenomenologists of religion (Van der Leeuw, Leenhardt,
Eliade),” who believed the diverse stories essentially expressed the same “pre-narrative consciousness” (ibid., 166).
14

Ibid., 171–72. Ricoeur said he was following after Max Weber’s Idealtypen by taking this approach (279).
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The Preeminence of Stories about Overcoming Evil
Not only do I adopt Ricoeur’s general typological approach, I also invoke his explanation
concerning the preeminence of stories about the origin and end of evil. This explanation is
important for responding to a possible critique of my general approach to eschatology. It would
be fair to question the sweeping manner in which I’ve used the word “story.” Diverse forms and
uses of story abound. In the prior chapter, I noted Tiley’s division between stories that set up, set
in, and upset worlds.15 Other narrative theologians have argued for the importance of everyday
accounts, communal stories, and biographies.16 Additionally, my use of the term “the Christian
Story,” may expose me to Ricoeur’s own warning against flattening the Bible into a “linear
account,” thereby making it “a grandiose but frozen one-dimensional narrative in which all the
varieties of discourse are leveled off.”17 I respond to this by recalling the preeminent place he
gave to stories about the origin and end of evil shortly after he completed The Symbolism of Evil.
After publishing La Symbolique du mal,18 Ricoeur began writing his work on Sigmund
Freud.19 In that book, he reasoned that the “correspondence between a symbolism of evil and a
symbolism of salvation signifies that we must … reflect upon the totality formed by these
symbols of the beginning and the end.” He suggested that the “architectonic task of reason” is to
speak on “this totality.”20 In the concluding chapter, Ricoeur returned to this point: “At the end of
15

Terrence Tilley, Story Theology (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1985).

16

E.g., James McClendon, Ethics, vol. 1 of Systematic Theology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986).

17

Paul Ricoeur, “Toward a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its Difficulties,” in Figuring the
Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer, ed. Mark Wallace, (Minneapolis, Fortress
Press, 1995), 237–38. Here Ricoeur pronounced Hans Frei guilty of flatting the Bible into a single dimension in his
Eclipse of the Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeutics (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1974).
18

Paul Ricoeur, Finitude et Culpabilité II: La Symbolique du mal (Paris: Aubier, 1960).

19

See Charles Reagan, Paul Ricoeur: His Life and Work (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 40.
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this journey we will discover that the great symbols [i.e., stories21] concerning the nature and
origin of evil are not simply one set of symbols out of many, but are privileged symbols.” They
are privileged because even rational, systematizing discourse, in imitation of these stories, can
only project solutions, but not solve the problem of evil. Stories about where evil came from and
how it is hoped to be overcome “show in an exemplary way that there is always more in myths
and symbols than in all our philosophy.” These stories have an “unsurpassable character”
because they organize and orient all other aspects of human life.22 By participating in such a
story, “reconciliation is looked for … in spite of evil. This ‘in spite of,’ this ‘nevertheless’ …
constitutes the first category of hope, the category of confidence.”23 Thus, if there is to be
Christian discourse on a hoped-for reconciliation, it must venture to speak of the creation-toeschaton story given by the Christian Scriptures, in all their variety. And, if this story is to be
compared, it must be set against other attempts at all-encompassing emplotment.24
In Ricoeur’s complaint against leveling off biblical discourse, he still recognized that the
Bible, especially as interpreted through the New Testament, did lend itself to be read as an “allencompassing story.” The point of his criticism was not to set aside this story, but to hear it as an
“open or ongoing story,” and not as a closed “chronological display of intervals” by which savvy
21

See Stiver, Theology after Ricoeur, 103–4, who noted that Ricoeur eventually came to see “how symbols
and metaphors are caught up in broader narratives.” But at the time of this writing, he still “tended to see the
symbols as standing alone and narratives as secondary. He later saw this was a mistake; the reverse is more likely
true, that is, that symbols arise in the context of larger narratives.” See also Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The
Owl of Minerva (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 2, “By symbols Ricoeur understands all expressions of double
meaning wherein a primary meaning refers beyond itself to a second meaning which is never given immediately.”
22

Ibid., 527. Ricoeur levied this as criticism against both Hegel and Freud who each thought their systems of
discourse overcame the need for mythic or symbolic language and resolved the problem of evil. See also, Ricoeur,
Symbolism of Evil, 278, “One lives only that which one imagines … metaphysical imagination resides in symbols.”
23

Ibid., 528.

24
Ricoeur read Freud as such an attempt: “Psychoanalysis conflicts with every other global interpretation of
the phenomenon of man because it is an interpretation of culture” (ibid., xii). At first, “Freud is [seen as] one
combatant among many; in the end, he shall have become the privileged witness of the total combat, for all the
opposition will be carried over into him” (60).
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Christians can read history in advance.25 Such a reading “tends to abolish the peripeties, dangers,
failures, and horrors of history for the sake of a consoling overview.”26 Explanations about the
so-called Big Picture or Divine Plan can cause Christians to forget they are still caught up in a
story that remains unresolved. Ricoeur was as concerned to remind Christians of the “in spite of”
character of their hope as he was to remind Freudian’s of theirs.
Paul Ricoeur’s Typology
Ricoeur constructed his typology of “Myths of the Beginning and the End of Evil” in order
to “recharge” modern language after a long season of “forgetfulness” of the “sacred.” He
believed that a critical retrieval of these ancient myths could irrigate the dry soil of Modernity.
Even though modern men and women could no longer live in these myths, they could ponder
them. By them, they might reconnect with the sacred and attain a “second naïveté.”27
The Symbolism of Evil was volume two, part two of Ricoeur’s larger project on a
philosophy of the human will. In that larger project, he sought to understand the tension between
human capability and fallibility, that is, our apparent freedom to choose what is good in contrast
with our apparent bondage to evil.28 Therefore, the organizing logic of his typology is centered
on holding this tension between human freedom and bondage—a tension Ricoeur thought
Modernity was losing through secularization. In the section that follows, I provide an historical
narrative to frame Ricoeur’s typology. Next, I describe its organizing logic, illustrate its elements
25

Ricoeur, “Toward a Narrative Theology,” 242.

26

Ibid., 238.
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Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 349, 351. At this time, Ricoeur was somewhat aligned with the demythologizing
program of Rudolph Bultmann. However, twenty years later, in Ricoeur, “Toward a Narrative Theology,” he would
express his “antipathy to an existential theology indifferent to the historical dimension, which would be exclusively
attentive to the irruption of the word in the instant of the decision of faith” (236).
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Paul Ricoeur, Philosophie de la volonté. I. Le volontaire et l’involontaire (Paris: Aubier, 1950) was vol. 1;
Paul Ricoeur, Finitude et Culpabilité I: L’homme faillible (Paris: Aubier, 1960) was vol. 2, part 1. See Blundell,
Paul Ricoeur between Philosophy and Theology, 66.
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of analysis, and then draw out an important distinction between two kinds of “evil.” By doing so,
I encounter him as a necessary “detour” on the way toward constructing my typology.29
Background: A History of Human Culpability
In Evil in Modern Thought, Susan Neiman narrated how western philosophy passed
through two world-changing crises. In her account, the names of two cities are emblematic:
Lisbon and Auschwitz. The first city was destroyed by an earthquake in 1755 and the second was
a center of operations for Nazi death camps: “the two events have been left to stand as symbols
for the breakdown of the worldviews of their eras.”30 “In both cases, catastrophe tipped the
bucket of assumptions that were already precarious. But in both cases, the events themselves
created boundaries between what could and could not be thought.”31 These conceptual upheavals
changed the way westerners declared evil to be “evil” and good to be “good.”
Alasdair MacIntyre called this sort of upheaval an “epistemological crisis.” Such a crisis is
induced by a disruptive experience that makes the reigning story unintelligible. It can be resolved
either by reclaiming the original story in spite of the experience or by rejecting it and telling a
new one. When a new story is told, it must enable the protagonist to understand two things:
both how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs and how he
or she could have been so drastically misled by them. The narrative in terms of which
he or she first understood and ordered experiences is itself made into the subject of an
enlarged narrative.32
The original story is not completely abandoned, but reinterpreted in light of a new plotline.
29

Blundell, in Paul Ricoeur between Theology and Philosophy, 1–12, presented the metaphor of “detour and
return” to the “main road” as an appropriate way to incorporate Ricoeur’s philosophy into theological discourse.
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Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2002), 8.
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Ibid., 239.
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Alasdair MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science,” in Stanley
Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones, eds., Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and
Stock, 1997), 140.
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Frank Kermode’s account of the literary feature “peripetiea” explains how the rejection of
one plot entails the acceptance of another unexpected, but ultimately more satisfying ending.
“Peripeteia … depends on our confidence in the end; it is a disconfirmation followed by a
consonance.” We thought the plot was going to resolve in a traditional happy ending, but our
expectations were upended. But “in assimilating the peripeteia” we enact a “readjustment of
expectations in regard to the end.” And “the more daring the peripeteia, the more we may feel
that the work respects our sense of reality.” Having “naïve expectations” overthrown can be
terrible, but in the end, we come to see we learned something we would have otherwise missed
“on our more conventional way to the end.” 33 Experiencing a peripeteia in a life-organizing story
allows an interpretive community to say: “Here’s how we came to realize how misled we were.”
Accepting this reversal refigures the world around a new plot.
In Neiman’s account, the Lisbon earthquake induced a peripeteia in the story of Modernity.
Prior to that event, the distinction between natural and moral evil was not significant for how
people made sense of their lives. All things came from God either as punishment, reward, or test
of faith. Shaped by the Judeo-Christian belief about a personal, providential Creator, people
generally assumed all events—both acts of human cruelty and instances of human suffering—
were some form of speech act from God. Whether to pronounce curse or blessing, they heard
their Creator saying something by them. Thus saith the LORD, “I make well-being and create
calamity, I am the LORD, who does all these things” (Isa. 45:7). According to Neiman, premodern “theists were willing to give God responsibility” for human suffering and sin, while still
blaming humanity for both.34 The only hope of resolution for this problem of evil would be a
33
Frank Kermode, Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: Oxford University Press,
1967), 18.
34

Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 3. Neiman cited Augustine as an example of a pre-modern theist who
insisted on giving humankind the blame for evil, but not “responsibility” in the sense of having any power to clean
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gratuitous act of God. Only God can reverse the curse of sin, suffering, and death. But this kind
of resolution offered no consolation for the question of why some would be saved from
punishment, while others would suffer eternally.35
Neiman summarized the French encyclopedist Pierre Bayle’s (1647-1706) thoughts on hell:
“A Being who makes the torments of hell eternal, restricts the number of those who escape them
to a tiny minority, and determines who gets what without regard to merit” makes “God appear a
monster.”36 Even without a doctrine of predestination, “the torments of the damned” are “the
block on which reason stumbles. For however bad a sin may be, it has to be finite. An infinite
amount of hellfire is therefore simply unjust.”37 As both Roman Catholic and Protestant
institutions began to lose social and political power in Europe, the God portrayed in the biblical
narratives seemed more and more immoral. A Christian story that included eternal punishment
became an evil to be overcome through Enlightenment.
German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) responded to Bayle with his essay that
coined the term Theodicy.38 He argued that the idea of a willful and capricious God was
mistaken. Leibniz declared God to be rational and gentlemanly: punishments only come to those
up our mess (43). Neiman explained that the critical difference between blame and responsibility will always be in
force as long as the notions of original sin and unmerited grace are in play. If humans cannot save themselves, they
can be still be blamed for their damnation, but they cannot be held responsible, so long as responsibility implies the
power to do something about it (see 36–43, 141).
35

This question was the open wound that animated the famous debate between Luther and Erasmus. See
Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, eds. E. Gordon Rupp and Phillip Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster
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who truly deserve them and everyone has the power to avoid them. “What is modern in Leibniz’s
account,” according to Neiman, “is the conviction that the causal links between sin and suffering
will become clearer with time, as will the ways in which, despite appearances to the contrary,
God has ordered all those links for the best.” But, by doing so, “Leibniz … put reason above God
Himself.” It is but a small step from here to eliminate the middleman and enthrone Reason.39
Whether the Christian God was pronounced evil or defended as good, in both cases, God was
made subject to the declarations of humanity. “In the process of defending God, Leibniz
disempowered Him … he gave us a God created in our image.”40
The Lisbon earthquake catalyzed the crisis that began with Leibniz’s response to Bayle.
Leibnitz insisted God’s purposes in the world were rational. The earthquake challenged this
because it seemed like an unprovoked attack. Was Lisbon more sinful than any other city? To
cope with the way the world dished out suffering indiscriminately, early modern thinkers like
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) bracketed out ‘natural evils’ as just that—natural.
“Rousseau began to demarcate a sphere of natural accident that is neutral: disaster has no moral
worth whatsoever and need have no negative effects.”41 Earthquakes were unhappy consequences
of plate tectonics. The modern deity wasn’t saying anything by them because the modern deity
wasn’t saying anything at all. He was a one-time designer now removed from the system. After
Lisbon, “God’s purposes” came to have “no public function.”42 Thus, the only problem of evil
that remained rested squarely on human shoulders. A problem of evil that had caused conflict in
39
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an old plot was overcome by fiat: ‘Let there be a demystified natural universe.’ Human beings
now bore the responsibility for evil alone. Any solution would have to be authored by them.
Neiman argued that Western Philosophy’s second epistemological crisis and accompanying
peripatetic reversal occurred after Auschwitz.43 The evil experienced there was so overwhelming
that human solutions seemed ever doomed to fail. “The more responsibility for evil was left to
the human, the less worthy the species seemed to take it on.”44 Captivity to sin, suffering, and
death threatened to collapse the modern separation between moral evils and natural evils. It now
appeared humans had no ability to author true solutions. Thus, they could not be considered
responsible, at least not in the strict sense. This made all evil “natural.” People became powerless
to do anything expect pick up the pieces after the dust settled. “Lisbon revealed how remote the
world is from the human; Auschwitz revealed the remoteness of humans from themselves.”45
In Neiman’s account, Auschwitz was conceptually devastating because it seemed to
entirely thwart “the possibility of intellectual response itself … for the tools of civilization
seemed as helpless in coping with the event as they were in preventing it.”46 This is an important
observation for understanding both Neiman’s narrative and Ricoeur’s typology. Both were
attempting to fill a void of philosophical reflection on evil. For Neiman, Auschwitz threatened to
“collapse the distinction between natural and moral evil.”47 This separation was for her an
enduring demand of human reason itself. Her work is an appeal to reclaim the demystifying story
43
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of Enlightenment.48 Ricoeur saw the problem in similar terms, but had a different solution. The
answer for him was not to reinforce Modernity’s rejection of mythology, but to return to myth as
the very basis of all philosophical reflection. For him, “philosophical exegesis and
understanding” of myths can “create a new peripeteia” by which humanity might negotiate the
tension between captivity to evil and responsibility to resist it.49
Ricoeur’s Organizing Logic: Human Culpability
The organizing logic of Ricoeur’s typology in The Symbolism of Evil runs on a single axis.
This axis represents increasing and decreasing degrees of human responsibility or culpability for
evil. There are three types of “myths” on the axis. A fourth type floats above it toward the
middle, but closer to the human culpability side (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Ricoeur’s “Typology of the Myths of the Beginning and the End of Evil”50
Type 4
Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

Low Culpability

High Culpability

(High Captivity)

(Low Captivity)

Ricoeur devoted a substantial chapter to each “type.” In a summary chapter titled “The Cycle of
the Myths,” he illustrated the dynamic tension between them. He favored Type 3. It placed the
blame for evil squarely on humanity’s shoulders. And with that, it expected the most out of our
48
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kind in terms of repentance and rehabilitation. But he also argued that Type 3 needs the others as
a balancing effect, so as not to demand too much of fallible men and women. The typology’s
conceptual payoff was to move Type 3 closer to center, hence the dashed arrow (Figure 1).
The balancing of Type 3 served as a lesson for Modernity. After 185 pages of lucid and
detailed reflection, Ricoeur applied his typology to any “philosophy of the will” which “tries to
remain an ethical vision of the world.” An “ethical vision” is a summary of the storied world that
existed between Lisbon in 1755 and Auschwitz in 1945. The power of this story was how it
made human beings responsible for their actions. Its vulnerability was its limited capacity to
cope with human captivity to evil without the total collapse of its ethical vision. Ricoeur spoke to
this problem: a philosophy of the will must learn from the tension between the myths “so that the
guilty man it denounces may also appear as the victim of a mystery of iniquity which makes him
deserving of Pity as well as of Wrath.”51
Ricoeur’s Elements of Analysis
Ricoeur analyzed three elements in each myth: protagonist, plot, and pain of being. The
importance of these storied elements issues from the typology’s organizing logic. Each is a way
of deciphering how the myth addresses the tension between human bondage and freedom. Each
myth has a protagonist, its own “archetype,” through which “man” is “manifested as a concrete
universal.” In “the myth the human type is recapitulated, summed up.” Second, each has a plot, a
“movement which is introduced into human experience by narration.” The plot empowers the
myth’s participants to stave off despair and live with hope. Life happens in the history between
“the perdition and the salvation of man.” Third, each myth expresses the pain of being, or “the
enigma of human existence.” The stories convey an agonizing sense of “discordance” between
51
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what humanity is “essentially” and the present “modality” of human life.52 Following Ricoeur, I
summarize these elements within each type below.
As for naming types, Ricoeur never completely settled on a summary term, but drew from
a rotary pool of words, phrases, and one-liners. He did this to reflect the nature of the types. As
stories, they resist summary and distillation into discrete elements. At the same time, reading and
understanding them requires some amount of second order discourse about what makes them
distinct. Therefore, I selected summary terms to reflect how Ricoeur explained the plot of each
story. I chose plot because it adequately reflects the character of the story as a whole and because
this element is the focal point of my typology that follows. My terms for Ricoeur’s four types
are: (1) Chaos to Order; (2) Tragedy to Wisdom; (3) Rebellion to Restoration; and (4)
Forgetfulness to Knowledge.
Type 1: Chaos to Order. Ricoeur called this “the drama of creation,” because in it, “the
origin of evil is coextensive” with the origin of all things.53 This type is illustrated by “theogonic
myths” of ancient Babylon. “These myths recount the final victory of order over chaos.”54 In the
beginning, there was evil. From this chaos, the now reigning divinities emerged in struggle and
violence, eventually conquering, creating order, and later making mankind as their servants. Yet
even in victory, chaos (evil) remains a constitutive and unsteady part of the equilibrium between
gods, man, and nature. Thus, “man is not the origin of evil; man finds evil and continues it.”55
Type 1 rests on the far left of the axis, where man is least culpable for evil and most captive to it.
He is captive, but not in the sense of being bound by an alien entity. He is captive because this
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volatile mix of order and disorder is the nature of all things. The natural human order is
portrayed in the archetype of the Babylonian king. He is called to re-enact the creation drama in
the cultic rituals and by waging holy war against any “resurgence of the ancient chaos.”56
In Type 1, salvation is equilibrium. Evil is disruption. The decisive salvific event occurred
prior to humanity’s entrance on the scene. Still, salvation for human beings remains ‘alreadybut-not-yet.’ The victory has been won, but human participation in it remains uncertain. The
status of the human king, the viceroy of the gods, is “revocable.” The “gods have changed and
can change their earthly servant. They have only to transfer the kingship to another city or
another state … just as among themselves they grant supremacy now to one, now to another.” At
the same time, the hoped-for harmony is guaranteed by the salvation accomplished in the Divine
King’s once-and-for-all taming of the primordial disorder. By continuously re-enacting this
victory, humanity endures a “pain of being,” which arises from the “instability of the order.”57
Type 2: Tragedy to Wisdom. Ricoeur called this “an intermediate type” between Types 1
and 3, reflecting its central location on the axis. It is called “tragic,” because “it attains its full
manifestation all at once in Greek tragedy.” From this type arises a “tragic theology of the god
who tempts, blinds, leads astray.” Here, the fault of the tragic hero is “indistinguishable” from
his very existence. He “does not commit the fault,” yet “he is guilty.” The source of evil is the
inexplicable malice of the wicked god. Salvation in this type can only be “aesthetic deliverance
issuing from the tragic spectacle itself, internalized in the depths of existence and converted into
pity with respect to oneself.”58 This type is centered on the axis because the tragic hero is neither
responsible for the evil that befalls him nor captive to an impersonal nature. Rather, he is the
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personal target of the evil god(s) that choose(s) victims indiscriminately. As a result, this myth
renders human will and action “impotent and irresponsible.”59
Ricoeur thought tragic theology may be “the only theology that cannot be avowed or, at
any rate, defended.” An attempt to formulate such a theology “would mean self-destruction of
the religious consciousness.”60 This is why Plato spoke so severely against the tragedians:
God, since he is good, is not the cause of everything, as is commonly said; he is the
cause of only part of the things that happen to men and has no responsibility for the
greater part of them … we will not allow the young to hear the words of Aeschylus:
“God implants crime in men when he wishes to ruin their house completely.”61
In spite of Aeschylus’s unavowable theology, Ricoeur recognized a peculiar tragic soteriology.
The plot consists in breaking the hero. His destruction is an extreme peripeteia. The hoped-for
end of this story is the “tragic wisdom” gained for the hero and for the witnesses of the spectacle.
Salvation is inaugurated by enduring suffering “for the sake of understanding.”62 Participants are
transformed into new people, who, if nothing else, can exercise some freedom by refusing to
give consent to the wickedness of the god(s) and looking with pity upon fellow sufferers.63
Type 3: Rebellion to Restoration. Ricoeur calls this the “Adamic Myth,” recounted in the
first three chapters of Genesis. Unlike the other two, this story locates evil in “an irrational
event” within a good “creation already completed.” Like Type 2, the origin of evil in Type 3 is
inexplicable. But instead of locating evil in God, it locates in the rebellious will of the creature.
This moves Type 3 to the far right of the axis, placing maximum blame on humanity. The plot is
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marked by a “tension between two representations: that of creation brought to a close with the
‘rest on the seventh day,’ and that of a work of salvation still pending, until the ‘Last Day.’”64
Salvation is the “sum of the initiatives” of the Creator coupled with the believing response of a
series of new Adams (Noah, Abraham, David). Salvation culminates with the “Last Adam,” the
“Son of Man,” and the final “elimination of evil.”65
The pain of human being in the story of Adam and Eve arises from the presence of the
tragic in the form of the serpent: “he represents the aspect of evil that could not be absorbed into
the responsible freedom of man.”66 Man “is not the absolute evil one, but the evil one of second
rank.” Humans become evil “through seduction.”67 Whatever the serpent is, he is not a
resurgence of primordial evil—“he is also a creature,”68 under the rule of the good Creator. This
threatens a “moral vision of the world,” which sees all suffering as just retribution for sin, not
mere collateral damage. There is an Evil in the world above the power of man yet under the rule
of God. Ricoeur recalled Job, who bore “witness to the irreducibility” of the “evil of scandal” to
the “evil of fault.”69 With Job, the Creator looks like the tragic god who blinds and leads astray.
“Behold, he is in your hand,” said the LORD to Satan (Job 2:6). “Is not God wicked? Is it not that
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possibility … the believer evokes when he prays: ‘Lead us not into temptation?’ Does not his
request signify: ‘Do not come to meet me with the face of the tragic God’?”70
The story of salvation in Type 3 restores the broken “trust between God and man.”71 It
remarkably enfolds this tragic dimension, suppressing it, without removing it altogether. The
Second Adam, who is also the Son of Man and the Suffering Servant,72 willingly submits to “a
suffering that is outside retribution, a senseless and scandalous suffering.”73 He embraces the
pain of human being and takes upon himself the sins of the world. “Father, into your hands I
commit my spirit” (Luke 23:46). Salvation is hoped for in spite of this spectacle. It is anticipated
“beyond any ethical vision to a new dimension of faith, the dimension of unverifiable faith.”74 It
is experienced, by hope, in “pardon” from God, which is also “participation of the individual” in
the Last Adam, whom God raised from the dead.75 The believer says all this and more in her
Lord’s prayer: “Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.”
Type 4: Forgetfulness to Knowledge. Ricoeur called this the “myth of the exiled soul.” It
“has played a considerable part in our Western culture, because it presided, if not over the birth,
at least over the growth of Greek philosophy.” It differs from the other three “in that it divides
man into soul and body and concentrates on the destiny of the soul, which it depicts as coming
from elsewhere,” straying “here below,” then returning to its proper home.76 “Divine as to his
soul, earthly as to his body, man is forgetting of the difference; and the myth tells how that
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happened.”77 Type 4 floats above the line because it alone accounts for evil by dividing man into
two parts. Like Type 3, it emphasizes human responsibility for evil and therefore it hovers on the
right side (Figure 1). Since Types 3 and 4 are united in this aspect, they were often comingled.78
Both tell of a “fall”—one, a broken trust, the other, a forgotten knowledge.
The “pain of being” in this myth is related to the “passion” of the body and contact with the
perishable things of earth. Here the archetype is a fusion of two figures: the god Dionysos and
the demonic Titans. As the story goes, Dionysos was captured, boiled, and eaten by the Titans.
“Zeus, to punish them, blasted them with lightning and from their ashes created the present race
of men. That is why men today participate both in the evil nature of the Titans and in the divine
nature of Dionysos.”79 This is the referent behind Plato’s comment about the “Titanic nature” of
man.80 The essential turmoil within the human soul is intensified by its fall into the body-prison
and subsequent forgetfulness of its nature. The key to deliverance is “knowledge”—knowledge
of its essence, origin, and the true order of things.81 Philosophy “consists then in the death of the
body, in order to ‘behold all things themselves with the soul itself.’” The body distracts the soul:
“The soul of every human being, when it is intensely pleased or pained by something, thinks that
the particular object of its feeling is the clearest and truest thing in the world, although it is not so
at all.”82 Therefore, the philosopher’s highest duty is to speak the truth. He must fit his words to
the comprehensive picture of the world, which includes both formal and material realms. Ricoeur
76

Ibid., 174. Also, “there is a pact between this myth and philosophy which has no equivalent” (281).

77

Ibid., 280.

78

Also, early Christian use of a “Neo-Platonic mode of expression” and New Testament use of Hellenistic
“vocabulary” makes “the myth of the exiled soul more seductive” for “Christian experience” (ibid., 330–34).
79

Ibid., 282.

80

Plato, Laws, 701c, quoted in ibid., 298.

81

Ibid., 300.

82

Ibid, 338, quoting Plato, Phaedo, 66d, 83c.

137

commented, “Platonism is throughout a justification of language.”83 Trapped on earth, humanity
is tempted to speak falsely about reality. The path of salvation is paved with accurate description.
Two Kinds of Evil
To summarize Ricoeur’s typology and transition to mine, I make explicit two distinct ways
by which he spoke about evil. There is a storied evil that is addressed directly in the advance of
the plot. This form of evil is the contrary of the good. There is also a scandalous evil, which the
plot confronts indirectly. This form of evil is the contradictory84 of the good. It does not merely
oppose the good, but threatens to unravel the storied declarations of what counts as “good” and
what counts as “evil.”
Storied Evil. This sort of evil can be quickly identified by the first term in each of
Ricoeur’s four types: chaos, tragedy, rebellion, forgetfulness. In Type 1, evil was the chaotic
disorder that prevailed before the drama of creation. The plot dealt with this evil directly by
recounting how evil was conquered and continues to be suppressed by ritual re-enactment. In
Type 2, evil was the tragic spectacle visited upon the hero by the wicked god. The plot dealt with
this evil directly through the suffering that produced fear, pity, and tragic wisdom. For Type 3,
evil was the rebellion manifested in the serpent’s seduction of Eve and Adam, followed by
humanity’s distrust of the Creator, which caused discord among fellow creatures. This evil was
dealt with directly in the restoration wrought by God through the Second Adam. And for Type 4,
the storied evil was humanity’s forgetfulness of their proper place in heaven. It was overcome
through education—through attaining knowledge about the true nature of things.
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Scandalous Evil. Ricoeur hinted about the presence of this evil. For Type 1, he specifically
noted that evil “becomes scandalous” for this myth when it becomes “historical.”85 This account
cannot conceptualize an historical entry point of evil into a previously good world. The story has
no fallen man or wicked god. There was only the primordial war of the gods that founded the
present order. Humankind is victimized, not culpable. Even the gods cannot be held responsible.
Violence goes all the way down to the essence of things. There is no truer or better order beyond
this. It is what it is. The notions of sin and responsibility are scandalous because they undermine
the hoped-for resolution of the plot. If “sin” were assimilated into this story, it could only survive
as a new peripeteia, an epistemological crisis that unravels the myth.
Type 2, the tragic type, is scandalized in a similar way. This story can be subverted in the
direction of Type 1 or Type 3. Ricoeur spoke of the failed tragedy attempted by “the moralist.”
In this plot, the hero’s good fortune turns to greed and sinful pride which then incite the wrath of
the god(s). But an “ethical moment,” an “avoidable fault” scandalizes the tragic plot. Tragic
wisdom requires “the mystery of iniquity of the wicked god.”86 The tragic plot can be
scandalized in the opposite direction as well, toward Type 1. The victory over chaos “saves the
‘tragedy’ by delivering it from the ‘tragic;’ the ‘wicked god’ is reabsorbed in the suffering of the
divine.” It is no longer tragic, because no one is to blame. It’s just the way the world works.
Type 3, because of its affinity with Type 4, is vulnerable on all sides. If evil were located
in the body and its earthly conditions, its way of salvation through the Second Adam would be
scandalized and absorbed into the myth of the exiled soul. If evil were located in the essential
nature of the creation, it would be conquered by Type 1. But Type 2, the threat of the tragic god,
is perhaps most scandalous on two counts. First, a tragic element is not foreign to, but is
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contained within the plot of the Second Adam. Second, Type 3 is protected internally from Types
1 and 4. The creation and the body are declared “good” from the beginning, making the narrative
logic of Types 1 and 4 foreign to Type 3. But the presence of the serpent, the undeserved
suffering of Job, the spectacle of the crucifixion, and the abiding threat of eternal damnation all
belong to the story proper. They all threaten the resolution. They scandalize the hope that the
original trust between God and his human creatures can be restored.
Type 4 is also scandalized by the others, but in a more general way. The declarations made
in the first three types would halt its hoped-for flight to the heavens. They would bring its
transcendent speculation back down to earth. Type 1’s declaration about the volatile order of all
things would contaminate the True, the Beautiful, and the Good assumed to be at the heart of
reality. Type 2’s wicked god destroys its ethical vision. And Type 3’s personal God, who stands
over and judges human reason, threatens both its knowledge and its autonomy.
Scandalous evil brings all the stories down to the same level. All must cling to an
unverified faith. All must wait to see if their Author proves trustworthy. All must live by hope.
A Typology of Narrative Theodicies
Having taken an analytical detour though Ricoeur’s typology, I now offer mine. In the
remainder of this chapter, I introduce its organizing logic and elements of analysis, briefly
applying them to each of the four model stories. A more detailed description will have to wait for
the following two chapters. There I will engage in Christian conversation with representative
authors from each type. As I noted above, the Christian story is intentionally excluded from the
typology. Whereas Ricoeur wanted Moderns to learn from the “myths” of Christianity (and
others), I want Christians to learn from the “myths” of Modernity (and others). In the final
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chapter, I will expand my summaries of Ricoeur’s Type 3 to offer an account of the Christian
story in distinction from the four narrative theodicies I introduce now. This will help me say
more clearly how Christian hope compares and contrasts with others.
Organizing Logic: Conflict and Resolution
Ricoeur’s organizing logic was centered on one horizontal axis, indicating increasing and
decreasing degrees of human culpability. The logic of my typology is centered on two axes.
Drawing on Neiman’s distinctions,87 I set the horizontal axis to reflect contradictory declarations
about what counts as evil. The vertical axis reflects two strategies for overcoming evil (Figure 2).

Idealist–Theoretic
“This ought not be.”

Realist-Theoretic
“It is what it is.”
transform

Idealist–Pragmatic

transcend

Figure 2. A Typology of Narrative Theodicies

Realist–Pragmatic

Imagine reading Elie Wiesel’s report about children being thrown into the fire at Auschwitz.88
An awful silence passes. Now imagine how we might respond. We would have at least two
responses open to us. What we say will configure the conflict in our plot. If we say, “This ought
not be,” we turn left, toward the idealist pole. If we shrug and say, “It is what it is,” we turn
right, toward the realist pole. Having made this declaration, we have another decision: What are
87
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we going to do about it now? Again, there are at least two options. We can either try to transcend
this event or attempt to transform the world that made it possible. Each offers a potential strategy
for resolving the conflict. These strategies could be pursued from either the left or the right side.
Also, each strategy calls for us to say something—to utter a plan of action or to speculate as to
how this fits into some bigger picture. We can either attempt to fit our words to the world or
make the world come to fit our words. That is to say, we can theorize or we can pragmatize.
We now have four paths set before us. If we pick one and wish to see it through, we will
begin to tell each other the story about our progress toward or regress away from our goal. We
will narrate our approach to the resolution of our conflict. We will “story” the world around us.
This story will become our standard story. And whether we break off and narrate alone, or
huddle together, or join the on-going story of some other group, our story will assume an Author.
To participate in this story, we must exercise an as yet unverified faith that its Author is reliable.
We must live by hope.
Elements of Analysis
Ricoeur analyzed his four model myths by protagonist, plot, and pain of being. He focused
on the pain of being, the “human enigma” in each. This was fitting in light of his larger project
concerned with a “philosophy of will” that could maintain an “ethical vision” after Auschwitz.
He was interested in maintaining a dialectical tension between human responsibility for and
captivity to evil. As Neiman observed, Lisbon revealed our alienation from the world;
Auschwitz, our alienation from ourselves. Ricoeur was working to overcome this estrangement.
As a French Army Officer in World War II, Paul Ricoeur spent five years in a German
concentration camp. Since the French and Germans both had signed the Geneva Accords,
Ricoeur and his countrymen were treated humanely. This was not the case with the Russian
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prisoners, who were housed about 500 meters from the French camp, close enough for one to see
what was happening in the other. Ricoeur’s biographer reported:
[The] Germans visited humiliation, cruelty, and frequently death on the Russian
POWs. The French could see the horrible physical condition of the Russian prisoners
and could see them daily burying their dead in a trench-like grave at the back of their
camp. According to Roger Ikor, only 1,400 Russian prisoners remained alive out of
the 4,000 who were initially imprisoned there.89
The overriding interest behind Ricoeur’s typology written 15 years after his release was
still immersed in the on-going project of the Enlightenment—what Ernest Becker summarized as
an “anthropodicy”90—a justification (and rehabilitation) of the ways of Man to humanity. His
typology appropriately bore the problems of its time. I do not wish to resolve the
Enlightenment’s problems, but to return to their source—to re-read the stories of Enlightenment
and understand how they seek to justify their authors. I employ Ricoeur’s elements of analysis to
do so, focusing especially on the dynamics of plot. I ask: how does this story declare conflict and
speak toward resolution? In other words, how is storied evil supposed to be overcome? I address
the other elements—the protagonist and the pain of being human—in relation to the status of the
Author. The hope and pain of being human is theodicy. Can the story render its Author
trustworthy in face of scandalous evil?
I briefly explore these elements within the four types. For now, I mostly restrict my
descriptions to a priori, abstract reflection on the formal, narrative logic. In the next chapter, I
will dialogue with representatives from each, making a posteriori adjustments as needed.
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Idealist-Theoretic. Within his discussion on the story of the exiled soul, Ricoeur stated,
“[T]here is a pact between this myth and philosophy which has no equivalent.”91 He returned to
this point at the end of that chapter. He explained how Greek philosophy demythologized the
stories about the Titanic nature of man and the soul’s fall into the body. The philosophers
interpreted these narrative events as “principles,” thus making “Good” and “Evil” into universal
concepts. Ricoeur called this shift “a new peripeteia.”92 Greek philosophy moved the battle
between Good and Evil from the world into the mind. The plot no longer comprised a sequence
of primordial, dramatic, or historical events. Instead it was formed by a series of speculations.
Put abstractly, the conflict in the Idealist-Theoretic plot advances by assertive declaration.
The central strategy is for the protagonist to fit his or her mind and words to a more
encompassing picture of the world. It begins by declaring, “There is more to the world than
meets the eye.” There is a genuine truth and beauty and goodness of the cosmos that cannot be
empirically measured, but only perceived by rational minds. This declaration immediately
overcomes one class of negative experiences: so-called “natural evils.” The cosmos is divided
between a natural order and a rational order. The natural order contains events proper to its
transient nature: growth and decay, pleasure and pain, calm and storm, life and death. The
rational order contains what is proper to it: the True, the Good, the Sublime.
With one set of ‘evils’ already overcome, the Idealist-Theoretic plot faces its storied evil:
immorality. It challenges human behavior that doesn’t conform to the natural law. In the face of
human crime, it responds, “This ought not be.” The protagonist recognizes a rift in the order of
things. Humans, as rational beings, must act in accord with the rational order, not the violence of
the natural order. The conduct is condemned, but the person is presumed innocent. He or she is
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truly a “lost soul,” who has forgotten or has not been properly educated concerning the truth.
Therefore, the strategy is to overcome storied evil by assertion. It is to more clearly and
comprehensively describe the world, thereby conforming human minds to the truth. And because
the organizing principles of the world are already firmly set, the movement of the story depends
on the emplotment, the discourse of enlightened humanity. They are its authors.
Idealist-Pragmatic. Similarly, the resolution of this plot is also guided by the authority of
enlightened humanity. But instead of overcoming the conflict by assertion, this story overcomes
by directive declaration. The key strategy here is for the protagonist to make the world come to
fit his or her words. Having also turned left toward the idealist pole, this form of pragmatism has
already overcome so-called “natural evil.” The material world was declared inert and amoral. It
must now be governed by another reality.
Unlike the theoretic idealist, the pragmatic idealist locates the principle of governance in
the human mind. The human mind is not dependent on or reflective of some imagined,
transcendent reality. The universe doesn’t issue commands. Humanity does. Everything else is to
be commanded. Whatever does not fit should be corrected: “This ought not be … and we must
transform it.” The storied evil in this plot is whatever doesn’t match the enlightened ideal.
Humans don’t transcend into the ideal. The ideal must be directed down to earth to become
historical reality. And every completed project is a proleptic sign of this author’s reliability.
Realist-Theoretic. This story also starts with a declaration. But it begins by declaring the
first two options, “Wrong.” The problem with the world is not the world. It is the false ideals
projected on it. The world “is what it is.” To put it in the shadow of some transcendent world or
manipulate it according to some passing human dream is wrong-headed at best, evil at worst.
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This powerful, authoritative utterance has instantly overcome the storied evils of the prior two
plots. This new Author has subsumed the first two into a new storied world—the “real world.”
In doing so, he or she has created a different form of storied evil to overcome: the
perceived need for ideals. Like the idealist, the realist theoretician answers the conflict by
assertion, by outlining an education to reality. The challenge to this program is false thinking.
Immature attempts to cope with reality must be exposed and excised from human thought. Both
pleasures and pains are to be transcended by a better description of the world. By fitting one’s
mind to the world as it really is, false hope is dispelled and true hope becomes possible,
assuming this Author can be trusted.
Realist-Pragmatic. This fourth plot also turned right. By denying the declarations of the
idealists, the realist authors have collapsed the division between moral and natural evils. The
idealist hope that arose from this division was continually dashed to pieces. Arrogantly, they
acted as if they lived in a world created in their image. Again and again, speculations and plans
failed. Isn’t it time to grow up? And so the realist story begins by declaring ideals to be infantile
illusions. Moral evil is overcome by fiat. There is nothing better hidden in heaven or the human
psyche. There is just reality. It is what it is.
But contrary to the theoretician, the pragmatic realist faces a challenge of human behavior,
not of human thought. The key to overcoming the evil of immaturity is habituation and
socialization. The strategy taken in this type is directive discourse. Make the world fit the word.
Unlike the idealist, these words are not to be heard as universal demands. They are simply
cultural conventions and agreed-upon practices. Humans don’t stand above their biology, they
are products of it. We should use our limited endowments to make life more tolerable. The
human race must travail through many peripeties, many falsified expectations, and naïve hopes.
But this is the way into adulthood, into authentic enlightenment. It is truly the best hope we have.
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The Scandal of Evil. In those brief introductions to the four stories, the explicit challenge
was evil in its storied form. But as Ricoeur hinted, scandalous evil always threatens to
undermine each plot. In my typology (Figure 2), colonizing advances made across either axis
represent the scandal of evil. The vertical division between idealist and realist reflects the rival
stories of Modernity suggested by Neiman. Each declaration about what counts as evil intends to
overrule the other. One projects an order behind appearances. One says appearance is all we
have. The horizontal division between theoretic and pragmatic approaches is similar. Of course,
theory does not rule out practice; nor does practice rule out theory. Both assume constant
collaboration between human thought and action. But when it comes to theodicy, one must lead.
The theodical question is, “Which form of discourse is our best hope for overcoming evil:
assertive or directive?” Where is the problem of evil ultimately located, in thought or behavior?
In the terms set by the stories of Modernity, one approach must overrule the other.
To borrow yet one more phrase from Ricoeur, scandalous evil results in an irreducible
“conflict of interpretations.”93 For the time being, no story can claim absolute supremacy over the
others. They can only persuade. They can only attempt to out-narrate their opponents. In doing
so, they all exercise the hope that their Author will prove trustworthy.
Summary
The content of my typology was enriched by the detour through Ricoeur. The most
important gain from this side trip was his implicit distinction between storied evil and
scandalous evil. However, my content differs markedly from Ricoeur’s. I am concerned with
how post-Constantinian Christians engage with Modernity and Postmodernity. My goal is not to
revive the languishing discourse of modern culture. Instead, I intend to help Christians give a
93
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more contextualized account of the hope arising from the Christian story. I want my interpretive
community to become more aware of the colonizing advances of these other stories. I want us to
tell and live the Christian story, especially when we face our particular scandal of evil: the awful
hiddenness of the God whom we have come to know in Jesus. Also different from Ricoeur, my
goal is not to find the golden mean or achieve the proper dialectic tension between the types. My
intent is to hear and understand the distinct voices of the competition. In the next chapters, we
will listen to some of those voices and converse with them.
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CHAPTER FIVE
IDEALIST TYPES
Christian hope is distinctive because Christians participate in a particular story of the
world. Like others, Christians organize and interpret life within an all-encompassing plot. Unlike
others, the Christian plotline is given with the story of Jesus-in-Israel-and-the-Church. The
Christian Scriptures narrate this story, project it prophetically, learn wisdom within it, express it
in poetry, and assume it in argumentation. The conflict driving its plot is fundamentally not a
matter of missing knowledge, improper behavior, or inauthentic consciousness, but of Israel’s
and all nations’ broken trust with the God of Jesus.1 As in other stories, the strategy for
overcoming this conflict centers on issuing speech acts. But resolution in the Christian story is
not realized in assertions made to match the world or directives given to modify it. Its hope is
realized only when its storied world comes to match the promise God has made and still makes
in and through Jesus and his Church. The full realization has been summarized in the Nicene
Creed: “And he will come again to judge both the living and the dead. And his kingdom will
have no end.” The Christian hope is for this promised state of affairs to attain. Until it is so, the
story is contested and threatened by rivals. Therefore, as with all other life-organizing stories, the
trustworthiness of its Author is in question. Its theodicy still awaits vindication.
1
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When comparing Christian hope with others, eschatology should be understood as
discourse on the resolution of conflict within a narrated theodicy. The Christian theodicy is
distinct because its conflict resolves in the appearing of Jesus to “judge the world in
righteousness” (Acts 17:31). The advent of Jesus to judge will be the vindication of God’s
faithfulness to his promise to bless all the families of the earth in and through Abraham’s family
(Gen. 12:1–3). Prior to this event, the Christian story remains threatened by its peculiar forms of
storied evil and scandalous evil.2
Storied evil for Christians is humanity’s broken trust with and subsequent rebellion against
their Creator. Scandalous evil for Christians is the hiddenness of their God who works all-in-all
to include suffering, death, and condemnation. It threatens to render the story unintelligible and
its Author unreliable. That God in his hiddenness contradicts God’s promise in Jesus is an
unresolved scandal for the Christian story. This challenges its participants’ hope of overcoming
storied evil. As long as the God of Jesus strikes them as unreliable, their trust in him will be
contested and attacked. When faced with this peculiar problem of evil, the Christian narrative
theodicy is distinguished by its strategy to overcome the conflict resident in its plot. Rather than
overcoming it theoretically by issuing more accurate assertions or pragmatically by giving
successful directives, its participants seek to overcome by narrating the promised advent of the
crucified and risen Jesus to judge and save. The Christian hope is unique because it is elicited by
this commissive speech act performed in the Spirit and by the authority of Jesus.
Eschatological hope arises from a life-organizing story, that is to say, a narrative theodicy.
Theses hopes are both realized and unrealized because their supporting stories are unresolved. As
on-going stories, they do not enjoy resolution, but project it. They cling to signs and proleptic
2
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fulfillments along the way. Slogans such as “realized” or “inaugurated” eschatology are
appropriate for discussions internal to Christianity. But they obscure the matter when Christian
hope is compared with others.
I propose better way to distinguish Christian hope in a post-Constantinian setting. This
involves not only returning to the Christian story, but also concretely saying what “staying with
the story” sounds like. In short, it sounds like the Church making promises for God by the Spirit
and the authority of Jesus. Christian hope arises from this narrated promise. Competing hopes
arise from other narrated speech acts.
To say more clearly how these narrated speech acts differ from the Christian narrated
promise, I offered a typology of narrative theodicies. In the first place, the typology furthers an
exercise in apophatic theology along the via negativa. It says what Christian hope is not. Once
these other eschatological hopes are seen to arise from rival stories, the typology can also serve
an analogic or constructive theology along the via positiva. It can help say what Christian hope
is by hearing echoes of its story even in its rivals. Given that the Christian story enfolds the
entire creation as its setting and claims to be the common ending of all stories, it is appropriate
for Christians to identify traces of their hope in competing plotlines. Thus, the typology serves
not only to highlight the differences, but also to seek a common ground and potential source of
cooperation with other story-formed communities.
In this chapter, I engage the two forms of idealist narrative theodicy, the theoretic and the
pragmatic. In the next chapter I will consider the realists. The focus of this chapter is the
difference between the theoretic (assertive) and pragmatic (directive) strategy, neither of which
is the mode of resolution in the Christian plot. The focus of the next chapter will be the
difference between the idealist and the realist declarations, both of which contest the creative
declarations of God in Jesus. Then, in the final chapter, I will give my constructive account of
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the Christian story and highlight some areas of overlap that it shares with each of the four types.
To summarize, chapters five and six take the via negativa and say what Christian hope is not.
Chapter seven takes the via positiva and says what Christian hope is.
As I seek to say what Christian hope is not, I will converse with actual expositors of each
type. The two main expositors included in this chapter are Gottfried Leibniz and Karl Marx. In
chapter six, I will converse with two “realists,” Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud. Along
the way, I will bring in other authors to provide context for their work and suggest on-going
impact. I do this to illustrate the themes of each type, not to argue for an authoritative
interpretation of any given author. I do, however, intend to offer a plausible reading of the works
examined. I am ready to admit there may be dimensions of each that do not fit the formal
constraints of the typology. I would welcome debate about better representatives. The content of
these two chapters is illustrative, not constitutive for my thesis. The authors discussed are
important insofar as each can help say what Christian hope is not. Additionally, their conflict
with each other can help identify a common ground with Christianity, even if that commonality
is only expressed in mutual opposition to a shared rival.
Via Negativa 1: Idealists
As announced earlier, I do not seek an objective or neutral perspective. I meet these writers
as a Christian and read them from within the contested hope of that story. At the same time, I
recognize how their accounts truly anticipate intelligibility for their own storied worlds. This
position is neither “fideist” nor “relativist,” nor even a general “perspectivalist” position. It is, to
borrow a term from Kermode and Ricoeur, peripatetic. It pursues resolution, expects to be
judged, and hopes for vindication. On the way, it endures a conflict of interpretations.
The conflict of interpretations is both external and internal to the Christian Church. The
typology I now employ is fitted for offering criticism and building consensus within my own
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divided interpretive community. What is our story? Where does its conflict reside? What is our
strategy to overcome? For what do we hope? And how is this hope distinct from others? To
answer these questions, I start with the last one. I account for the hope that arises from other lifeorganizing stories. The fundamental distinction of the Christian story is that it looks for evil to be
overcome in the promised parousia of Jesus to judge and save. Other stories look elsewhere.
Idealist-Theoretic
The story that enacts an idealist-theoretic theodicy is perhaps the closest rival to the
narrative theodicy Christians have received, re-told, and interpreted over the last two millennia.
Recalling Ricoeur’s study, the myth of lost and re-learned knowledge “played a considerable part
in our Western culture, because it presided, if not over the birth, at least over the growth of
Greek philosophy.”3 This resulted in an unparalleled pact between Greek philosophy and the
myth of the exiled soul. It was into this conceptual soil that the first seeds of the Christian gospel
were sown.
Ricoeur argued that early Christian use of a “Neo-Platonic mode of expression” and the
New Testament’s use of Hellenistic “vocabulary” makes the myth of the exiled soul especially
“seductive” for “Christian experience.”4 Even more powerful than shared vocabulary was a
conviction common to both the Christian and Platonic traditions. It is the conviction that the
world’s ultimate source is reliable in spite of experience that seems to say otherwise. As Irenaeus
of Lyons (circa 120–202) wrote, “Plato is shown to be more religious” than other pagans because
“he shows the Creator and Maker of this world to be good.”5 These historical and conceptual
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links have made a Platonic version of the idealist-theoretic story sound plausible to Christians
scandalized by evil. Notable among them was Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716).
Leibniz is an important example for at least three reasons. First, having coined the word
“theodicy,” he recognized that the reliability of God was a most crucial problem for human
thought and action. Second, he was a confessing Christian who identified himself as an
Evangelical (Lutheran) and aligned himself with the theologians of the Augsburg Confession.6
Framing him as a narrator of a rival story illustrates how Christians are liable to be co-opted by
competitors, especially when straining under scandalous evil. Third, his Theodicy can be read in
two ways—either as direct competition for the Christian story or as a Christian defense gone
astray.7 Therefore, he offers a link between extra-systematic observation (via negativa) and intrasystematic critique and construction (via positiva). For now, he will stand as the former. I read
him as an exponent of a rival hope, an idealist-theoretic narrative theodicy.
Leibniz was a “universal genius.”8 He was a mathematician, inventor, alchemist, statesman,
librarian, lawyer, historian, and philosopher. His “life was dominated by an unachievable
ambition to excel in every sphere of intellectual and political activity.”9 His many projects fit
within a larger effort to unify Christendom “in the face of a Europe devastated by the Thirty
Years’ War.” His work should be understood in the context of “an Empire in decline and
6
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impotent against the rise of new independent states, and a Christian church torn apart by radical
reforms and captured by the new ‘national’ political units.”10
Like Plato, “his great philosophical hero,”11 Leibniz believed that good theology was the
key to good politics. The body politic must see God as powerful, wise, and praiseworthy if these
virtues are to have a fighting chance among us mortals. Theology should be placed in service to
civil life. Theology could serve civility because Leibniz believed that “God’s benevolence is
known by pure reason, and apart from Christian revelation.”12 This belief was directly opposed
by Pierre Bayle, who claimed that the God revealed in the Bible could only be trusted if Reason
were “compelled to lay down its arms, and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith.”13 It
was to Bayle that Leibniz addressed his Theodicy, first published in 1710.14
Bayle was only the catalyst. At stake was theology’s power to form European culture. A
lawful, orderly society must be grounded in good principles. For public and private virtues to be
secure, they must be “reasonable,” that is, “related to God, who is the supreme reason of things.”
Therefore, the “purpose of religion should be to imprint these principles upon our souls.”
Without them, one cannot love God. To love God is to know and reflect his perfections in “true
piety.”15 When people “ill understand the goodness and the justice of the Sovereign of the
universe; they imagine a God who deserves neither to be imitated nor to be loved.” Leibniz
warned of the dangers of false knowledge: the “source of piety should be preserved from
10
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infection.” Bayle’s arguments and others like them were a threat to civilization. And so they
demanded a response. Leibniz explained, “I have been compelled to gather up my thoughts on all
these connected questions, and to impart them to the public.”16
When Leibniz set out to justify God’s ways to men, he started with a general Christian
framework. He assumed God to be the Author of all things. He assumed human beings bore the
image of God and were created for communion with Him. He also assumed the basic Christian
plotline. God had sent various prophets to reveal himself, culminating in his Divine Son, Jesus
Christ. Leibniz cast Jesus’ mission as serving the propagation of true knowledge of God:
It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished that the
Divinity should be the object not only of our fear and veneration but also of our love
and devotion. Thus he made men happy by anticipation, and gave them here on earth
a foreknowledge of future felicity. For there is nothing so agreeable as loving that
which is worthy of love. Love is that mental state which makes us take pleasure in the
perfections of the object of our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God …
To love him it suffices to contemplate his perfections, a thing easy indeed, because
we find the ideas of these within ourselves. The perfections of God are those of our
souls, but he possesses them in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us
only drops have been granted.17
Leibniz used elements and themes from the Christian story, but he refigured them within the
plotline of Platonic philosophy. In this life-organizing story, the conflict is resolved in the
movement from forgetfulness to knowledge. Here, the strategy for overcoming evil is to issue
accurate assertions that will cause minds to be fit to the world as it truly is, despite appearances.
When Leibniz gave his account of the problem of evil, he began with a Christian
perspective. He assumed God’s omnipotent governance of the universe. When disease, disaster,
and death strike, we must receive them from God’s providential hand. Additionally, God’s
rational creatures (angels and humans) are no less dependent on Him. Granted, these creatures, in
16
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their freedom, have the capacity to choose moral evil. But, Leibniz acknowledged, “an action is
not, for being evil, the less dependent on God.”18 This makes it difficult to understand how God
can threaten to punish moral evil. Is not God somehow an accomplice to moral evil since he
sovereignly permits it?
This difficulty is not relieved, but multiplied in light of God’s plan of salvation. Leibniz
admitted that “it is much worse when one considers the life to come, since but a small number of
men will be saved and since all the rest will perish eternally.”19 Just as appeals to creaturely
freedom did not seem to solve the problem of temporal suffering, neither do they help when
faced with eternal suffering. God has promised only to save those with faith. And “this lively
faith is a gift from God,” because “we are dead to all good works,” including faith. We must
conclude that “God is the final reason of salvation, of grace, of faith and of election in Jesus
Christ.”20 Leibniz, goaded on by Bayle, did not shrink from the stunning implication:
So it is a terrible judgment that God, giving his only Son for the whole human race
and being the sole author and master of the salvation of men, yet saves so few of
them and abandons all others to the devil his enemy … And this outcome inspires all
the more horror, as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to all eternity is
God’s having exposed their parents to a temptation that he knew they would not resist
… These men too are condemned to be for ever rebellious against God and plunged
in the most horrible miseries … though in essence they have not been more wicked
than others, and several among them have perchance been less guilty than some of
that little number of elect, who were saved by grace without reason, and who thereby
enjoy an eternal felicity which they had not deserved.21
The only thing more stunning was Leibniz’s proposal: “I hope to remove all these difficulties.”22
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The main challenge Leibniz faced was the problem of moral evil, or sin. Since men and
women were made in the image of God, morality, which is rational behavior, is most natural for
their kind. To be morally evil is irrational. Leibniz’s standard for judging between good and evil
was God’s own moral perfection, which is the organizing principle behind the natural world,
despite its chaotic and unruly appearance. But if the moral order is the true nature of all things,
how do we explain sin?
Leibniz’s answer: the source of human sin can only be ignorance or misunderstanding. If
misconceptions about God and the world are present, sin will result. When God is conceived as
“an absolute prince employing despotic power, unfitted to be loved,” humans will likewise act
without wisdom and love. They will become unworthy of love. Following from this diagnosis,
Leibniz stated his strategy to overcome moral evil: “Our end is to banish from men the false
ideas that present God to them as … unworthy of being loved.” 23 Sin is caused by
misinformation. It is dispelled by knowledge of the pre-established harmony of the universe.
Leibniz issued assertions to make the minds of his readers conform to this hidden reality:
I offer a vindication of [God’s] perfections … I explain how evil has a source other
than the will of God … I show that it has been possible for God to permit sin and
misery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, without detriment to his
holiness and his supreme goodness.24
This is the critical point: the conflict that drove Leibniz’s life-organizing story was not that
people suffer in their mistrust and rebellion against their Creator. Rather, his conflict was our
ignorance as to how this misery was nevertheless part of an ultimate harmony.
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To dispel our ignorance, Leibniz sub-divided evil into three kinds: “Metaphysical evil
consists in mere imperfection, physical evil in suffering, and moral evil in sin.”25 To say
something has metaphysical evil is simply to say that it’s not God. To wish for metaphysical evil
not to exist would be to wish for there to be no creation. As one Leibniz commentator put it, the
world was “as perfect as it could be without collapsing back into God himself. Consequently, to
blame God for creating this universe as he did would be tantamount to saying that he should not
have created anything at all.”26 Creaturely imperfection is what makes physical and moral evil
possible. Moral evil, or sin, becomes a reality only when a rational creature ignorantly chooses it.
God accepted moral evil as the cost of having virtuous creatures who freely love Him. And as a
righteous consequence of moral evil, God responds with physical evil, or suffering.27 Thus, all
evils are accounted for. Metaphysical evil is simply “not-God-ness.” Moral evil is what nondivine rational beings have the potential to do. Physical evil is the just reward for moral evil.
Leibniz’s theoretic theodicy turns on two points: first, God’s freedom is perfect, but not
absolute; second, God’s freedom is compatible with human freedom. Human freedom is
exercised within God’s lawful order and has real consequences, for good or for ill. Armed with
this defense, Leibniz sought to vindicate his Divine client. In Neiman’s words, Leibniz explained
“that the accused could not have done otherwise.” Like any other agent, God “was constrained
by the possibilities available to Him.” Furthermore, he asserted “that all the Creator’s actions in
fact happen for the best.”28
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It may be objected here that Leibniz has taken salvation out of God’s hands and made it
depend on human choice. Leibniz’s counter claim was to show how God’s choices and human
choices harmoniously correlate. As Hinlicky summarized, “Leibniz’s over-arching argument is
that God, as cause of all causes, though not maker of all choices, is justified in His judgments
since divine determination is compatible with human freedom, given certain clarifications.”29
The divine defendant is vindicated to the degree the judge accepts that God wanted “to produce
as much good as possible.” Thus, when God “permits sin, it is wisdom, it is virtue.”30
Leibniz is typically criticized in one of two ways: either he makes evil less evil or he makes
God less God. His critics often say his argument collapses into a form of fatalism, whether Stoic
or Spinozist. Ross concluded, “Leibniz is therefore committed to the Stoic position that all is
predestined by Providence.” He thought we should acquiesce and apply our reason “to the task of
aligning our perspectives on the world with the optimal perspective that God has.”31 Hinlicky,
however, has criticized this position. He claimed that determinist presentations of Leibniz are
typically “parasitic upon the parody Voltaire rendered with the figure of Dr. Pangloss in
Candide,” and do not reflect Leibniz’s actual arguments.32
From Hinlicky’s perspective, “Leibniz in the end retreated to the semi-Pelagianism of the
later Melanchthonian tradition, defending half-heartedly free will on a priori ground, in order to
maintain his posture as an independent, rational, or natural theologian.”33 In other words, Leibniz
used free will as a concept to keep us from thinking of God as an irrational, unprincipled force.
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He wanted to save us from Spinoza, the modern Stoic.34 Above all, he wanted to maintain an
ethical vision of the world. Whether seen as a determinist or a voluntarist, Leibniz, from either
perspective, was scandalized by an evil that remained absurd or inexplicable. He authored a story
that would resolve when it successfully explained why all evil is necessary for the greater good.
Leibniz’s theodicy is not merely theoretical. It is for him a life-organizing story. His essays
on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil are the culmination of a
life-long conceptual quest to align his view of the world with the optimal view that is God’s. He
had meditated on this problem “since his youth”35 and narrated his progression:
Indeed, there are perhaps few persons who have toiled more than I in this matter … I
flitted from book to book … I was charmed by the work of Laurentius Valla against
Boethius and by that of Luther against Erasmus … I had opportunity on my journeys
to confer with some excellent men of different parties … I have also since read many
and various good authors on these subjects, and I have endeavored to make progress
in the knowledge that seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured
the idea of supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in God.36
The Theodicy was a major achievement toward transcending evil by means of knowledge.
Here Christians might be tempted to call this “over-realized” eschatology. The problem
with this assessment is that Leibniz was the first to admit that he had not arrived at the final goal.
He had not achieved, but anticipated comprehensive knowledge. He had only proleptically
resolved the conflict. The final resolution would only come with the “light of glory.”37 Leibniz
used Luther’s term from De Servo Arbitrio, but in a different sense from Luther.38 The hoped-for
34
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light, in Leibniz’s story, was not dependent on the promised parousia of Jesus to end this present
evil age. Instead, it was divine insight God dispensed to individuals upon a sainted death or
perhaps, in special cases, before.39
Leibniz recognized he had not yet arrived. What sets apart his eschatological hope is not its
degree of realization. It is distinct because it arises from a life-organizing story that judged evil
with respect to a hidden moral principle and sought to overcome it by assertive discourse. His
conflict is resolved by re-interpreting the experienced world so that it fits with the declared
morally-principled world. This is not Christian hope because it has the potential to resolve
independent of the Christian story, which will only resolve with the coming of Christ to judge
the world in righteousness. Leibniz began with but did not stay in the Christian story. In this
way, he offered an exemplary idealist-theoretic narrative theodicy.
Idealist-Pragmatic
Like the first type, narrators of idealist-pragmatic stories judge the world according to a
hidden ideal. Unlike the former, this type does not look for the ideal in a pre-established
harmony reflected in the natural world, but in the moral vision of humanity. This difference
dictates a change in strategy for overcoming the declared gap between is and ought. Since the
ideal is not already present, waiting to be described, it must be prescribed. The goal is not to
uncover the Good but to actualize it, to fit the world to the word. Whereas storied evil for the
theorist was ignorance, storied evil for the pragmatist is an unjust world that allows for concrete
injustices. And so the ideal must be brought into historical reality as directed by the voice of
authority. The pragmatic idealist does not wish to transcend evil but to transform the conditions
that have thus far made evil possible.
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Karl Marx (1818–83) wrote, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently,
the point is, to change it.”40 This eleventh thesis on Feuerbach is perhaps “Marx’s most
frequently quoted saying.”41 With this criticism, Marx set himself apart not only from Feuerbach,
but also from Hegel, who introduced his lectures on world history by saying that “our method is
a theodicy, a justification of God, which Leibniz attempted metaphysically, in his way, by
undetermined abstract categories.”42
Like Leibniz, Hegel tried to justify God and the world by transcending evil—by coming to
see everything within a harmonious whole. Both of these giants of German Idealism assumed
humans could discern this harmony because our Reason participates in God’s. Then Feuerbach
came along and asserted that God was merely a human projection.43 As Marx said, Feuerbach’s
“work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis.” But Feuerbach went wrong
by raising this secular basis into “an independent realm in the clouds.” 44 Like the others, he was
merely offering a different interpretation of the world. Leibniz, Hegel, and Feuerbach are agreed
that evil is primarily a problem of having an insufficient mental picture of the world. Their
strategy to overcome it was theoretic—to better fit their minds and words to the world as it
by that light [of glory].” But, it was perhaps possible to be illumined earlier “by a peculiar grace.”
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“actually” is. Marx’s difference is his rejection of this strategy. He was not content to assert the
truth, but directed “Man” to “prove the truth … in practice.”45
Marx’s Idealist-Pragmatic Story. Why study Marx as a rival? Weren’t his communitarian
hopes utterly dashed by the failures of the twentieth century? Even if Marx’s revolutionary
vision included predictions that now seem doubtful, his basic story of taking pragmatic action to
create a better world continues to be persuasive. Compared to abstract theories that explain evil
and silence its victims, Marx’s call to unite as a community and take concrete steps to eradicate
specific evils comes as a relief. The Marxist story is important because it opposes the theoretic
strategy of coping with evil. It is still an idealist story, for it continues to denounce evil by
measuring it against a declared, universal, human good. But, it is a new kind of story because it
directs how the world should be reformed to bring this good into being. Marx’s plot is worth
studying, keeping in mind it is only one form of the idealist-pragmatic type. Abolishing private
property and overcoming class differences are not essential to the general type. This kind of story
begins when someone declares that theorizing conceals our real task, which is “to take
responsibility for the world rather than explain it, to transform rather than to endure.”46
One year after Marx was born, a steamship crossed the Atlantic for the first time. Six years
later the first railway was opened for business. Ten years later electric telegraph wires went live.
“Within a few decades, the frontiers of the world had been marvelously expanded. The fables of
antiquity had been realized. The productivity of human labor had been increased to an incredible
45
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extent.”47 But these advances were not without cost. According to one Marxist historian, the
factory workers paid the price, and reaped little reward:
The proletarian had himself become a commodity ... He was a beast of burden … an
instrument, a wheel in the machinery of exploitation, a dead thing. Impotent … he
must accept his lot, under pain of starvation should he refuse.48
Neither Marx nor his associate Friedrich Engels were of proletarian origin. Marx’s father
was a Jewish lawyer who had converted to Protestant Christianity when Karl was six. Engels’s
father was an industrious Calvinist, part-owner of a textile firm with factories in Germany and
England. As young men, the two became disillusioned with their bourgeois Judeo-Christian
heritage. They first met when Marx was the editor of Rheinische Zeitung, a socialist newspaper
with revolutionary leanings. They became close friends when working together in Paris after the
paper was shut down due to conflict with government censors.49 By 1846, they had co-authored
The German Ideology, which Roy Pascal called the “first full statement of Marxism.”50
In the preface to a later work, Marx said that in 1845 he and Engels “resolved to work out
in common the opposition of our view to the ideological view of German philosophy, in fact, to
settle accounts with our erstwhile philosophical conscience.” This “resolve was carried out” in
the The German Ideology.51 Marxist historian Otto Rühle explained how the book was the
product of a year-long labor to move “beyond the criticism of philosophy, of politics, and of
economics, to the criticism of the interpretation of history.” It contains “an elementary
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formulation of the materialist interpretation of history, which was subsequently to be worked out
as a complete method.”52 Therefore, Marx’s thought can be viewed “as a continuing meditation
on central themes first explored in 1844.”53 In light of this, Nicholas Lash, in his study on Marx,
used The German Ideology as a gateway into Marx’s work.54 I follow Lash’s approach and take
this early statement as a rough outline of the narrative theodicy authored by Marx (and Engels).55
The German Ideology tells a powerful story about human liberation culminating in the
development of “complete individuals,” united in community and “the casting-off of all natural
limitations.”56 In the preface, Marx offered a brief parable to introduce the work: “Once upon a
time an honest fellow had the idea that men were drowned in water only because they were
possessed with the idea of gravity.” Eager to save lives, “he fought against the illusion of
gravity.” By knocking this idea “out of their heads,” he hoped to remove the danger of water.
“This honest fellow was the type of the new revolutionary philosophers in Germany.”57 The dig
was against the Young Hegelians, represented by Feuerbach. They thought they could fix society
simply by fixing human ideas. These “ideologists, in spite of their allegedly ‘world-shattering’
statements,” are in fact “the staunchest conservatives.”58 They relocated the foundation of society
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from the mind of God to the mind of men, but in the process they changed nothing. They only reasserted the “ideas of the ruling class” as the “ruling ideas.”59
For Marx and Engels, the real engine of history was not concepts but material conditions.
Hegelianism excluded “the relation of man to nature” and created a false “antithesis between
nature and history.”60 Actual history is made by living human beings interdependent on each
other and on their natural environment. “The writing of history must always set out from these
natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.”61
Morality, religion, metaphysics, consciousness, and all forms of ideology are dependent on the
material conditions. These conditions determine modes of human production and provide for
basic human needs.62 The conflict in this story, then, arises not from religious and philosophical
illusions, but from the reality that great masses of human beings are limited, controlled, and
dehumanized by their insufficient material conditions. The conceptual illusions “are nothing
more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations … the relationships which
make one class the ruling one.”63
“Marxism,” in general, narrates “the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a
realm of Necessity.”64 Humanity, in the state of nature, experiences a tension that must be
resolved. People by nature are mutually interdependent. At the same time, nature has placed
them in conflict with each other, due to their differing needs, dispositions, and fortunes. This
creates a cleavage “between the particular and the common interest.” A prime manifestation of
59
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the conflict between the individual and the community is the involuntary division of labor. It
makes a man’s productivity “an alien power opposed to him.” It “enslaves him instead of being
controlled by him.” When labor is thus distributed in the interest of the common good, the
individual is estranged and alienated from his work. He is assigned an “exclusive sphere of
activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape.” Human production
becomes a “power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to
naught our calculations.”65 This aggravates the estrangement among individuals, classes, and the
greater community.
Eventually, only revolution will relieve the pressure. But these revolutions will remain
penultimate so long as they continue to produce new ruling classes. The division of labor, the
possession of property and capital may shift hands, but the estrangement remains. Thus Marx
and Engels held out the prophetic hope of a time when new modes of mass production would
enable a final Revolution. Up to now, “a mass of individuals remained subservient to a single
mode of production.” But in the anticipated proletarian revolution, “a mass of instruments of
production must be made subject to each individual and property to all.”66 This classless people
without private property would finally rid themselves “of all the muck of the ages and become
fitted to found society anew.”67 In a “communist society,” forced labor divisions will be replaced
by self-creating activity. Contingency and fortune will be removed. General production will be
so precisely regulated as to liberate humanity. Marx delighted in this hope: It will be possible for
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me “to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner,
just as I have a mind, without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.”68
Marx “threw his whole being into a powerful protest against all the current foibles of his
century, understanding their utter inadequacy to the problems and needs of the time.” He aimed
to “shock his age out of its complacency.”69 This attack was a means to a greater end—to realize
hope not by transcending theoretic evil, but by transforming the material conditions that produce
actual evils. Like other narrative theodicies, the story Marx told made sense of suffering by
showing how it could be overcome. “In one respect, however, he broke with every preceding
form of theodicy. What others left implicit, half-thought or half-dared, was for Marx as serene as
an axiom. Theodicies had hitherto defended God; the point was to replace Him.”70
Marx’s life-organizing story is criticized in a variety of ways. Neiman thought all his talk
of common good reduced to petty interest-group politics. His blasphemous demand to replace
God made him sound like Plato’s tyrant Thrasymachus, for whom justice was “doing good to
your (class) comrades and evil to your (class) enemies.” Everything else was condemned as
“bourgeois ideology.”71 Becker took a slightly different perspective. He complained that Marx’s
vision was an insufficient call to action because it ultimately collapsed into determinism. Becker
noted how other interpreters had pointed out this contradiction between Marx’s “urge to activism
and his faith in historical inevitability.” On the one hand, he calls man to “make himself,” but on
the other, he “shares the futuristic optimism” of thinkers like “Leibniz.” Becker thought one must
finally choose: either faith or works, but not both. In his reckoning, Marx opted for faith. He
68
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threw “the whole burden of perfectibility and progress into an automatic law of history, aided by
the continual class struggle.”72
Fredric Jameson defended Marx and Marxism against both of these criticisms. Jameson
noted that local revolutions must be understood “as vital episodes in a single vast unfinished
plot.”73 Universal in scope, the “ultimate Marxian presupposition” is that the “socialist revolution
can only be a total and worldwide process.” Jameson also responded to the accusations that Marx
naively thought this process would happen automatically. Historical “Necessity” is “presented in
the form of the inexorable logic involved in the determinate failure of all the revolutions that
have taken place in human history.”74 These local revolutions are restricted by their objective
limitations. The Revolution must be brought about by liberated humanity on a global scale. And
it will free human beings who give this inexorable form of development its material content.
Whether Marx is judged as insufficiently activist or overly tyrannical, his story generated
hope that the declared gap between is and ought would be overcome only when the world came
to fit his words. Whether or not his perceived ought reflected “true” justice is irrelevant to
classifying his response to evil as idealist. However, if we choose not to take his demand to
“change the world,” at face value, but hear it as a deterministic prediction, then his narrated
discourse would no longer be a directive, but an assertive. His story would simply be a re-telling
of Hegel’s Leibniz-inspired idealist-theoretic theodicy.
So if Marx resorts to predictive assertions in the end, do we have a better example of an
idealist-pragmatic theodicy? It is worth noting that when Becker accused Marx of determinism,
he did so in the interest of correcting and completing Marx’s directive to restructure human
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society and thereby overcome the conflict in Marx’s plot. If Marx’s theodicy fails to be fully
pragmatic, then Becker aims to finish the job. This would make Becker’s narrative of sociology a
more fitting representative of the ideal pragmatic type.75
Liberal Democracy’s Idealist-Pragmatic Story. In order to add to the illustration of this
type, let me take in hand a narrated theodicy that, to some at least, might seem to be the opposite
of Marxism, namely, the standard story of liberal democracy. In this next sub-section, I portray
the triumphal quest of liberal democracy as another form of an idealist-pragmatic narrative
theodicy—a story that resolves its own declared problem of evil by making the present world
conform to its directive word.
William Cavanaugh offered support for this portrayal of liberal democracy in his 1995
article on the so-called “Myth of Religious Violence.”76 As the story goes, “the modern,
secularized State arose to keep peace among the warring religious factions.”77 Having saved
Europe from the Post-Reformation wars of religion, it created the possibility of a perpetual peace
through religious tolerance, free markets, and strong national defense. Next, liberal democracies
banded together in an international coalition to spread this practical hope of peace around the
world, fighting wars only as a means to this most noble end. As Francis Fukuyama argued,
history has, in fact, come to an end with the arrival of liberal democracy. The “end of history”
does “not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life, and death would end,” but that “there would
be no further progress in the development of underlying principles and institutions, because all of
75
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the really big questions had been settled.” Fukuyama clarified that this ending was proleptic in
that “the greater part of humanity” still needed to be led “to liberal democracy.”78
Cavanaugh called this story a “myth” because it is generally accepted as unquestionably
true.79 He aimed to offer a counter-narrative to challenge the normative status of the “Myth of
Religious Violence.” Cavanaugh argued that what was at stake in the so-called wars of religion
was not Church doctrine but conflicting intentions to “consolidate Imperial power,” “control the
monarchy,” or stop “the nobility’s challenge to royal pretensions to absolute power.”80
Cavanaugh explained how the very phrase “wars of religion” is anachronistic:
… what was at issue in these wars was the very creation of religion as a set of
privately held beliefs without direct political relevance. The creation of religion was
necessitated by the new State’s need to secure absolute sovereignty over its subjects.81
The “religion” created by the formation of the modern State was molded after the “Platonic
scheme.” It was a “universal human impulse common to all” and was based on “common,
universal truths which underlie all particular expressions of ‘religious belief.’”82
With religious expression internalized and removed for the material world, the liberal State
could exercise its role as the eschatological bringer of the “end of history.” Cavanaugh called this
the “soteriology of the State.” Because it presents itself as the best solution to keeping the “war
of all against all” at bay, the State’s “sovereign authority” must be “without rival.”83 Once the
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State became the guarantor of freedom and peace its ultimate goal was to “maintain itself
perpetually.”84 A soteriology of the State implies an “idolatry of the State.”85
In a similar fashion, Richard Bauckham spoke of a more general myth, or eschatology of
progress, which continues to take an
idealistic, even messianic, form … in the United States, [where] it retains the quasireligious aspects … the conviction of historical inevitability and the aura of salvation
that attends the freedom it proffers. In its American version, the old idea of the
United States as a messianic nation still justifies an imperialistic role that is portrayed
as a mission to bring freedom to the rest of the world.86
According to Cavanaugh, the modern idolatry of the liberal State was made possible in part by
inventing a form of Christianity separable from the Church. In order for Christianity to become a
sub-species of a more general class of religious longing and expression, it must be removed from
the life-organizing story of Jesus’ Church, whose public gathering, proclamation, and worship is
a proleptic fulfillment of God’s intention to bring the entire creation to fit his word of promise.
Without the narrated promise, Christian hope is reduced to a vague hopefulness or elation that
can comfortably fit within any number of rival stories.
In terms of tactics, the hope of Marx’s classless society and the hope of liberal democracy’s
perpetual peace are opposites. But in terms of general strategy for overcoming storied evil, they
both speak of resolving their conflict by issuing successful directives—by making the world fit
their word. Likewise, they are both scandalized by failed directives. With the large-scale collapse
of socialism in the late twentieth century, would-be Marxists were faced with an epistemological
crisis. Would-be participants in the life-organizing story of liberal democracy have a similar
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problem. When faced with continuing wars, intermittent peace, self-inflicted environmental
disasters, and economic catastrophes, they must continue to recount their proleptic triumphs.
They must assume their authorities can be trusted. They must live by hope.
Summary. I grouped these idealist stories because they all begin by invoking a universal
standard of goodness to condemn some aspect of experience as “evil.” This condemnation should
be taken as a declarative speech act. It does what is says and says what is does. It simultaneously
fits the world to the word and the word to the newly declared, storied world. But, what is the
status of that storied world? Is it complete or is it deficient? The answer to that question sets the
narrative strategy for overcoming the storied evil. If the storied world was deemed complete,
then the participants just need to struggle to get their assertions in line. For them, the strategy is
to fit their words to the world as it is was already declared to be. This is the theoretic strategy. If
the storied world was deemed deficient, then the strategy is to fit the world to the word. The
declared standard must be brought into being by issuing fulfilled directives. This is the
pragmatic strategy.
Within each type, the successes of the strategy are chronicled in a narrative past. For the
theoretic type, success might be the construction of a more full and balanced body of doctrine.
For the pragmatic type, success might include the implementation of social or political sanctions.
However, in spite of these successes, each story continues to be threatened by a scandalous evil.
This evil does not merely undermine the strategy, but attacks the very declaration that created the
storied world. Therefore, they are all contested and unfinished stories. If they are to remain lifeorganizing stories, they must project their ultimate triumph into the future.
The Possibility of a Dual Strategy to Overcome Evil
In the prior chapter, we saw how Ricoeur used his typology of myths not merely to classify
and draw static borders between types. The typology was also a heuristic device given for the
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task of discovery. Ricoeur said a “dynamic use” would reveal how the types often overlapped
and created hybrid versions.87 In this chapter, I chose Leibniz and Marx as the ideal types
because the discourse in their respective works—Theodicy and The German Ideology—roughly
follow my formal definitions of idealist-theoretic and idealist-pragmatic narrative theodicies.
But, as we saw in the discussion, Leibniz’s narration incorporated elements of both the Christian
and Platonic plotlines. Also, Marx made Hegel’s story his point of departure and it remains
unclear how Marx’s strategy is different from that of his forebear. As idealists (in Neiman’s
sense of the word), they all condemned evil by some allegedly universal standard of goodness—
be it knowledge of the pre-established harmony, the future realization of the Absolute Spirit, or
the creation of a harmonious, classless society. After the declaration was made, two formal
strategies were open to them: either re-describe the world or change it. In my classification, I
assumed that only one strategy can be taken: you can either transcend or transform, but not both.
However, given Leibniz’s worldly activism and Marx’s determinist prophecies, we should ask
whether or not a story can work both strategies.
In Evil in Modern Thought, Neiman presented Kant as the model for how to work both
strategies in tandem. He aimed to transcend evil by appeal to a higher order and at the same time
demanded we transform the world to fit the ideals of reason. Kant can be heard as telling either a
theoretic or pragmatic narrative theodicy. Bayer listed Kant as the model of an “active theodicy.”
He explained how Kant argued that we cannot think out, but can only act out solutions for evil.88
Recall Kant’s vision of a moral kingdom of heaven on earth, which we “have a glimpse of in the
continuous advance and approximation toward the highest possible good on earth.”89 In a
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contrasting assessment, Becker expressed dissatisfaction with Kant. He thought Kant was too
theoretic and did not offer a more definite plan for enacting social progress. He complained that
although “Kant had opted for man as a free center and moral agent, his inability to carry through
critically on any but a philosophical level had its expected issue.”90 That issue for Becker was
Kant’s failure to provide concrete directions on how to transform human society and remove
moral evils.
These conflicting accounts of Kant can be explained by Neiman. She argued that Kant
believed the empirical world should in fact match the rational mind. “Kant thought all moral
action has one goal: to realize a world in which happiness and virtue are systematically
connected. Every time we act rightly, we are acting to bring the world closer to this ideal.” But in
everyday experience, we often fail and the world fails to bend to our demands. So as not to
despair, Kant posited the need for a rational faith. We must “believe that all our efforts to be
virtuous will be completed by a Being who controls the natural world in ways we do not.”91
Without this belief, and without some signs of progress, the modern distinction between moral
evil and natural (or physical) evil would eventually collapse, and with it, the notion of human
responsibility.
Neiman described what she took as a brilliant tension inherent in Kant’s thought. On the
one hand, if we had certain knowledge that Providence ordered all things for the best—justly
paying out happiness to those who deserve it—we would instrumentalize God and render virtue
void. On the other hand, without the posited but hidden work of Providence blessing our efforts
with signs of progress, we would give up. God’s hiddenness in the face of human failure and
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suffering is a necessary part of Kant’s (and Neiman’s) system.92 Evil is justified like we might
justify a father teaching his son to ride a bike—wisely giving the right mix of unnoticed help
while still letting him on occasion suffer a fall. It is an attempt at a double strategy for telling an
intelligible story of the world. If we were certain there were a just God with his hand guiding
history, we wouldn’t struggle to practice justice. But without the practical hope of a just God, we
would eventually grow cynical and give in to despair.
In spite of an impressive attempt at a dual strategy, I read this as a final retreat into theory.
When faced with scandalous evil, Kant and Neiman return to the assertion that the natural world
must appear random, senseless, and amoral in order for humanity to be free and virtuous. God’s
hiddenness surprisingly makes this the best world after all. “Einstein said the Creator was subtle;
Kant’s thought showed Him brilliant. Our very skepticism is a providential gift.”93
Nevertheless, I find Kant’s attempted dual strategy distinct enough to give him a special
place in the typology. I mentioned I would not portray Christianity as maintaining the ideal
balance between theory and practice; or, anticipating the next chapter, between the idealist and
realist response to evil. If anyone deserves this tragic and torn middle ground, it is Kant.
Kant’s almost-successful dual strategy for overcoming evil gives his story a unique
capacity to coopt others. Cavanaugh identified Kant as “the intellectual forebear to many of
today’s liberal political theorists.”94 Kant’s private sphere was the realm of faith and religion. It
was for him the last stronghold against despair in the face of scandalous evil. It provided space
for individuals to transcend personal guilt and suffering in a private quest for meaning. In
contrast, the public realm provided space for liberal nation states to transform the conditions that
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allow for the suffering caused by moral and, to some extent, natural evil. In this division between
private and public realms, Kant’s story attempted to subsume every other life-organizing story.
Other stories could survive as private beliefs which must remain subservient to the ends and
means dictated by the public story—the story of the triumphal, liberal nation state.
When the Christian faith is practiced under these constraints, it “is no longer a matter of
certain bodily practices within the Body of Christ, but is limited to the realm of the ‘soul,’ and
the body is handed over to the State.”95 In a recent essay, Pannenberg explained how Kant’s story
of moral and political progress provided a place for Christian hope, so long as it limited itself to
hope for the soul in the afterlife.96 In this way, it would become essentially the same as all other
private stories. It would function as a bulwark against despair when troubled by evil as defined
by the story of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment’s original scandal of evil was that a just God
would reveal himself via external discourse and make this-worldly promises to some particular
group of people. Once a group of people believed they had received and now speak the definitive
word from God, society would soon collapse into the religious intolerance and wars of the past.
Kant’s arrangement kept God safely hidden and known only by a private faith. It allowed for
individuals to arrive at their own theoretic resolutions to evil while the State issued and, if
necessary, lethally enforced its directives to ensure society never returned to the hopeless warfare
caused by superstitions and irrational beliefs.
Most of the prior paragraph is a restatement of Cavanaugh’s argument warning against the
idolatry of the liberal democratic State. Cavanaugh, a Roman Catholic scholar, was not calling
for the Church to take up her medieval sword once more. “Contesting the State’s monopoly on
94
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violence does not mean that the Church should again get a piece of the action, yet another form
of Constantinianism.” He only argued that pulling the sword from the Church “did nothing to
stanch the flow of blood on the West’s troubled pilgrimage. The pitch of war has grown more
shrill, and the recreation of the Church as a voluntary association of practitioners of religion has
only sapped our ability to resist.”97 Cavanaugh made a “plea for the social and political nature of
the Christian faith … a plea for a Christian practice which escapes the thrall of the State.”98
Hearing this plea from a Confessional Lutheran position means taking Article XVI of the
Augsburg Confession seriously: “Christians, therefore, are obliged to be subject to political
authority and to obey its commands and laws in all that may be done without sin.”99 Escaping the
thrall of the liberal-democratic state and developing the means to resist its idolatry begins by
subsuming its narrative into the Christian narrative. To do so would be to take a cue from Marx
and narrate it as a mere temporary stage on the way to the new creation in Christ.
Summary
The eschatological hopes discussed in this chapter are not Christian because they do not
depend on the Christian story. They are rivals to Christian eschatology because they tell a
different story. Representing the idealist response, they issue a definitive judgment on what
counts as good and what counts as evil. They either displace or replace the God of Israel, who
has appointed one person to judge—the man he raised from the dead (Acts 17:31). Moreover,
they take up a different strategy to overcome their own forms of storied evil. Their plots resolve
by fitting their assertions to a hidden, impersonal reality or by bending the world to match their
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directives. In contrast, the Christian strategy to overcome evil is to speak by the Spirit of Jesus
and make threats and promises for God. This “deputized discourse”100 happens in the context of
the on-going story of Jesus-in-Israel-and-the-Church. In this era between the resurrection and
return of Jesus, the Holy Spirit is at work through the Church’s public, embodied speech acts to
bring the plot to final resolution.
Like other life-organizing stories, the Christian one is threatened by its own particular form
of scandalous evil. This scandal threatens to undermine the seven-fold declaration that got the
story going: “And God saw that it was good” (Gen. 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31). God’s promise,
as announced by the Church, is that in the crucified and risen Jesus, God has and will finally
deliver his creation from evil. God has promised to defend and vindicate its goodness. But the
terror of present and eternal suffering—which is also part of the story—is the scandal that
threatens to undermine this narrated promise. If God’s promise implies his unilateral
commitment to deliver his creatures from evil, then why are some delivered, but not others?
When Christians are confronted with this scandalous evil, they are often tempted to seek
solutions in other narrative strategies—in theory, practice, or both. But by doing so, they
unintentionally promote rival stories, other forms of hope. They may also be tempted to redefine
evil according to the idealist scheme, that is, to place even their God under some self-projected
standard of goodness. If this temptation is resisted, and we “let God be God,”101 then another
temptation, to be discussed in the next chapter, arises. It is the temptation to stop using the
notions of good and evil altogether. This is the response that gets realist stories going.
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CHAPTER SIX
REALIST TYPES
This chapter is a continuation of the via negativa we began in the prior chapter. The
authors considered on this apophatic path help express what Christian hope is not. In chapter
five, I discussed the idealist response to the experience of sin, suffering, and alienation. The
idealists said, “This ought not be.” By doing so, they presumed to judge the experience against
some universal standard of the Good. For them, the Good was presently hidden. It was hidden in
either a pre-existing rational harmony or in an as yet unrealized future. Their strategies to
approach the Good divided them into separate types. They either re-described the world with
more accurate assertions, or attempted to re-make the world by issuing successful directives. The
focus of that chapter was on the difference between the theoretic (assertion-making) and the
pragmatic (directive-giving) strategies. This chapter incorporates and develops that distinction
while focusing on the difference between the declarations that get a life-organizing story going.
The idealist declared, “This ought not be.” But the realist replies, “It is what it is.”
Via Negativa 2: Realists
The two exemplary realists I discuss here are Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud.
Others will be included to provide context or to suggest contemporary manifestations of their
form of life-organizing story. Again, I do not seek an objective or neutral perspective. Nor do I
intend to offer an authoritative interpretation of their works, only a plausible one. I read them in
the interest of saying how Christian hope is distinct both from the idealist hopes they disdain and
from the tragic and mature hopes they offer.
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Narrators of a realist story begin by rejecting the idealistic appeal to a better reality, hidden
behind appearances. For the idealists, the hidden Good served as a standard by which to judge
human thought and behavior. It served as a moral ought. As long as this ideal was in place, the
distinction between physical evil (suffering) and moral evil (sin) held. Physical or natural evil
could be managed and mitigated. With the advent of modern science, it was completely
demystified. The designer of the universe wasn’t saying anything by “natural” disasters or death
by “natural” causes. These evils were overcome by fiat. Only moral evil remained a problem,
since it was caused by human beings and was therefore within human power to prevent. But the
realist story, by condemning this ideal as a personal projection, collapsed the distinction between
what ought to be and what is. All the nasty things people are inclined to call “evil” are part of a
single natural reality that is indifferent to our projections. To condemn something as “evil”
because it fails to meet your personal ideals becomes a sign of immaturity. In both the theoretic
and pragmatic versions of the realist story, immaturity is part of the conflict to be overcome.
Realist-Theoretic
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) claimed he was the first to formulate the following
insight: “there are absolutely no moral facts.”1 He thought that we “rob reality of its meaning,
value, and truthfulness” to the extent that we “make up an ideal world.”2 It is for axioms like
these that he has been hailed the “godfather of contemporary ‘postmodernism.’”3 Not only is
there continuing philosophical interest in his life and work, he is also increasingly discussed
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within Christian theology, especially in postliberal and radical orthodox schools of thought.4
Besides his present popularity, he is important for my project because, according to Julian
Young, Nietzsche’s “most famous book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” should be read as a “religious
work”5 that “challenges all existing religions,”6 and aims to narrate a “great theodicy.”7
In 1888, just prior to, or perhaps on the cusp of his descent into madness, Nietzsche, the
once pious son of Lutheran pastor, completed his autobiographical account titled “Ecce Homo.”
He took the title from the words Pontius Pilate spoke to present Jesus to the riotous crowed:
“Behold, the man” (John 19:5).8 In “Ecce Homo,” Nietzsche narrated how he became the author
of Zarathustra, which he asserted to be the “greatest gift” humanity “has ever received.”9 To
become the giver of such a gift, he had to pass through at least two significant epistemological
crises: the first occurring shortly before publishing Human, All Too Human (1878), the second
beginning in 1881, when “the thought of the eternal return” came to him while hiking in
Switzerland.10 Young used these two turning points to index Nietzsche’s work in three stages:
romanticist, positivist, and mature. His romanticist stage consisted in his acceptance of
The first “thinks of reality as multi-aspected, so that different perspectives reveal … different aspects of it” (338).
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Schopenhauer’s version of Kant’s metaphysical idealism. The positivist stage involved his
rejection of idealism, concluding that “Nothing exists ‘behind’ nature, nothing exists but nature.”
His mature stage was not a rejection, but a synthesis “of the romantic and positivist horizons into
a third.”11
An important influence in this mature stage was the pantheistic philosophy of Baruch
Spinoza (1632–77),12 who was one of the great opponents Leibniz discussed in his Theodicy.
After reading of Spinoza in 1881 near the beginning of his mature period, Nietzsche wrote to a
friend, “I have a forerunner. And what a forerunner! ... I discover myself in [Spinoza’s] teaching:
he denies freedom of the will, purpose, a moral order of the world, the unegoistic, evil … In sum,
my aloneness … is now at least a two-ness.”13 Nietzsche’s doctrine of the “eternal return” meant
that Spinoza’s “realist” world could be conceived as sacred on its own. It could be affirmed,
without modification or further re-description. Even Schopenhauer’s “worst of all possible
worlds”14 could be seen as good, without appeal to a higher harmony, blessed future, or personal
immortality. The conflict in this budding story of salvation was in how to bring oneself to affirm
life, as a whole, without exception—even the “devastated battlefield” through which Nietzsche
once walked as a medic during the Franco-Prussian War; even the images of the “indescribably
sad human body parts and stinking corpses” that haunted him.15 This too must be celebrated.
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Nietzsche’s eschatological hope was to move beyond the false ideals that condemn the real
world. In his 1888 book Twilight of the Idols, he summarized how the “true world” (the ideal)
“finally became a fable.” It began with the proposition that the “true world” is “attainable for a
man who is wise, pious, virtuous.” The philosopher who had proleptically completed his journey
to speak truthfully about the world embodied the ideal: “I, Plato, am the truth.” Next, said
Nietzsche, the “true world” became “unattainable for now, but promised” to those who continue
to make conceptual progress. This hope held for a while, but eventually Kant made it
“unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable.” Nevertheless, “the very thought of it” could still be “a
consolation, an obligation, an imperative.” Finally, the “true world” became an “idea that is of no
further use, not even as an obligation.” The realists demanded, “let’s get rid of it!” At this, “Plato
blushes in shame” because of the “pandemonium of all free spirits.” Now the true world is gone
and the ideal vanished with it. The “longest error” has ended.16 All that remains is the real world.
The real world, thus declared, is the setting of Nietzsche’s life-organizing story. It is an
account of coming not only to accept all that is, but to will it, to celebrate it. The conflict in his
story can be resolved only by coming to desire the “eternal return” of life and death “throughout
infinite time—not an expurgated version with the bad bits left out, but exactly the same life,
down to the last detail, however painful or shameful.”17 Nietzsche’s hope of salvation resembles
that of the “tragic myth” explored by Ricoeur. There, suffering is endured “for the sake of
enlightened nation-states “saved” Europe from religious war.
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understanding.” Salvation is aesthetic deliverance, the bestowal of “tragic wisdom.”18 Tragedy,
said Nietzsche, is “the highest art of saying yes to life.”19 “What doesn’t kill me makes me
stronger.”20
Seeking tragic wisdom, the “mature Nietzsche’s prime aim” was “world-affirmation.”21
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, written between 1883 and 1885, was among the first of his mature
works. Nietzsche called it “a fifth Gospel.” According to Young, it was to be “the central, sacred
text of the new religion” supposed to “replace the now-‘dead’ Christianity.” It would be a
religion “of life,” rather than of “after-life.” 22 It chronicled the protagonist’s journey toward
world-affirming wisdom and his efforts to make disciples along the way: “To lure many away
from the herd, for that I have come...Fellow creators, Zarathustra seeks, fellow harvesters, fellow
celebrants.”23 Zarathustra, a Christ-like figure, in a sense “is Nietzsche,” the “ideal Nietzsche,”
the person he wanted to be.24
When he was thirty years old, Zarathustra left his home to live alone in the mountains.
After ten years of solitude, he emerged full of wisdom, “like a bee that has gathered too much
honey.” He needs “hands outstretched to receive it.”25 He goes to a city, which represents the
sickly culture of the modern west.26 Upon seeing the crowd gathered to watch a tightrope walker
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in the town square, Zarathustra shares his message: “Man is a rope, tied between beast and
overman [Übermensch]—a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way.”27
The Übermensch is the icon of humanity overcoming their need to protect themselves from
reality by appealing to conventional ideals. He was a signpost of the hope that some would come
to will the eternal return and so attain salvation.28 But first, they must go over (über). Zarathustra
urged his hearers to “remain faithful to the earth.” Do “not believe those who speak to you of
otherworldly hopes!”29
With the crowd rejecting him, Zarathustra leaves town to call disciples and deliver his
speeches. He tells his fellow celebrants of the earth they must learn to conquer every “thou shalt”
with a resolute “I will.”30 They must become the creators of their own values. The evils they
must overcome are the “afterworlds,” the rational pre-established harmonies, the moral
universes, the utopias dreamt by a weariness “that wants to reach the ultimate with one leap.”
Zarathustra explains how “suffering and incapacity” led people to abandon the real world and
invent “gods and afterworlds.”31 When people speak of “highest good” and “great evil,” they are
simply sounding “the voice of their will to power.”32 Zarathustra, the great educator, teaches his
disciples “to speak ever more honestly” about the world.33 To become as the Übermensch, they
must learn to fit their words, minds, and wills to the world created by the realist declaration.
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But Zarathustra still struggles with this doctrine and so he often removes himself from his
disciples and returns to solitude. He recognized that he continues to be a man “on-the-way.” He
knows the only salvation possible in a realist story of the world must begin by sacrificing every
moral ought. He must not only accept, but must will the world as it is and so transcend it. To
recreate all “it was” into a “thus I willed it”—“that alone should I call redemption [Erlösung].”34
But he knew he had not yet arrived. Zarathustra chided himself: has “the will yet spoken thus?”
Has “the will yet become his own redeemer and joy-bringer?” That “will,” is “the will to power.”
It must be taught to will “backwards.” But, “Who could teach him also to will backwards?”35
Who could muster the courage to say “once more” to life?36—to return eternally “not to a new
life or better life,” but to this “same, selfsame life”?37
Zarathustra believed that it was his “destiny” to be “the teacher of the eternal recurrence.”38
He must create a storied world in which “time itself is a circle.” There, time does not fly forward
as an arrow toward a target, but forward as a giant wheel endlessly rotating toward what has
gone before. From the perspective of those entangled in time and causality, the path appears to
go on eternally in opposite directions, never to meet. But in fact, the paths do come together
where each individual stands—“here at this gateway” called “moment”…
From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies an
eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not
whatever can have happened, have been done, have passed by before? ... Must not
34
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this gateway too have been there before? And are not all things knotted together so
firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to come? Therefore—itself too? For
whatever can walk … it must walk once more.39
Nietzsche’s life-organizing story begins by saying of the world, “It is what it is.” As a
creative declaration, it discloses a storied world filled with purposeless pain and fleeting
pleasure. The plot moves forward like a man moving precariously across a high-wire strung out
over an abyss.40 It is a struggle of an evolving perspective: to move from a false (idealistic)
perspective, through an honest (realistic) yet despairing perspective, eventually to arrive at an
empowered, joyous perspective. It’s a story about growing up, not to change the world, but to
affirm it as it is. The conflict resolves only when the protagonist can honestly match his words to
this world and say, “Thus I willed it.”
It is not until the conclusion of Part Four that Zarathustra enjoys a proleptic experience of
salvation. Otherwise, the thought of the “eternal return” nauseates him.41 It finally overtakes him
during his “drunken song”—drunk on life, that is, and maybe buzzing on wine. Surrounded by
his celebrating higher men, he exclaims, “Joy … wants recurrence, wants everything the same …
You higher men, do learn this, joy wants eternity. Joy wants the eternity of all things.”42 The
next morning, Zarathustra awakes and leaves his higher men. For a moment, he almost pities
them and regrets the loss of their company. But then hardens his face like flint: “Well then, that
has had its time!” he says. “My suffering and my pity for suffering—what does it matter?” Then
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he sets off to continue his journey, “glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark
mountains.”43
Zarathustra’s story, especially his speech on Erlösung, “salvation,” reveals what Young
called “Nietzsche’s basic strategy: theodicy—showing that problematic phenomena are really
just blessings in disguise.” Young continued: “In narrating one’s life in this way one is, of
course, giving it unity, ‘composing into one’ all that was previously meaningless ‘accident’.
Apparent accidents become parts of ‘personal providence’. To authentic ‘selves’ accidents never
happen.”44 For the mature Nietzsche, “Redemption, salvation, finding the world perfect, amor
fati, embracing the eternal return, are one and all simply different expression of the same
thing.”45 They speak to the resolution of the plot’s conflict, which intends to justify both story
and author. “Nietzsche’s work tried to overcome theodicy by offering a bolder version of it.”46
Nietzsche and Leibniz shared a similar strategy.47 They both aimed to match their assertive
discourse to their storied worlds. Granted, they inhabit two radically different narrative settings.
Leibniz’s world came into being by the declaration that there be a universal, impersonal ideal in
which God, humanity, and nature participate. In this world, divine and human freedoms are
compatible. Leibniz’s storied evil was human immorality, which must remain distinct from
“natural evil” (e.g., the Lisbon earthquake). In some respect, natural or physical evil is part of
how the world works, but is aggravated by moral evil, or sin. And at the root of all moral evil is
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always human ignorance. It is overcome by education. But Nietzsche (and Spinoza before him)
declared the world all natural. This collapsed the distinction between moral evil (sin) and
physical evil (suffering). By doing so, he brought an entirely new storied world into existence.
Here, human beings are irretrievably entangled in the natural, causal order just like everything
else. This world has no end goal or final purpose. It just is.
Nietzsche’s story opens up a way of salvation that offers hope against nihilistic despair.
The storied evils in this plot are the false ideals that condemn the world or seek to modify it.
They are evil because they weaken the will. They delay the coming of the Overman. In his place,
they created the “last man,” the “most despicable man,” who “lives longest” and “invented
happiness.”48 And so, as with Leibniz, salvation must be delivered through education, through
making more honest assertions. Nietzsche saw himself as a doctor of culture. His aim was to
rightly diagnose and heal the idealist disease.49 He believed this was both his will and his
causally determined destiny, making him evermore resolute in his calling. Though his methods
appeared harsh, he was working for the salvation of others—to teach them even as he continued
to teach himself to say “Once more!” to life. And mean it.
Nietzsche’s life organizing story has ties to Eastern religious thought in general, and
Buddhism in particular. In The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche said that “Christianity promises everything
and delivers nothing,” whereas “Buddhism does not promise,” but “delivers.”50 Not that
Nietzsche recommended Buddhism—he thought it belonged with Christianity as a “nihilistic”
religion. At the same time, he said “Buddhism is a hundred times more realistic [realistischer]
of saying both Nietzsche and Leibniz tried to accurately or honestly fit their words to their respective worlds.
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than Christianity.”51 In sharp contrast to Christianity, which he had called “Platonism for the
‘people’,”52 Nietzsche thought Buddhism “has left the self-deception of moral concepts, – it
stands, as I put it, beyond good and evil.”53 Buddhism delivers, because it does right by reality
[der Wirklicheit].54
Like Nietzsche’s story, “Buddhist Eschatology” narrates an individual journey through
perspectives: from delusional, to honest, to enlightened. Buddhist scholar Jan Nattier explained:
To speak of Buddhist eschatology is, in a sense, a misnomer. If eschatology is
understood to refer to “final things”—that is, the idea that the world will one day
come to a definitive end—there is simply no parallel in the Buddhist tradition. On the
contrary, Buddhist scriptures regularly refer to “beginningless saṁsāra,” a cycle of
birth and death of the universe (as well as of the individual) for which no starting
point can be discerned. Nor is there an end...It is only on the level of the individual
living being … that Buddhist texts do speak of an ultimate and final end. Indeed, the
entire purpose of the Buddha’s teachings … was to provide his followers with the
means to escape from the treadmill of saṁsāra once and for all. This could be
accomplished by carrying out a process of self-cultivation … that would ultimately
lead to a complete and definitive awakening to the understanding of reality as it is,
the experience known as nirvāṇa.55
Nietzschean and Buddhist eschatologies appear to be different in that the Buddhist hopes to
escape saṁsāra, while Nietzsche hopes to say “Once more!” eternally. But they are similar in the
way they declare conflict and seek resolution in their respective plots. Storied evil in both
accounts is a false picture that imagines life were something other than a pendulum between
unsatisfied desires and post-satisfaction boredom.56 The Buddhist strategy can be stated
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negatively or positively, either as extinguishing one’s will or as awakening one’s understanding.
Likewise, Nietzsche’s strategy can be stated negatively or positively, either “willing backwards,”
or replacing every “it was” with a “thus I willed it.” In both cases, storied evil is transcended by
authentically matching one’s words, mind, and will to the declared world. Thus, they both serve
as fitting examples of a realist-theoretic narrative theodicy.
Realist-Pragmatic
The pragmatic realist, like the theoretic, begins by declaring ideals to be infantile illusions.
There is no better world hidden in the heavens or reflected in the human psyche. There is just
reality. It is what it is. The pragmatist hope is distinctive because it pursues a different strategy to
overcome the conflict that remains in its plot. This type is not ultimately concerned with
speaking honest assertions about its storied world. Instead, it aims to issue successful directives
that will manipulate human and non-human nature to match local or personal preference.
Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), the Austrian-born father of psychoanalysis, will be our main
expositor of a realist-pragmatic narrative theodicy.
Ernest Becker called him a “true Enlightenment figure,” who “crowned” that tradition.57
Paul Ricoeur thought he was the Master of the modern masters of suspicion.58 Philip Rieff
portrayed him as “the transitional figure” for understanding our present day culture.59 Susan
Neiman said he was responsible for “the most widespread assumptions that determine
and boredom, and these two are in fact its ultimate constituents. This has been expressed very quaintly by the saying
that, after man had placed all pains and torments in hell, there was nothing left for heaven but boredom.”
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contemporary thought” on the so-called problem of evil.60 Compared to the others, portraying
Freud as a theodicist may seem strange. Leibniz (and his intellectual heir, Hegel) was expressly
attempting a theodicy. Many recognize Marx and Nietzsche as implicitly striving after some
form of secular or post-secular theodicy. But most scholars agree that Freud refused to offer any
form of consolation. So in what sense can we say he offers a rival hope?
I answer by returning to my formal definitions. I argue that Freud, in spite of his irreligious
convictions, nonetheless has a life-organizing story. As with others, his story develops a conflict
and strains after a resolution. Final resolution has not yet occurred, but he can point to signs of its
coming. Although his storied evil still needs to be managed, the movement of the plot elicits
hope and effectively defends against despair.
We might be tempted to say that Freud’s eschatology is not hopeful because it doesn’t offer
Heaven, Utopia, or even a resolute will to say “Once more!” to life. But, as experienced from
within Freud’s story, those are all infantile illusions. They offer no genuine hope. His account
differs from others because it aims to offer real hope—a mature hope stripped of delusion. By
removing the projected wishes of those false hopes, he also avoids the antisocial neuroses caused
by their counterparts: the fear of Hell, the anxieties of Revolution, or the nausea of trying to will
the Eternal Return. Freud offers eschatological hope, not because he speaks of “end times,” but
because he speaks to the resolution of a story that discloses the “real” world. “Not in any
beyond,” said Freud, “but here on earth most men live in a hell: Schopenhauer has seen this very
well. My knowledge, my theories and my methods have the goal of making men conscious of
this hell so that they can free themselves from it.”61 The intelligibility of this story of liberation
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depends on whether or not its Author proves trustworthy. Freud’s hope, like all the others, is
elicited by the telling of a narrative theodicy.
To depict Freud as a narrative theodicist, I make an analogy between his account and the
chaos-creation myth described by Ricoeur in The Symbolism of Evil. We’ve seen similar
analogies with the others. Like the Platonic philosophers, Leibniz re-told a version of the myth
that resolved by moving from ignorance to knowledge. Marx’s progressive, communitarian hope
has often interpreted as a kind of biblical drama dressed up in secular garb.62 And we noted
Nietzsche’s quest for the tragic wisdom that comes through suffering an education to reality.
Now Freud’s account brings us back to the far left side of Ricoeur’s typology,63 to ancient
Babylon.
Paul Ricoeur gestured toward this reading of Freud in his Freud and Philosophy. Ricoeur
connected Nietzsche and Freud with the life-organizing story of Spinoza, the early modern
pantheistic determinist, whom Leibniz had credited with “destroying freedom,” by divesting
“God of intelligence and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates of necessity.”64
Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Freud all tell a similar story, a realist story. It is an account of passing
through stages of maturity. First, being confronted with “bare reality,” one “finds himself a
slave” of necessity, captive to the primordial impulses and causal connections that determine the
universe. Next, “he understands his slavery.” Finally, “he rediscovers himself free within
understood necessity.”65
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Ricoeur noted how “the final development” of Freud’s theory “marks the return of
psychoanalysis to a sort of mythological philosophy, the emblems of which are the figures of
Eros [urge toward sexual union], Thanatos [urge toward death], and Ananke [necessity].”66
Freud’s interest in a global interpretation of culture was brought to light in his 1920 essay,
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. There Freud argued for the hypothesis that all reality was
governed by two conflicting primordial forces: the life instinct (Eros) and the death instinct
(Thanatos). The first “seeks to force together and hold together the portions of living substance.”
The second is a kind of inertia that struggles against the first. It “was brought into being by the
coming to life of inorganic substance.”67 In 1930, Freud developed these reality-governing
principles in Civilization and Its Discontents. There he claimed that the development of
civilizations presents
a struggle between Eros and Death [Thanatos], between the instinct of life and the
instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is
what all life essentially consists of … And it is this battle of the giants that our nursemaids try to appease with their lullaby about Heaven.68
Ricoeur commented on this passage: “In placing the task of culture in the field of the struggle
between Eros and Thanatos, Freud raises his interpretation to the rank of a single and strong
idea,” a “global and sovereign” worldview.69
Like Spinoza and Nietzsche, Freud declared into existence a world dominated by natural,
impersonal forces. In one powerful move, this declaration solved the various problems of evil
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created by the idealist versions of the world. It did so by removing the distinctions between
moral, physical, and metaphysical evils and judged them all to be “natural.” In one sense it
created a new, more mature, late-modern world. In another sense, it re-created the old world
arising from the “theogonic myths” of ancient Babylon.70 In this story, salvation was already
granted with the equilibrium forged in the violent struggle of life out of lifelessness. Violence is
inscribed “in the origin of things, in the principle that establishes while it destroys.”71 Since
salvation was given proleptically with the original life-equilibrium, the remaining storied evil
can only be a “resurgence of the ancient chaos.”72 The conflict that drives the plot is located in
the problem of individuals and communities falling prey to disruptions of the equilibrium. In
order to participate in salvation, they must ritually re-enact the action victory. Eschatological
hope is realized in the proper management of the chaos and maintenance of the order.
In Freud’s version of the realist story, one of the great obstacles to realizing this hope is
traditional religion itself. In his 1927 essay, The Future of an Illusion, he argued that religion
was “the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity.”73 All religious doctrines have developed
out of the human urge to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Civilization invented religion to restrict
antisocial behavior and to offer consolation when life gets too hard. Freud admitted these
doctrines have had some benefit for culture, but have since exhausted their usefulness. They
console and restrict people only by coddling their infantile wishes. And the “pitiful rearguard
actions” of modern philosophers are no better. They think “they can rescue the God of religion
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by replacing him by an impersonal, shadowy and abstract principle.”74 What civilization needs
now is an “education to reality.”75
The new reality of which Freud speaks is the world governed by Eros, Thanatos, and
Ananke—by life, death, and necessity. In Civilization and Its Discontents, he offered a strategy
for effectively dealing with reality. He recognized that we are threatened by a threefold
suffering: a decaying body, a harsh external world, and a malicious humankind. The best hope
for mitigating this suffering is to become “a member of the human community.” Then, “with the
help of a technique guided by science,” we should continue “the attack against nature” and
subject “her to human will.”76
The attack against nature comes in two forms: one directed toward the non-human and the
other toward the human. Some scientists exercise their craft upon the external, non-human world.
They apply their technique directly by physically manipulating objects and natural forces. Other
scientists exercise their craft upon human nature. They manipulate the human psyche and the
cultural arrangements within which the psyche is formed and managed. They must apply their
technique indirectly by working through human consciousness to manipulate the determinative
natural forces at work in the unconscious. Like the royal priesthood of ancient Babylon, they
must master and enact the various rituals of renewal and “rites of elimination”77 and so maintain
the social equilibrium.
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Unlike Nietzsche, Freud’s strategy for overcoming storied evil is ultimately pragmatic.78
Though both could speak of an “education to reality,” Freud did not think that bringing oneself
to celebrate the world as-is would help society at-large. Since the “clamor of life proceeds for the
most part from Eros,”79—from that swirling reservoir of desire stored in every individual—
human life is fundamentally “a problem of the economics of the individual’s libido.”80
Unconscious desires can be relieved, displaced, transferred, or sublimated. The point is, they
need to be channeled somewhere. If they are mismanaged or repressed, a resurgence of the
ancient chaos is bound to occur.
Freud’s life-organizing story offers both individual and communal hope. For the individual,
he described a journey that each person must take to learn the right technique for managing the
supply-and-demand of their personal desires. Therapists can serve as guides or life coaches in
this endeavor. This technically savvy priesthood knows there “is no golden rule which applies to
everyone: every man must find out for himself in what particular fashion he can be saved.”81 All
sorts of factors will play into developing the right technique for living: ability to modify the
external world, psychical constitution, external circumstances. In order to develop a mature Ego,
a customized set of activities, stimulants, and discharges will need to be assembled and
prescribed for every individual.
The best hope for communities is to keep these individual Eros-economies in mind. The
problem with forming culture via religion is that it “restricts this play of choice and adaptation.”
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Traditional religion “imposes equally on everyone its own path to the acquisition of happiness
and protection from suffering. Its technique consists in depressing the value of life and distorting
the picture of the real world.”82 But a properly structured civilization will learn to “lower its
demands” on the individual. The “id cannot be controlled beyond certain limits. If more is
demanded of a man, a revolt will be produced in him or a neurosis, or he will be made unhappy.”
A principal example of an over-demanding religious imposition is the commandment, “Love thy
neighbor as thyself,” which is “impossible to fulfill.”83 Nothing else “runs so strongly counter to
the original nature of man” and is, in the end, counterproductive to the aims of civilization.84
According to Rieff, Freud’s goal was simply to “soften the collar” of civilization around
the neck of humanity.85 Stated even more modestly, Freud wanted “to transform hysterical
misery into common unhappiness.”86 This might not sound like much for hope, but compared to
the unreasonable demands and the undeliverable promises made by religionists and
revolutionaries alike, it wasn’t half bad. Having declared humanity to be a volatile mix of
aggressiveness, self-love, and inclination toward death, Freud thought that “mastering the
disturbance of the communal life” was a challenging but attainable goal.87 He cast his hope upon
the endeavors of “scientific work,” through which “we can increase our power” and “arrange our
life.” The modest hope of science is “no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what
science cannot give us we can get elsewhere.”88 Freud ended the 1930 version of Civilization and
82

Ibid., 84.

83

Ibid., 143.

84

Ibid., 112.

85

Rieff, Triumph of the Therapeutic, 6. Rieff called this the “gospel of freer impulse” (24).

86

Michael Roth, Psycho-Analysis as History: Negation and Freedom in Freud (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987), 15.
87

Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 145.

88

Freud, Future of an Illusion, 56.

200

Its Discontents on a hopeful note. He looked for Eros, the urge toward life and unity, to “make
an effort to assert himself in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary”—Thanatos, the
urge toward death and destruction. In the 1931 edition, after Hitler’s intentions were becoming
more apparent, Freud added the following: “But who can foresee with what success and with
what result?”89
Becker called Freud’s “scientific theory of ego development” a “critical anthropodicy.”90 It
sought to justify the human being to humanity not simply by absolving our guilt and relaxing our
demands. More critically, Freud offered a story within which to organize life. His account
explained why some people never fully grew up and, at the same time, offered a plan of action
for those who were willing to learn the technique and follow its prescriptions. Evil, in his storied
world, was disruption and disturbance within “the eternal struggle between Eros and the instinct
of destruction or death.”91 His strategy for overcoming evil was to issue successful directives to
redirect and reconfigure the natural forces that govern the universe, as far as we are able.
In the prior chapter, I mentioned Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man as a
possible example of an idealist-active narrative theodicy. However, it is possible the problem he
addressed makes better sense within Freud’s story. Fukuyama struggled with the problem of “the
last man” at the “end of history.” Here he was referring to Nietzsche’s “last man,” that most
despicable man who invented happiness. Liberal democracy was destined to produce such
creatures—“men without chests”—because it replaced human strife with self-preservation and
prosperity. Fukuyama’s fear was that the “last man” was an inherently unstable creature because
he lacked an outlet for his aggression. He had no way to win for himself recognition from others.
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Liberal democracy might have made life too easy for humanity. Might “the fear of becoming
contemptible ‘last men’ not lead men to assert themselves in new and unforeseen ways, even to
the point of becoming once again bestial ‘first men’ engaged in bloody prestige battles, this time
with modern weapons?”92
Though he never cited Freud, Fukuyama’s solution sounded rather Freudian. The internal
inconsistency of liberal democracy is that it grants equal recognition, rights, and dignity to
unequal people. But if everybody’s a winner, then nobody’s a winner. So how does a liberal
nation state prevent its own undoing from its citizens’ desires to exalt themselves over others? It
needs to create positive outlets to release this aggression and “grounding wires that bleed off
excess energy that would otherwise tear the community apart.”93 It needs to help its citizens
develop their own customized techniques for managing their reservoirs of desire. Some might
find an outlet in entrepreneurship. Others will find it in climbing K-2, developing new
technologies, or by excelling in “perfectly contentless formal arts.”94 And if none of these work,
the people might need to let off some steam by fighting “a short and decisive war every
generation or so to defend its own liberty and independence.”95
Fukuyama spoke of a struggle between “rational desire” (self-perseveration) and “rational
recognition” (self-exaltation). He argued “that modern liberal democracy” ushered in the end of
history because it “best satisfies” these two giants “in some kind of balance.”96 That is to say, it
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“constitutes the best possible solution to the human problem.”97 Was it the final solution because
it best reflected the universal standard of the Good? Or because it discovered an effective
technique for managing the most base natural forces? In the end, it sounds like democracy wins
by quelling our infantile urges with the right mix of upper-middle class lifestyle, extreme sports,
and wartime heroics. If his solution to the problem of the “last man” at the “end of history” failed
to be fully idealistic, then his book is a testament to the influence of the story told by Freud.
Whether or not we judge him as succeeding, Fukuyama, like the other idealists, wanted to
maintain a notion of human freedom that could rise above our biology. In stark contrast to this is
contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett, who explicitly embraced the realist-pragmatic
plotline. Theologian Paul Hinlicky, in his “critical retrieval of Leibniz,” confessed that Dennett’s
book Darwin’s Dangerous Idea “awoke me from my proverbial ‘dogmatic slumbers.’” He said
that Dennett’s so-called secular fundamentalism showed him “in plain print how the Kantian
walls of the past two centuries [i.e., the distinction between is and ought] … have indeed come
crashing down like those of old Jericho.”98 In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Dennett argued that
“We need to grow up.”99 We must come to grips with the fact that there is no divine parent or
intelligent designer or moral meaning behind the world. Accepting this reality is a small, but
hopeful step toward maturity.
In a more recent article, Dennett argued that Charles Darwin is “by far the scientist who
has made the greatest contribution to philosophy.” “If I could give a prize for the single best idea
anybody ever had,” said Dennett, “I’d give it to Darwin. In a single stroke Darwin’s theory”
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united “the realm of physics” with “the realm of meaning.” For Dennett, this was cause to
celebrate. The chains of idealistic tradition had been broken. Now we can receive all things as
gifts—“as fruits on the tree of life.”100 Dennett told a Darwinian story of how our “‘godlike’
powers of comprehension and imagination” arose from “naturalistic forces” alone. Remarkably,
the tree of life has granted us power to change our situation and navigate from “sub-optimal”
peaks, through set-backs, on to what might be a “global summit.” Though we “are not perfect
truth-trackers,” we can “evaluate our own shortcomings by using the methods we have so far
devised, so we can be confident that we are justified in trusting our methods in the foreseeable
future.”101 With the right technique in play, Dennett’s pragmatic story proffers both personal and
corporate hope. It provides a personal eschatology in terms of growing up and overcoming our
childish beliefs. It also provides a corporate eschatology with the hope that the “tree of life” will
ultimately lead us to the global summit.102
The Possibility of a Dual Declaration
In the last chapter I discussed the possibility of a dual strategy for overcoming evil—one
that would attempt to both transcend it by assertion and transform it by issuing directives to
modify the social structures that produce evil. I gave Kant the pride of place for an attempt to
hold his footing on this tortuous middle ground. In this chapter, I will consider whether or not
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it’s possible to hold the tension across the vertical division in the typology, that is, the line
between the realist and idealist responses to experience.103 I take James Edward’s book The Plain
Sense of Things as an attempt to issue this paradoxical dual declaration: the world “is what it is”
and “ought not be this way.”
Edwards’s stated problem was how to restore the power of a sacred reality in a culture of
“normal nihilism.”104 In this setting, it seems we can only appeal to personal values or local
customs and not to “truth.” So, can Western intellectuals still be shaped by a powerful,
transcendent norm? Does there remain any moral “ought” that does not reduce to mere personal
preference? Edwards, an atheist philosopher trained in the post-Nietzschean school of Martin
Heidegger, wanted an affirmative answer to these questions. He sought to imagine a set of
religious practices that could “contain, concentrate, and transmit the sacramental energies—
energies for limitation in the face of hubris and for transformation in the face of complacency—
that used to be bound up in the stories of the gods.”105
Edwards began by telling a version of the Enlightenment’s story about growing up. Like
Freud, Edwards believed that the human problem was with how to cope with the vicissitudes of
life in the body abused not only by the external world but also our fellow man. “We are, as we
somehow all know at some level of consciousness, coping, trying to make sense of things.”106 By
his count, Westerners passed through at least four stages or four kinds of coping mechanisms.
First they told the stories of the gods, who exercised their inscrutable will over humanity. The
benefit of this stage was that it curbed human pride and kept people in line. The downside was
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that it offended their sense of justice and personal autonomy. During the second stage, humanity
domesticated their gods and subdued them under the impersonal ideals of Goodness, Truth, and
Justice. This addressed the deficiency of the first stage. But, after about working for 2,000 years,
it began to falter because few agreed on what exactly this “ideal” was. It seemed there were as
many ideals as there were authorities who taught them. In an effort to ground the ideal in
something certain, people scrapped the traditional authorities and looked for solid ground in the
individual human mind. But this third stage only multiplied the number of authorities. By
seeking an impersonal standard of judgment, they had made every person the final judge. This
moved Western culture into its fourth and present stage, which Edwards called the “Age of
Transvalued Values.” This mode of coping created our present “mood” of “normal nihilism.”107
The theme of this story was the “gradual but inexorable loss of the sacred’s power.”108
What started as a way to cope with reality by privileging human autonomy led to a flaccid
humanism. Edwards’s example of what this looks like was the local shopping mall, where life is
transformed into “lifestyle.”
The tools, garments, and attitudes specific to particular times and places become
commodities to be marketed to anonymous and rootless consumers … An outfit, an
electronic toy for bored adult males, a book detailing an aerobic exercise program for
Christians—these are, in Nietzsche’s sense, values.109
Now that humanity has become the creators and masters of their own values, Western culture is
vulnerable to both “runaway humanism” and “triumphant normality.”110 The first threat is a
“quasi-religious demand” that we “continually create new and better forms of human life;”
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where “life for the sake of life … becomes change for the sake of change.”111 The second threat
is the fearful response to the ever-multiplying options of the first. Here, we sink into welldefined social roles. Our desire to hold on to “normality” is threatened by anything that appears
“abnormal.” Edwards admitted, “I am afraid these powerful forces will beset us in vicious
alternation, leaving us (and our fellow travelers on the planet, and finally the planet itself)
spoiled and exhausted.”112 It seems our current coping mechanism—the Freudian story about
acquiring a custom-fit technique for living—has undermined our hope for a better future.
So far, Edwards appears to be working squarely within the scheme of a realist-pragmatic
narrative theodicy. Life is hard. Over the years humanity has prescribed different ways to cope.
Some offered sacrifices. Others went shopping. But Edwards thought this pick-and-choose
religiosity had proved self-defeating. What we lack is that old-time religious Pathos. Back in the
day, before the gods were domesticated, people believed things because they were true, not
because they were valuable. Edwards wanted to discover a form of religious practice that could
not be cherished or discarded as personal therapy. He wanted a normative Thou shalt that could
stand over and judge a human I prefer. He wanted to embrace this aspect of religious life without
surrendering the hard-fought intellectual battles that led to Enlightenment maturity.
While traditional supernatural religion is no longer possible for us, we still need
something: something to bound our temptation to eat up the earth and ourselves in
pursuit of ever new, and ever more reckless, forms of self-fashioning; and—
simultaneously—something to loosen our captivity to whatever particular form of life
is commonsensically dominant here and now.113
For what is Edwards asking? He did not want (in the manner of Nietzsche) to transcend the
pain of being human by turning every “it was” into a “thus I willed it.” He did not want (after the
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method of Freud) to develop more effective techniques for managing libidinal urges. Rather, he
wanted to come under the scrutiny of something truthful that would make human life
“transparent to itself.” He wanted religious practices that could critique and shape our values and
not merely express them.114 Edwards approached the human problem not at the level of strategy,
but at the moment of the declaration that characterized the conflict in the plot. He wanted human
life to be judged and vindicated by something more than human. At the same time, he could not
bring himself to unconditionally trust any external judgment, especially if it claimed to be divine.
He wanted to be judged. And he wanted to retain his right to negate the judgment.
Edwards summarized his proposed religious practice as “poetic dwelling on earth as a
mortal,” an approach drawn from four of Heidegger’s essays written in the 1950s.115 Heidegger’s
later works turn on theological-sounding phrases like “the realm of revealing,” “the turning of
the age,” and measuring oneself “against the godhead.”116 Edwards noted that these should not be
heard as referring to the “personified supernatural presences of vulgar religious belief.”117
Instead, they are expressions of that paradoxical hope to be judged without finally coming under
authoritative, external judgment.
What was Edwards was trying to do? He was not advocating one strategy over another, as
Marx rivaled Leibniz (and Hegel) or as Freud rivaled Nietzsche. He was looking for a
trustworthy authority to declare what counts as good and what counts as evil. On the one hand,
he did not trust an individual’s capacity to reflect infallible Reason. According to his
Nietzschean argument, reflection is always projection of the will to value. He did not want to
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make personal subjectivity the uncontested guide of life because this is precisely what led us to
the crisis of normal nihilism, to the shopping mall. On the other hand, he did not advocate
becoming a faithful disciple of some religious tradition, for this would demand “intellectual and
spiritual suicide”118—a surrender of Enlightened maturity.
On what basis could Edwards judge these rival stories if he couldn’t trust his own internal
moral compass to direct him? In place of a sacred person or an innate sense of the Good,
Edwards looked for sacramental practices that could guide him. But in the very process of
assembling these secular sacraments and interpreting their meaning, he would still be either
crafting or participating in a story of how he got there and where he’s going. To fulfill his desire
to be formed by an authority that stands over every human value, he must come under judgment
and follow as disciple. To exercise unchecked, critical judgment, he must become a shopper at
the mall. When faced with the conflict that drives our stories, when faced with the problem of
evil, we must finally either judge, or be judged. A declaration must be made if our stories are to
have a world and our worlds are to have a story.
Summary
Edwards was a good case study for the realists because his desire to be judged while
rejecting external judgment reveals the similarity between the realists and the idealists. At first it
seemed as though the realists were different because they refused to judge humanity and the
world by some self-devised ideal. They rejected the idealist “ought” and said, “It is what it is.”
But now we have come to hear the realist response also as a form of judgment. In the case of
Nietzsche, it was more obvious. He condemned those who would condemn life and declared that
the eternal recurrence of all things must be desired and celebrated. Freud also began his story by
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rendering judgment on the infantile ideals of those who refused to grow up. Edwards hesitated.
He wanted the formative power of the idealist declaration as well as the liberating power of the
realist declaration. But as long as he wished to maintain hope against the despair of normal
nihilism, he must either judge or be judged. He must become the Author of his own customized
story. Or he must be storied within some other Author’s world.
This concludes our detour to say what Christian hope is not. As we transition to the via
positiva, toward an effort to say what Christian hope is, we must ask: Why are these various
kinds of hope not Christian? It would be a mistake for Christians to evaluate these narrative
theodicies by some abstract, superintending standard. I do not criticize the theorists as being
socially unproductive or too willing to accept the status quo. I do not criticize the pragmatists as
being conceptually unsatisfying or too optimistic. I do not judge either group on their ability to
maintain the proper balance between presumption and despair. Each story has the potential to
meet all these standards in their own way because each intends to render its narrative world
intelligible. Each story has the power to speak to some human longing, depending on the
person’s present disposition and life setting. None of them have a special advantage over the
others in this regard. They all point to signs and experiences of fulfilled hope. They are all
equally plagued by some sort of scandalous evil. And so my aim was not to evaluate them in
terms of their potential to form culture or assuage existential angst. My aim was only to say how
they are not Christian.
Furthermore, these standards of judgment (e.g., optimistic, sober-minded, socially
productive, conceptually satisfying, properly balanced), as Edwards helped us see, are all values.
And values always proceed from personal judgment. Christians are people who have come under
the judgment of the person of Jesus Christ. They are people who participate in the story that will
resolve only in Christ’s advent for final judgment.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
STAYING IN THE STORY
How does Christian hope compare to other forms of hope? What do they hold in common?
What makes it distinct? These are the questions that prompted this project. The answers given so
far were guided by the assumption that human beings, inasmuch as they struggle to maintain
hope against despair, face some peculiar problem of evil. This problem becomes the conflict in
an on-going, life-organizing story. Because the story anticipates a resolution to the conflict, it
elicits eschatological hope. At the core of narrated hope is a contested belief or as-yet unverified
trust that evil can either be transcended or transformed and so overcome. For conflict to be
overcome there must be an Author, an agent of emplotment. A participant in the story might
assume the mantle of authorship and attain a form of personal providence. Or, he or she can look
to a community or another individual to fill that role. In both cases, the participant takes it on
faith that the story will resolve intelligibly and that the Author will prove trustworthy. Therefore,
a life-organizing story offers a narrative theodicy, with theos conceived as the Author or agent of
emplotment.
This is precisely what Christian hope holds in common with other life-organizing hopes.
All imply an eschatology—a logic of resolution that offers a narrated theodicy. They elicit a
hope that “evil” will not prevail. This thesis has at least two important implications. On the one
hand, Christians should not distinguish their hope by claiming a cognitive certainty, a religious
consolation, an existential meaningfulness, or an ethical productivity that rises above others.
Their problem of evil is as acute and unresolved as in all other life-organizing stories. On the
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other hand, Christians, when pressured by this problem, should remember that other prospective
stories of the world are plagued by a residual conflict that is no less scandalous and corrosive.
If Christians wish to distinguish and maintain their peculiar hope, they should bear witness
to what is most appropriate for their corporate struggle against evil, not what is most effective.1
The appropriate place of struggle for Christians to maintain hope against despair is within the
Christian story as narrated in the Bible, summarized in the ecumenical creeds, assumed in the
dogma of the Church, and reflected in the biographies of the baptized. This story has a
characteristic mode of resolution to its continuing conflict with evil. In the Christian plot, evil
will be overcome by the action of God in his Son and Spirit to fulfill his promise to Abraham: “I
will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you and make your name great, so that you will
be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and him who dishonors you I will curse, and in
you all the families of the earth shall be blessed” (Gen. 12:2–3). In the New Testament, the
particular man Jesus of Nazareth, who is called Christ, the Son of God, is depicted as the maker
of this promise, its fulfiller, and its paradigmatic recipient.
Ever since Yahweh made his pledge to Abraham, God’s people have been tempted to find
another solution to their problem of evil. In search for a mode of resolution that is more
effective, they have made declarations and pursued strategies that are inappropriate. That is to
say, they have participated in rival life-organizing stories. Or, in more traditional terms, they
have broken the First Commandment. They have committed idolatry by trusting a rival agent of
emplotment. As we observed in the last two chapters, these stories—whether conceived as
personal, communal, or cosmic—offered effective and empowering hopes. But they were not
Christian. To be a Christian, to hope as a Christian, is to participate in the Christian story. In this
1
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concluding chapter, I entreat fellow Christians to identify and embrace their unique hope. When
confronted with both storied and scandalous evil, Christians should “stay in the story.”
In the first part of the chapter, I account for storied evil as it is encountered in the Christian
drama of salvation. In general terms, this is the conflict dealt with directly in the unfolding of the
plot. In the second part, I address the problem of scandalous evil. Also in general terms, this is
the conflict that threatens the intelligibility of the story as a whole. It cannot be addressed
directly from within the story. It can be resolved in one of two ways. On the one hand, the plot
and Author can be rejected in favor of a different story. This constitutes an epistemological crisis
or peripatetic reversal. On the other hand, the scandal can be endured from within the original
story. If the first option is taken, if one becomes apostate with respect to the prior story, the
original scandal will be removed, but a new one will take its place. I illustrated this phenomenon
in chapters four, five, and six. However, if the second option is taken, if one opts to remain in the
story, the scandal of evil can only be lamented with an as-yet unverified hope it will be overcome
in the plot’s final resolution, that is, in the eschaton. These problems are common to all stories
that propose to organize life for their participants. Christians, as participants in the story of Jesusin-Israel-and-the-Church, resist and lament evil in their peculiar, Christian way.
By recounting the life-organizing stories modeled by Leibniz, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud,
I have said much about what Christian hope is not. Now I aim to say what Christian hope is. I
identify it as one narrative theodicy among rivals. Along this via positiva, I draw upon the
understanding gained from the via negativa. More importantly, I return to what Richard
Bauckham called the “Christological foundation and criterion of Christian hope,” which is
“contested by few who write intentionally Christian eschatology.”2 The Christian hope is most
2
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properly distinguished by a specific man: Jesus of Nazareth, crucified under Pontius Pilate,
buried, raised from the dead on the third day, who “will come in glory as Savior of those who are
saved and as Judge of those who are judged.”3
Christian hope arises within a narrative theodicy. It is an account of the righteousness of the
God who made a promise to Abraham and raised Jesus from the dead. The righteousness of God
means that God does right and makes right. It also means that God displays the characteristic of
righteousness (trustworthiness). As the Creator and sustainer of all things, God alone justifies the
initial and continuing existence of his creation. He decides whether or not his creatures do right
by him. If and when his creation goes awry, God assumes full responsibility, as N. T. Wright
likes to say, “to set the world to rights.”4 Thus, the question of justification (setting right) does
not arise first with regard to sin and redemption, but already with creation.5 God is the justifier
because God is the creator.
But this raises questions about the righteousness God displays. How can God be relied
upon in the face of evil? How can God be trusted if we are sinners under his wrath, who
experience suffering as his disfavor or indifference? The story of Jesus-in-Israel-and-the-Church
is an answer to these questions. It is a narrative theodicy because it testifies that this God does
right and makes right, thereby displaying his trustworthiness. Of course, the on-going experience
3
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of evil contests this answer on all sides. The Christian hope is that evil will not prevail, that the
conflict in the plot will resolve.
It should go without saying that this is not a definitive or exhaustive account of Christian
hope. I have narrowed my witness to the hope of Christ as it applies within the confines of this
project. I attempt to say what it means to stay in the story and to hope as a Christian among the
four rival narrative theodicies. In purely negative terms, the Christian hope is set in contrast to an
idealist or realist declaration of what counts as evil. Furthermore, Christian hope will neither be
realized with more accurate descriptions of God and the world, nor in successful prescriptions to
change the world. Instead, it will be realized when the God of Jesus fits his world to match his
word of promise, which he extended to Abraham’s family.
The Christian confession is that Jesus of Nazareth is both the paradigmatic recipient and
authoritative fulfiller of this promise. The Christian hope will be realized only when God acts in
Jesus to keep his promise to Abraham. The pattern of fulfillment, or shape of the plot, has
already been given in God’s act to vindicate Abraham’s true heir by raising him from the dead.
God will finally fulfill his promise when he fits the world to the image of his crucified and
resurrected Son. In this way, and in this way alone, God will demonstrate his trustworthiness.
In this chapter, I account for Jesus as both speaker and recipient of God’s promise to
Abraham. As the definitive speaker of the promise, Jesus assumed the authority, power, and
responsibility to make the world fit to his word. I argue that confessing Jesus as the speaker and
fulfiller of God’s promise is an appropriate way to proclaim and participate in the Christian
story, especially when faced with the problem of storied evil. Thus, Jesus’ role as speakerfulfiller will be the focus of the first part of the chapter. In the second part, I focus on Jesus’ role
as the paradigmatic recipient of God’s promise. He is Abraham’s heir, the anointed son of David,
the king of Israel, to whom God promised to give the nations, the ends of the earth, even the
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whole cosmos as his inheritance (Ps. 2:8, Rom. 4:13). As the recipient of God’s promise, he
waited, lamented, and ultimately trusted his Father to deliver him from evil. Thus, Jesus’ life in
the Spirit, crucifixion, and resurrection are the paradigm of participation in the Christian story.
Accounting for Jesus in this way is most appropriate for enduring the on-going scandal of evil.
Christian Hope against Storied Evil
Earlier, I characterized the plot of the biblical narrative to be driven by the problem of false
trust, or idolatry. This is not the only way to speak of the conflict in the Bible’s plot. Christians
have characterized the conflict in other ways. For example, the story can be understood strictly in
anthropological terms as the endeavor to overcome human corruptibility and culpability. Or, it
can be understood theologically as the removing of all that tarnishes God’s glory and opposes
God’s will. It could even be understood in broad ecological terms as God’s project to forge a
proper home for him to dwell peaceably with his creatures, having delivered them from all
enemies. I do not deny the viability of these or other accounts. However, I will not focus on them
here because they do not correspond as well with the account of the Christian story as a narrated
promise, a notion which I began developing in chapter two. For the purpose of this essay, I have
taken the Christian account as the drama of a promise given, proleptically fulfilled, but now
contested in the interim between proleptic and final fulfillment. The conflict in this telling
centers on the trustworthiness of the promiser in the hearts and minds of the hearers.
Storied Evil as False Trust
Why tell the story this way and not some other way? From the beginning of this essay I
have been pursuing an external use of attributes. This was a use fitted for comparing one, whole,
storied system with another. It is distinct from an internal use of attributes, which is fitted for
deriving and attaining a greater understanding of a single storied system. If we were interested in
appreciating the plurality and complexity of features that cohere within the biblical narrative,

216

then reflection on the plot in all its anthropological, theological, or ecological dimensions would
be appropriate. However, since we are comparing the Christian story with other life-organizing
stories, these focused themes are less helpful. Recall how many of the rival narrative theodicies
examined in chapters four through six had no place for human guilt, an offended God, or an
eternal dwelling place. They did, however, all begin with a declaration of what counts as good
and evil. Furthermore, they continued with a strategy for overcoming evil that involved issuing
assertive or directive speech acts. Having made a declaration and set a strategy, they experienced
a sense of conflict and trusted an agent of emplotment whose reliability was still contested. To
formulate the Christian story in comparable terms would be an external use of attributes. This
requirement was met by an account of Christian hope as it arises from the on-going story about a
commissive speech act: the narrated promise the God of Jesus made to Abraham. As Paul
confessed before King Agrippa’s court: “I stand here on trial because of my hope in the promise
made by God to our fathers” (Acts 26:6).
In chapter one, I anticipated that this focus on the external features of Christian hope would
yield significant insights for those on the inside of the story. Characterizing the Christian conflict
as a singular problem of trust may be one such insight. Conceptually, the problem of mistrust or
false trust dialectically incorporates anthropological, theological, and ecological elements. The
biblical narrative is not exclusively about human guilt, divine glory, or Creator-creature
communion. It is about the Creator who promises to establish himself as trustworthy to sinners
who have traded out trust in him for trust in his creatures. This, of course, is not a novel insight.
This point is a hallmark of Reformation teaching, which is especially noticeable in the works of
Martin Luther and in the Confessional documents authored by his colleagues and students.
Although I have publically made the confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church my own
confession, I have not, in this argument, appealed to them as an authority. My argument was
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designed to exhibit how the theme of God’s trustworthiness arises when one persistently asks
how the storied hope of Christianity is distinct from its rivals. Luther and Lutheran theologians
have been cited along the way, but only to the degree they helped answer the question.
Admittedly, having been formed in a Lutheran tradition, I have been trying to think like a
Lutheran all along. But this requires two clarifications. First, what it means to be “Lutheran”
today is by no means a settled matter. Second, a foundational point of the historic Lutheran
Confessions is that Luther is dispensable, Jesus is not. Lutherans are disciples of Jesus who
participate in the on-going conversation about what constitutes the Christian tradition.6 In my
reckoning, the main contribution Lutherans bring to the unam, sanctam, catholicam, apostelicam
table is still the Reformation dogma of justification by grace through faith (or trust) in the
promise on account of (propter) Christ.7 This formulation expressed something foundational to
the tradition, something upon which it stands or falls. Or, as Lutheran theologian Oswald Bayer
said, something upon which the world stands or falls.8 Along the via negativa of chapters five
and six, we heard how the participants and proponents of other life-organizing stories also
struggle with the singular problem of whom to trust. Which Author will finally resolve the
conflict and so prove trustworthy? Every storied world stands or falls on this question.
In the interest of this question, I have used the notion of “narrated promise”9 to compare the
Christian story with other narrated speech acts. This approach formed the basis of my typology
of narrative theodicies. This Christian story is a narrated promise with the corollary conflict of a
6
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false trust. This articulation facilitates an external use of Christian hope’s attributes. Such a use is
a pressing matter for Christian discipleship and mission in a post-Constantinian context. Where
Christianity is surrounded by many rival ways of “storying” the world, it is, perhaps, easier to
see that our central dilemma is not simply between faith and reason or between religious trust
and critical doubt. Rather, it is between one trust and another. Broken trust with respect to the
Christian God implies a rival trust in another authority and participation in another story. To the
degree that humans hold fast to hope against despair, they inhabit a story. Outside of absolute
despair, there is no neutral, un-storied realm for uncommitted, critical thinkers. Doubt toward
one authority is enabled by trust in another. This makes the conflict in the Christian story reside
between trust in God or idols, not merely between belief and unbelief.
Jesus as Speaker and Fulfiller of God’s Promise
Trust is basic to human life.10 From conception through childhood we were dependent on
parents and guardians. As adolescents, we listened to other people telling us who we are and
what we might become. As adults, the words and actions of others continue to shape our
identities and direct our lives. We live a tension between trust and suspicion. We doubt what
some people say. Others we take at their word. Much of human life is a struggle to find out
whom we can and cannot trust.
There are many ways to identify someone as trustworthy. We may simply observe their
behavior over time and draw this conclusion. Often, it comes from personal interaction. Promisemaking is a common practice for building trust. In chapter two, I drew on the work of Searle to
describe promises as commissive speech acts. They announce the speaker’s intention to do
10
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something that the hearer perceives as good.11 In Wolterstorff’s terms, a promiser takes up a
“normative stance” toward the hearer.12 Such a stance offers the hearer the right to hold the
speaker to his or her word. He or she takes up duties and obligations toward the recipient of the
promise. Why would a speaker do this? The intended perlocutionary effect is trust. The speaker
aims to evoke or maintain a bond of trust with the hearer. A new husband promises his bride, “I
will be faithful.” A mother promises her son, “I will never stop loving you.” The trust evoked
depends on the identity of the speaker established through past performance—promises kept or
broken. It can be threatened or confirmed, depending on the outcome of outstanding promises.
In the Genesis narrative, Yahweh made and repeated a promise to Abra[ha]m: “Fear not,
Abram, I am your shield; your reward shall be very great.” We are told that the promise “took.”
Abram believed Yahweh, and Yahweh “counted it to him as righteousness” (Gen. 15:1–6). The
entire biblical narrative is a drama about this bond of trust built upon the status of this promise
made to Abraham and to all who “walk in the footsteps” of his faith (Rom 4:1–12).
The New Testament writings, especially the Gospels and Acts, ascribe to Jesus of Nazareth
the ultimate authority to make, renew, and keep God’s promise to Abraham’s family.13 In his
sermon at Pentecost, Peter proclaimed “Jesus of Nazareth” as “a man attested to you by God
with mighty works and wonders and signs that God did through him in your midst” (Acts 2:22).
Among the mighty words and deeds of Jesus, Luke reported how Jesus came “in the power of the
Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950) and The Life Cycle Completed (New York: Norton, 1982).
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Spirit” (Luke 4:14) and taught in the synagogues, preaching “the good news of the kingdom of
God” (4:43). He commanded the unclean spirits “with authority and power” (4:36), declared a
leper clean and it was so (5:13), forgave sins and they were forgiven (5:20–26), spoke to a dead
man and he awoke (7:14–15), and silenced a storm with a word (8:24). According to Luke, these
words and works are what led to Jesus’ arrest, trial, condemnation, and death. Israel’s own
authorities accused him of blasphemy for daring to forgive sins (5:21). They were “filled with
fury” when he healed on the Sabbath (6:11). They planned to destroy him after he condemned
their appropriation of the temple, God’s house (19:45–47, 20:9–19). Finally, they condemned
him for claiming to be “the Son of God” (22:70).
Ironically, the title that God himself had ascribed to Jesus is what finally gets him killed. In
Luke’s account, God the Father speaks verbally only two times. He speaks non-verbally at least
once. First, the Father declared directly to Jesus, “You are my beloved Son, with you I am well
pleased” (2:22). Second, he spoke directly about Jesus to Peter, James, and John, with Moses and
Elijah present on the mountain: “This is my Son, my Chosen One, listen to him!” (9:35). Finally,
the Father spoke non-verbally after Jesus prayed his dying words from the cross, “Father, into
your hand I commit my spirit!” (23:46). God answered by raising by him from the dead. He
vindicated Jesus as his Son, the Chosen One, Israel’s King and the world’s Lord.
Shortly after Pentecost, Peter stood in the temple and bore witness to the crucified and risen
Jesus. First, Peter made his own people responsible for Jesus’ death: “you killed the Author of
Life, whom God raised from the dead” (Acts 3:15). God reversed this great evil so Jesus could
go on doing what the Father had sent him in the power of the Holy Spirit to do: “God, having
raised up his servant, sent him to you first, to bless you by turning every one of you from your
wickedness” (3:26). God vested Jesus with his own authority to declare divine blessing and
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favor, just as God had blessed Abraham so that in his offspring “all the families of the earth”
shall “be blessed” (3:25).
This meant, among other things, that Jesus is the fulfillment of God’s promise to raise up
for Israel a prophet like Moses from among their brothers: “You shall listen to him in whatever
he tells you.” Anyone that “does not listen to that prophet shall be destroyed from among the
people” (3:23). Luke ascribed to Jesus the authority and power to speak and fulfill God’s
promise to Abraham for the blessing of all nations. The conflict, that is, the storied evil, in this
account is the singular problem of trust. Having once rejected and killed him, will Israel now
listen to and trust their God-given King? And will the nations turn from their idols and toward
their Lord who will come from heaven at “the time for restoring all the things about which God
spoke by the mouth of his holy prophets long ago” (3:21)?
Appropriately, Luke left these questions unresolved at the end of Acts. Along the way,
many of the Lord’s witnesses have been murdered, persecuted, and imprisoned because of their
testimony. Paul has been put under house arrest while he awaits trial before the Roman Emperor.
In spite of these afflictions, Luke tells us Paul continued welcoming all who came to him. The
narrative ends like it began. First there was Jesus “speaking about the Kingdom of God” (Acts
1:3); then Paul, “proclaiming the kingdom of God and teaching about the Lord Jesus Christ with
all boldness and without hindrance” (Acts 28:31). Those who hold to the Christian hope today
continue to “story the world” as the setting for the coming rule and reign of God. Their hope is
distinctive because they look for God’s reign to be uncontestably established on earth as it is in
heaven, at the coming of Jesus.
As Luke and the other evangelists have told the story, this awaited reign of God is not
ultimately one ushered in by brute force. There is, without doubt, a terrifying threat of force
against all God’s enemies. Jesus depicted himself as the coming King who would say, “But as
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for these enemies of mine, who did not want me to reign over them, bring them here and
slaughter them before me” (Luke 19:27). But the intended perlocutionary effect of this threat is
not despair or resignation but repentance. It is given to turn all people away from their false faith
in idols toward true faith in Jesus, God’s Son. He promises forgiveness and life to all who hear
him. One day his kingdom will come and crush all rivals. Now it is established and built up by
God’s Word and Spirit. It is received by listening to him, by taking him at his word.
Storied evil is mistrust in the God of Jesus supported by a false trust in some other
authority, whether religious, philosophical, cultural or personal.14 The strategy for overcoming
evil is listening15 to the man accredited by God through “mighty works and wonders and signs.”
This is why the Church has traditionally retold a portion of one of the four Gospels in her weekly
gatherings to celebrate the Lord’s Supper and so “proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes” (1
Cor. 11:26). This was and is a primary time to listen to her Lord, to heed his warning to turn
from evil, and to hear his promise of forgiveness and blessing.
This is a pragmatic strategy for overcoming evil. But, it does not seek a resolution to the
story’s conflict by issuing successful directives. Instead, it resolves only when the promise is
finally fulfilled. Like the pragmatists of chapters five and six, Christians look for the world to
conform to the word, not vice versa. They share this quality against the theorists who hoped to
transcend evil by coming to see how it necessarily fit into a greater harmony or by coming to
accept or celebrate the world as it is. Christians, similar to the pragmatists, expect this world to
be transformed, not transcended. The difference between these two kinds of pragmatic solutions
14
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Word of Life: A Theology of John’s Gospel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 65, “Sin, in John’s Gospel, is first a
relational concept. It is unbelief or alienation from God, and it is therefore the antithesis of faith … people relate
rightly to God by believing in Jesus, the one whom God sent.”
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is not the direction of fit, but the responsibility of fit. God, as he has spoken definitively in Jesus,
bears the full burden of demonstrating himself to be trustworthy by fulfilling his promise.
Jesus, as the story’s commanding character, is the final actor. He will bring all these things
to pass. God, having announced and pledged his intentions in advance, is re-creating a
relationship of trust between himself and his people. His kingdom comes by the Word. It calls
for a faithful, active response from those who hear from this God “who gives life to the dead and
calls into existence the things that do not exist” (Rom. 4:17). Thus, storied evil, or false trust, is
overcome by listening to Jesus, turning from idols, and keeping his commands while waiting for
him to make good on his promise.
Along the way toward final fulfillment, God has given Abraham’s family advances, signs,
and guarantees of his faithfulness: a deliverer in Moses, the Exodus, the Promised Land, the
Davidic kingship, the Temple, the word of the prophets, the return from exile. These testify of
God’s faithfulness to his people. This is why it is not only the Gospels that are re-told and
proclaimed in the Church, but the entire narrative and counsel of Holy Scripture. Together, they
attest to the trustworthiness of the God of Israel, the God of Jesus. The Church is the community
that listens, remembers, and retells God’s story. This is the story about the promise God made to
Abraham. Within this storied world, the God of Abraham continues to speak that promise
through his Son.
The Church’s Role in Overcoming Storied Evil
Christian faith and hope is directed toward Jesus. It is not directed toward an idealist
explanation of the universe. It is not directed toward a pragmatic plan of action, but to a specific
man. Like the realists, the Christian story privileges a concrete experience over all ideals. But it
is unique because it privileges the particular experience of being confronted with the on-going,
verbal, apostolic witness to the crucified and risen Jesus. This specific experience is privileged
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above all other experiences. It is “anti-realist” in that it ascribes to this one person final and
universal authority to vindicate all that is good and to condemn all that is evil.
Christian hope is elicited by this narrated promise now proclaimed by the Church. The
story establishes the real world as the world pledged to Abraham’s family and under the
impending judgment of Jesus. The creation has been declared “good,” but corrupted by trust in
authorities other than the Creator as he has revealed himself definitively and finally in Jesus.
While evil comes in many manifestations, its root and source is condemned by the First
Commandment: “You shall have no other gods before me” (Ex. 20:3). Having been distorted by
idolatry, God’s good creation has come under condemnation. As it stands, it is deficient and
needs to be transformed.
The strategy is not to transcend evil by re-description and speculation about an unseen,
higher harmony. The Christian story anticipates a pragmatic solution rather than a theoretic one.
But its pragmatics differs from those seeking to resolve the conflict by issuing successful
directives. The direction of fit is the same for a directive and a commissive, but with a
commissive, the responsibility of fit is carried by the speaker rather than the hearer. The
Christian plot, having been characterized by a promise, will resolve only when the Promiser
transforms the world to match his word. Jesus assured his apostles that these conditions will
attain at the “close of the age” when he sends his angels to gather out of his reign all causes of
stumbling (skándala) and workers of lawlessness and to throw them into the “fiery furnace.”
Then, the righteous will shine like the sun in the reign of their Father (Mat. 13:41–43).16
As the speaker and fulfiller of God’s promise, Jesus is the commanding character of the
Christian story. After his resurrection, he gave his apostles the promise of his Father, pledging
16

Cf. Jeffrey Gibbs, Matthew 11:2–20:34 (St. Louis: Concordia, 2010), 690–711.
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they would be “clothed with power from on high” and so become his witnesses (Luke 24:48–49).
Even though all of the initial apostles have died, the Church throughout all times and places has
been deputized17 and empowered to perform the same authoritative, commissive speech acts that
were recorded in the book of Acts. At the end of Luke’s Gospel, Jesus’ explanation to the
apostles serves as a charter: “Thus it is written that the Christ should suffer and on the third day
rise from the dead, and that repentance and forgiveness of sins should be proclaimed in his name
to all nations, beginning in Jerusalem” (Luke 24:46–47).
The Church has received the sermons and speeches in Acts as a canonical standard for
what qualifies as discourse deputized by the crucified and risen Christ. This discourse can be
summarized as a narrated threat and promise, with the understanding that the threat, while real
and to be taken seriously, is not an end in itself, but serves the promise. As the risen Lord told
Paul on the road to Damascus, the threat is made so that both Jews and Gentiles “may turn from
darkness to light and from the power of Satan to God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins
and a place among those who are sanctified by faith in me” (Acts 26:18).
The Acts’ speeches made to Gentile audiences are especially suited to help distinguish
Christian hope from others. The pre-Constantinian setting in Acts resembles the postConstantinian situation of the Church today.18 There the Gospel of Jesus as Lord and Christ was
preached amid rivals. In the following analysis of Paul’s speech in the Areopagus at Athens
(Acts 17:16–34), I note how Paul both engages and criticizes the existing life-organizing stories
of his hearers. Though Paul did not have my typology in mind, his brief (and interrupted)
confession can help us reflect on how the Christian story both overlaps and scandalizes the four
17
Woltersdorff, Divine Discourse, developed the notion of “deputized discourse” assumed here. See his chap
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18
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Dame Press, 1984), 80–85.
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model narrative theodicies. By hearing Paul’s speech in this way, we can continue to mark how
storied evil will be overcome according to the Christian account.
This vignette in Acts begins with Paul waiting in Athens for his missionary partners. Luke
tells us that Paul got angry when he saw the city filled with idols. As was his custom, he entered
the synagogue and reasoned from the Jewish Scriptures that Jesus was the Messiah (see 17:2–3).
He also conversed “in the marketplace every day with those who happened to be there,”
including some of the “Epicurean and Stoic philosophers” (vv. 17–18). There, Paul’s witness to
“Jesus and the resurrection” is met with both confusion and derision. This prompted an invitation
for Paul to speak to a larger audience, presumably to other philosophers and perhaps even “an
official body that has responsibility for the city, including its religious facilities and rites.”19
Robert Tannehill argued that this setting posed a “rhetorical problem” that appears to have
guided Paul’s strategy in the speech. Paul had already spoken of Jesus and the resurrection, but
this seemed to be a conversation-stopper with the Greeks. He likely recognized that this new
audience was “already prejudiced against him and not disposed to listen to anything he may say.”
In this situation, it behooves a speaker to lay an ad hoc “foundation for understanding on the part
of the audience before bringing up the central issue.”20 And this is just what Paul did. Before the
speech was over, he had quoted a Greek poet and expressed resonance with themes in Greek
philosophy, such as divine transcendence and the universal reach and importance of theology.21
Paul began by noting that the people in Athens were “very religious.” They even had an
altar “to the unknown god” (vv. 22–23). He then proceeded to make this unknown God known to
19
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them. This God is the maker and sustainer of all things. Paul depicted “God’s role in creating and
giving as irreversible. God gives and creates for humanity; humanity may give and create, but
not for God.”22 As the One who creates and gives unilaterally, the Creator has the right to address
his creatures from a privileged position. They are responsible to him. God’s present demand
upon “all people everywhere” is that they “repent” and turn to him in faith. Paul’s ground for
making this claim was that God has “fixed a day on which he will judge the world in
righteousness by a man whom he has appointed,” that is, the man he raised from the dead (v. 31).
At the mention of “the resurrection of the dead,” he was interrupted and mocked as he was in the
marketplace after preaching “Jesus and the resurrection.” Luke reported how the conversation
continued elsewhere, leading some of the Athenians to convert to the Christian faith (vv. 32–43).
In a similar analysis of this speech, Joel Okamoto borrowed from Paul Griffiths to argue
that Paul was “giving an account” of the world that was for him “comprehensive, unsurpassable,
and central.” Paul was telling a life-and-world-organizing story that made claims on and
contested every other such story. Paul’s account not only defined and identified the one true
God, but also declared his will. According to Paul’s account, God is defined not merely as the
authority that backed one’s personal life-organizing story, but as the Author of all things. God is
the one who “gives all things their being and stands over and against all things as creatures.”
This God is identified “ultimately and definitively with the man Jesus, whom he had raised from
the dead.” And this God calls everyone to repent “and finally receive God’s promises of
forgiveness, life, and salvation.”23
service to the gods, the nearness of God to men, man’s relatedness to God.”
22
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By defining God, identifying him, and declaring his will in this way, the Christian account
critically engages each of the four model narrative theodicies. Here we note both overlap and
contradiction. Like the realist accounts, the Christian story scandalizes the idealists. Christians
can affirm realist criticism of the idealist response to evil. Seen from within the Christian story,
the idealist appeal to a disembodied, dehistoricized, universally accessible moral ought is
exposed. Such appeals to impersonal standards of judgment are always projections and
impositions of a veiled personal or communal judgment.24 Like the realist, the Christian account
agrees that judgments are always rendered by persons.
But the Christians and the realists diverge over the matter of universality. Here the
Christian response to evil scandalizes the realist and joins sides with the idealist by declaring that
all people everywhere are accountable to a universal judgment. But in the Christian story, evil
will be condemned and overcome by the authority and power vested in a single, specific person.
God the Father has placed all matters of judgment into the hands of the Son. “The Father judges
no one, but has given all judgment to the Son, that all may honor the Son, just as they honor the
Father” (John 5:22–23).
Christian Hope in spite of Scandalous Evil
Paul Ricoeur thought that hope is always exercised in spite of evil.25 Every life-organizing
story, whether it hopes to finally explain the world or change it, will eventually run up against
some scandalous evil that cannot be resolved within that particular plot. Against this scandal, the
24
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story can either be reclaimed or rejected. If it is rejected, the participant in that story will
experience a peripeteia, a reversal of expectations, a discordance followed by concordance
within a refigured plot. This plot will eventually collide with other stories, other authorities, and
another scandal of evil. However, if the story is reclaimed, the scandal can only be endured. Its
agent of emplotment must be trusted in spite of evil.
The Christian hope shares this plight with hopes arising from other life-organizing stories.
It is distinguished not by its degree of epistemological certainty, social productivity, or
psychological consolation. Instead, the external character of Christian eschatology is discerned
by how it characterizes conflict and anticipates a resolution. The conflict, or storied evil, in the
Christian plot can be characterized as trust in authorities other than the God who has identified
himself in Jesus of Nazareth, whom he raised from the dead. The Christian strategy for
overcoming storied evil is listening to and proclaiming God’s narrated promise and turning away
from all idols to actively follow our Lord, keep his commands, and look for his appearing. False
trust is overcome by listening to, and participating in, the story. This strategy is supported by an
account of Jesus as the speaker of God’s promises, who is vested with the authority and power to
fulfill them at his coming to judge the living and the dead.
The Scandal at the Center of the Story
The Christian story scandalizes the others at the level of the declaration made about what
counts as good and evil. Storied evil in this account is not simply infantile ideals or immoral
behavior, but trust in authorities other than God as he has identified himself in his crucified Son
and his lowly deputies. The Apostle Paul, in his letter to the Corinthians, made a similar point.
He and his partners preached the one who stands crucified (Christòn estaurōménon). This was a
stumbling block (skándalon) to the Jews and folly to Gentiles, “but to those who are called, both
Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:23–24). Paul
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grounded his reasoning neither on self-evident truths nor on conventional tastes but on what God
had elected to do in His economy of salvation:
For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger
than men. For consider your calling, brothers: not many of you were wise according
to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not many were of noble birth. But
God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in
the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, even
the things that are not, to bring to nothing the things that are, so that no human being
might boast in the presence of God (1 Cor. 1:26–29).
Commenting on this passage, Anthony Thiselton said it “is of critical importance to
emphasize that this proclamation of a crucified Christ (v. 23) constitutes the greatest affront
(Greek skandalon) to all except those who appropriate what is proclaimed.”26 Thiselton
referenced Martin Hengel’s work, The Cross, to recall how the cross could not have been an easy
source of pious reflection for the first Christians. The report that “Jesus died on the cross” was
not obviously good news for the members of Roman society, where death on a cross was
regarded “as brutal, disgusting, and abhorrent.” It was
so offensive to good taste that crucifixion was never mentioned in polite society,
except through the use of euphemisms. For Gentiles who might image a “divine”
savior figure, and for Jews who expected a Messiah anointed with power and
majesty, the notion of a Crucified Christ, a Messiah on the cross, was an affront and
an outrage.27
Thiselton pastorally challenged Christians to “hear afresh the effective reality of the cross as a
reversal of all ‘natural’ human values.” What the world despises, God chose.
This is in no way a general negative dialectic, by which all that was previously declared to
be “evil” is now called “good.” God did not choose what was abhorrent in a general way. He
chose this particular crucified man. Trusting this man and his chosen deputies “brings self26
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reliance to nothing and turns attention wholly to Christ as the source and channel of effective
reality as God reveals it.”28 But what is the basis for this crucifying form of trust? Sadism?
Masochism? Anti-rationalism? No. It is the storied rationality proclaimed by the apostles again
and again in the sermons of Acts: “God raised him from the dead.”29
Christians are people who participate in a peculiar story of the world by trusting the God
who identified himself definitively in the crucified and risen Jesus. Within this story, Christians
exercise hope not because of but in spite of the cross.30 There is an appropriate way to return and
reflect on Jesus’ crucifixion as a supreme demonstration of God’s righteousness and love for
sinners as John did in his Gospel or as Paul did in the third and fifth chapter of Romans. But at
least two qualifications must be made. First, this reflection can be done only after Jesus’
resurrection. Paul maintained that “if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and
your faith is in vain” (1 Cor. 15:14). To trust the crucified Christ, the scandal of the cross must
be endured, not redefined. Jesus himself is our example of this.31 According to the author of
Hebrews, Jesus, the founder and perfecter of our faith, “endured the cross, despising the shame”
for “the joy that was set before him” (Heb. 12:2).
There is a second qualification for pious reflection on the cross. Though the Christian
tradition, especially in the West, has at times taken it in this way, it is by no means clear that
Paul, in Romans and elsewhere, transcended the evil of the cross by speculating on cosmic
transactions or a necessary logic of salvation. The debate over theories of atonement is complex32
28
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and I do not wish to engage it here. I only note an implication drawn from our via negativa.
There I observed a common feature that united the four narrative theodicies. They all hoped to
resolve their internal conflict in some future state of mind or state of affairs that was independent
or unassociated with the parousia of Christ to raise the dead and render final judgment. At least
since the time of the Gnostic sects, Christians have been tempted to transcend their canonical and
creedal narrative in search of a “better” solution to evil. But the Christian hope is not directed
toward an unseen drama behind the cross.33 It is directed toward the man who endured the cross.
The story of Jesus and his apostles is displaced when the affront of the cross becomes a
theoretical problem to be solved. Anselmian solutions, such as the explanation that God’s
wisdom had to find a way to satisfy God’s justice before God’s mercy could be lawfully
dispensed, may fit well within a theological system, but they have trouble fitting within the
actual story of Jesus. Questions arise like, “How did Jesus forgive sins before he died on the
cross?” Or, “If God’s justice demands eternal suffering in hell, how did Jesus satisfy the
requirement by suffering only a few hours?” To keep the integrity of the system, the theoretician
might claim Jesus’ sacrifice stands “outside of time,” or that any suffering from God incarnate,
regardless of duration, is sufficient. Answers like these have been convincing to some Christians
and offensive to others. Either way, they are typically commended or criticized not by reference
to the story of Jesus and his apostles, but by reference to some alleged “story behind the story.”34
Christian Thought” (199–213), for a succinct review of the tradition. For a dialogue on the issue, see James Beilby
and Paul Eddy, eds., The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006).
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This is not to say that an account of the Christian faith should exclude reflection on how
Jesus’ death, among other things, fulfills the Yom Kippur narrative from Leviticus 16.35 This
narrative was especially important for the author of Hebrews. The high priest’s one-a-year
sacrifice may also be what Paul had in mind when he wrote that God put Jesus forward as a
hilastērion (Rom. 3:25). I am not denying the legitimacy of this account. What I am excluding is
a theoretic solution to the question of God’s trustworthiness in the face of scandalous evil.
The Christian story is scandalized by the question, “Why does God deliver some from evil
but not others?” If this question were asked in the case of Jesus, a theoretical solution could be
pursued. Q: Why didn’t the Father take the cup of suffering from him? (Luke 22:42). A: Because
God’s justice requires that sinners be punished eternally in hell, so Jesus had to suffer hell in our
place in order to save us. Q: But why didn’t Jesus have to suffer in hell eternally? A: Because
he’s God. Q: So God is above the law? A: Yes. Q: But if God does whatever he wants, why does
Jesus have to suffer at all? Why does God’s plan of salvation require a crucifixion? And for that
matter, why hell? If our efforts to deliver ourselves from evil, whether theoretically or
pragmatically, will always fail, why doesn’t God deliver everyone?
Rational answers can be given to these questions, but they would not proceed from the
storied rationality of the canonical narratives. Well-meaning Christians have done so in the past,
and they have often appealed to Scripture to do so. However, these texts needed to be lifted out
of the biblical narrative and placed into an idealist-theoretic narrative. Leibniz, a confessing
(Lutheran) Christian, authored this form of narrative theodicy (see chapter five). This was the
story told about a conceptual journey to proleptically see the big picture of how everything fits
35
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into a pre-established harmony. In this account, the cross and the world upon which it stood are
transcended. Evil is seen to contribute to the overall harmony and justice of the universe.
How might this be done with respect to the question about Jesus’ cup of suffering? Portions
of the letter to the Hebrews could be employed in a theoretic account. Consider the passage:
“without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness of sins” (Heb. 9:22). Should this be seen
as part of an explanation as to why God required Jesus’ sacrifice on the cross? Or, should it be
understood as a description of what God did in his dealings with his chosen people? If we go
with the first, we would also need to speculate about some structures of the universe to which
even God conforms. If we opt for the second, we would fit this text within the account of what
God did to turn Abraham’s family away from idolatry toward trust in him.
If Hebrews 9:22 is taken in a theoretic explanation, then the proposition “no forgiveness
without bloodshed” would stand in a story of transcending sin and suffering by fitting one’s
mind to match the structures of the universe. The gospel message heard within this story must
primarily be understood as assertive discourse, that is, as speech acts made to fit minds to the
world as it is: “This is how God’s justice was finally satisfied.” Such an account of the gospel
would have a difficult time explaining how the apostles could preach the gospel in Acts without
depicting Jesus’ death as a vicarious satisfaction of God’s justice system. However, Hebrews
9:22 (and similar statements in Scripture) could also be taken as a plain description of what God
elected to do among Israel “under the law” (9:22a). In this case, it would stand in the on-going
story of God’s words and deeds accomplished through Jesus to turn Israel and all nations to trust
Him in spite of the cross, without an explanation, but with a promise that our hope is not in vain.
The Scandal of an Electing God
Hearing and participating in the Christian story raises difficult questions. You don’t need
an academically trained theologian to raise these questions. My five-year old son does just as
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well: “Daddy, why doesn’t God help us?” Challenges are also posed by those who hold to rival
stories. The Christian story is scandalized by different forms of the following question: “Why
does God choose to deliver some from evil (moral, physical, temporal, or eternal), but not
others?” This question can be expressed in at least five ways: 1) Why does God allow evil at all?
2) Why did this particular evil happen to me or to my loved one? 3) Why doesn’t the Holy Spirit
do a better job sanctifying his Church? 4) Why can’t I or my loved one overcome this particular
sin? 5) Why are some ultimately saved, but not others?36 All of these queries wrestle, in some
way, with the problem of God’s election.37
The problem of God’s election is by no means peripheral to Christianity. “Christian
theology must not only recognize the truth of the doctrine of election. It must see election as a
central theme in its story and witness.”38 The famous debate between Erasmus of Rotterdam and
Martin Luther centered on the question of whether or not God, in his choices, can be trusted.
Luther commended Erasmus: “Unlike all the rest you alone have attacked the real issue … the
question on which everything hinges.”39
Luther did not deny the reality of that universal human experience of making choices. He
simply denied that these choices are free—that is, that they are made independently and apart
from the influence of forces beyond our control. All choices are subject to God. An appropriate
metaphor to capture Luther’s assertion is to say that God is “Author.”40 God stands outside of the
36
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perceived contingencies of the world and composes the story just as he pleases.41 The characters,
the setting, the plot, and even the conflict have no existence, no movement, apart from his
choices. He alone is Author. And his creation necessarily “cooperates” with his will, with his
purpose.42 As Paul said to the Athenians, “The God who made the world and everything in it …
gives to all mankind life and breath and everything … having determined the allotted periods and
boundaries of their dwelling place, that they should seek God” (Acts 17:24–27).
If we opt to remain in the Christian story, Luther claimed that we “cannot comprehend how
this God can be merciful and just.”43 The scandal arises from God’s apparent choice to deliver
some from evil (whether physical or moral, temporal or eternal), but not others. Luther thought
that the prospect of eternal suffering in hell “is the greatest possible offense” and confessed: “I
myself was offended more than once, and brought to the very depth and abyss of despair, so that
I wished I had never been created a man.” For this reason there is much “sweating and toiling to
excuse the goodness of God.” But the construction of theories cannot remove the scandal—“alas
then for us wretched mortals in the hands of that God!”44 Yet Luther came to see this as a
“salutary despair,” which brings one “near to grace.”45
Luther’s response to this scandal was not a series of once-and-for-all inferences that stands
ready to answer every questioner. This point is lost on those who would claim that Luther taught
“double-predestination” as a way of explaining that God reveals his compassion in saving some,
but shows his justice in condemning others—as though an ideal of excellence needed to be met.
It is equally lost on those who think “single-predestination” can be used to theoretically defend
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God’s goodness and demonstrate his trustworthiness.46 Luther’s response is not a form of caseclosed deductive reasoning, but an open path that must be walked. This is the path upon which
the faithful children of Abraham have walked for generations—the flight from God hidden in the
ordered, yet ambiguous chaos of a cursed creation to “God preached” in Christ.47
For Luther, faith and hope in the God of Abraham must come from the outside. The only
reason he believed was because this man Jesus was raised from the dead and then sent out
preachers to call all people away from their false authorities and to promise them an inheritance
among God’s people. Luther urged his fellow Christians to trust the reality of this promise over
and against every other experience. We must occupy ourselves “with God incarnate, with Jesus
crucified,” who weeps, wails, and groans “over the perdition of the ungodly,” who “has been
sent into the world for the very purpose of willing, speaking, doing, suffering, and offering to all
men everything necessary for salvation.”48
Jesus as Paradigmatic Recipient of God’s Promise
In the face of this scandalous evil, the story can be rejected or reclaimed. If it is reclaimed,
the scandal is endured, lamented, and resisted. At this point, it is helpful to include another
account of Jesus. Not only is he the speaker-fulfiller of God’s promise to Abraham, but also the
paradigmatic recipient. He is the exemplar of how God keeps his promises. His life in the Spirit,
his crucifixion, death, and resurrection provide the shape of the Christian plot.
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I use the term exemplar to distinguish from Jesus as exemplum, that is, as someone to
imitate. Not that this is an inappropriate way to understand Jesus. After he washed his disciples’
feet, Jesus himself said that he had given them an exemplum (John 13:5, Vulgate) to follow.
Also, Peter said that Christ, in his sufferings, left us an exemplum (1 Pet. 2:21). But this is not
what I refer to when I speak of Jesus as the recipient of God’s promise to Abraham and his
family. Jesus is our exemplar, in the sense that he provides the image into which God the Spirit is
conforming the Church. As Paul said, God chose for us to be “conformed to the image of his
Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers” (Rom. 8:29).
In the account of Jesus as speaker of God’s promise, a forensic, or declaratory, account of
justification was prominent. Jesus, speaking for God, promises, forgives, adopts, and so justifies.
Like father Abraham, he declared the trusting hearer “in the right.” Now, with Jesus as paradigm,
a participatory account of justification is prominent. As Paul told the Ephesian believers, “even
when we were dead in our trespasses,” God “made us alive together with Christ” and “raised us
up with him and seated us with him” (Eph. 2:5–6). The believer is justified with Christ, by
sharing in his resurrection. He was “raised for our justification” (Rom 4:25). A forensic account
is not eclipsed here, but magnified. Paul told the Christians in Rome that in their baptism they
were co-crucified, co-buried, and co-raised with Christ (Rom. 6:1–11).49 Baptism, a forensic act,
a promise, an adoption into the people of God, effected a participatory reality.50
Speaking of Jesus in these terms makes room for a third account alongside the categories of
Christus Victor and Christus Vicar inspired by Gustaf Aulèn’s influential book.51 As our victor,
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Christians confess Christ, who liberated us from bondage to Satan, sin, and death. Jesus died in
battle to deliver us, but God raised him up never to die again. As our vicar, Christians confess
that Jesus’ cross cannot be universalized. His death was unique. He suffered God hidden in wrath
and condemnation alone. He did this for us. As Christus Exemplar, Christians confess that while
Jesus died alone, we do not. We pass through God’s wrath, punishment, and condemnation with
him.52 He is the paradigm into which we have been and are being fit. As Paul said,
I have suffered the loss of all things … in order that I may gain Christ and be found in
him, not having a righteousness of my own that comes from the law, but that which
comes through faith in Christ … that I may know him and the power of his
resurrection, and may share in his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, that by
any means possible I may attain the resurrection from the dead (Phil. 3:8–11).
Jesus, our elder brother, whose Sonship we share by our adoption in the Spirit, is our
exemplar for enduring our scandal of evil. Leopoldo Sánchez explored how Jesus, in the Garden
of Gethsemane, wrestled “with God’s will in a tragic world—that is, a world hostile to the
Father’s love, a world where the innocent suffer.”53 It was there that Jesus finally gave himself
into “the Father’s hands, but that ultimate self-giving and entrusting to God does not come
without intense struggle.”54 After making such a statement, Sánchez had to struggle with how the
Christian tradition, especially in the West, has often explained away Jesus’ agony by appealing
to his immutable, divine nature. At the same time, Sánchez wanted to avoid twentieth century
solutions that seek to make God trustworthy by explaining that he suffers the tragic world
trans. A. G. Hebert (New York: Macmillan, 1969).
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alongside us.55 Sánchez took on this challenge to help the Church find in Jesus “what it means to
wrestle with God’s will in a world that is surrounded by pain and death.”56
Sánchez offered an account of Jesus’ Gethsemane prayer that moved beyond “the
theological bipolarity that in evangelicalism has shaped the current debate between classical and
open theism.”57 He explained that classic theists want to protect God’s freedom and open theists
want to protect not only human freedom, but also defend God’s trustworthiness in the face of
evil. In this scheme, the debate not only leaves us with an “either/or,” it also tends to leave the
canonical story behind in favor of theoretic explanations. Granted, we need some explanation,
but this should be directed primarily toward helping us actually participate in the on-going story
of Jesus-in-Israel-and-the-Church.
A Christian account of divine transcendence should derive from the storied event: the God
of Abraham made a world-transforming promise and proleptically fulfilled it by raising Jesus
from the dead. As an aspect of their discipleship, Christians should struggle to avoid prior ideal
notions about God, such as immutability and impassability, which are then imposed upon the
biblical narrative. Instead, having been confronted and addressed by the emissaries of the risen
Jesus, they should reason within the story that God is able to make good on his promises, neither
being helped nor hindered by any created being or circumstance. This storied rationality redirects
our confidence to God’s power and authority to make good on his promises spoken by Jesus,
rather than to theoretic explanations about divine attributes. This puts a check on what Sánchez
called “an overworked substantialist approach” that relativizes the narrated promise God made to
55
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Abraham in favor of a theological system.58 When the story serves the system, the struggle to
consummate the system becomes the new life-organizing story.
Likewise, an account of human responsiveness should arise from participation in the story
of God’s threat and promise in Christ. I use the term responsiveness instead of freedom to
indicate the proper Christian conception of humanity’s situation before God.59 As Paul
proclaimed in the Areopagus, God calls everyone to repent in response to his announced
intention to judge the world in righteousness through Jesus, whom he raised from the dead (Acts
17:31). For those who insist on trusting other authorities, this announcement is a standing threat.
But for those who hear, it stands as God’s promise in Jesus to forgive sins and secure for them “a
place among those who are sanctified by faith in me” (Acts 26:18). This should be taken as a
genuine commissive speech act issued to evoke a response and create a relationship of trust.
Appeals to human freedom independent of the God of Jesus can provide a theoretical explanation
for why there is sin and suffering in the world. These may even help people toward figuring their
lives around an intelligible story. But it won’t be the Christian story.
Sánchez sought to leave behind “the God of ‘theisms’” (whether classical or open) and
“move towards the ‘triune’ God of the Biblical narratives.” The pattern of participation in this
story becomes particularly evident “in the Son’s life of prayer to God the Father in and by the
Spirit.”60 This encourages us to account not only for Jesus’ prayer, but also the Church’s life of
prayer “as a Trinitarian event grounded in the mystery of filial communion between the Son and
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the Father in the Spirit.”61 Sánchez critiqued Thomas Aquinas’s description of Jesus’ prayer
primarily as a lesson about the two natures of the God-man and as an example for Christians to
imitate.62 In terms of theory, it was instruction. In terms of practice, Christ was “our pedagogue
in the ways of humility.”63 This explanation safeguards notions of divine transcendence and the
two natures of Christ, but it makes “the incarnate Logos’ prayer” something “entirely accidental
and external to His person.”64 In other words, it disassociates the Jesus of the system from the
Jesus of the story. This makes the system liable to be subsumed within a rival story.
The notion of divine “substance” can be a helpful abstraction from the Christian story. It is
a way of confessing the difference between God and creation, with no third option in between.
But it is a hindrance if we forget that it is not divine substance that is identified in the canonical
narrative but divine persons. If we remember that every system is first a storied system, we can
recognize how the narrative ascribes to the Son an identity that is distinct from the person of the
Father.65 As depicted in the Gospels, it is proper to identify the Son as the one who, in the power
of the Spirit, eternally trusts, depends on, and receives all things from the Father. This is
important because Christians are, in time, being conformed into the image of the Son. They are
not most properly imitators of the Son, but participants in his unique identity. By their adoption
in the Spirit, they are “being made faithful and trusting” children of God, who share “by grace in
Christ’s own identity as the Son who prays and entrusts Himself to the Father.”66
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By remaining in the story and privileging divine persons over divine substance, Sánchez
defined prayer as “a historical expression” of “filial life (the life of sonship) both for Jesus and
the followers of Jesus because both pray to the same Father in and by the same Spirit.”67 Prayer
is “an address to a personal God”—not meditation on an ideal, not resignation to reality—but
speech acts directed toward the God who is “relational in His own triune being and therefore
relates to us in a meaningful way.”68 With words of prayer we express “filial trust,” which is “not
a matter of submitting to an apathetic God or persuading a self-limiting God.” Instead, it is a
matter of “trusting in a loving Father who has given us the Spirit of His Son to enter a reciprocal
I-Thou relation with Him characterized by faith on our side and love on His side.”69
Christian Hope as Answered Lament
Oswald Bayer said something similar in his proposal for a “theology of lament” or
complaint (Klage).70 He argued that lament is a neglected category in Christian theology and that
a dogmatics that included the complaint of faith would significantly rework present systems,
especially in the doctrine of God, creation, man, Christ, atonement, and eschatology. Bayer noted
how through “the influence of Stoic thought, lament was pushed out of the everyday lives of
Christians.” In contrast, a proper Christian theology of lament stands “in radical contradiction to
the Stoic theology of submission.”71 Here, the present distress and suffering of a creation in
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travail “is not made insignificant or covered up, but it is taken seriously without becoming the
ultimate reality or leading to resignation or cynicism.”72
From Bayer’s perspective, systematic theologians are often tempted to consummate their
systems and reach “a happy ending too quickly.” They do “not take serious the uncertainty and
hopelessness along the way.” This alienates the system from everyday life because it “takes time
to walk the way in prayer, meditation, and affliction (oratione, meditatione, tentatione).” Both
theoretical cover-ups and Stoic piety distract Christians from “holding God to his given promise
and from demanding God’s answer with passionate protest and lawsuit like Job.” But lament, as
an expression of faith, can help keep Christians on the way and in the story. It is different than
skepticism or doubt because “no lament exists entirely without remembered trust or, finally,
expected answer.”73 The lament of faith “confesses God’s lordship and our expectation of his
goodness.”74 It comes from a people who have already been adopted in the Spirit, made
witnesses to the resurrection, brought home out of exile, settled in the Promised Land, having
been rescued out of slavery in Egypt, and now looking forward to the restoration of all the things
the God of Abraham promised by his prophets long ago.
Bayer also suggested what an “eschatology of answered lament” might look like. In the
first place, it would need to be grounded on a “Christology of answered lament,” with reference
to how on the cross Jesus took up the words of Psalm 22, “My God, my God, why have you
forsaken me?”75 As long as Jesus was dead in the tomb, this prayer was unanswered. God’s
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pledge to make the nations his inheritance remained unfilled. God’s trustworthiness remained
contested.76 But in the resurrection, his prayer was answered and the promise fulfilled, with Jesus
as the “firstfruits” of the full harvest to come (1 Cor. 15:20–28). As the Church walks toward the
promised future of the risen Christ, she prays by the same Spirit, “exhorting and charging God to
grant justice to people and all creatures against the enemy (Luke 18:1–8) and thereby remain
loyal to his own justice.” Bayer described the final judgment as “the world-completing act of the
Creator, who in boundless mercy saves from all distress.” Therefore, lament “calls on God to
establish his promise of life: ‘O Jesus Christ, you are tarrying with your Day of Judgment …
please come.’”77
Sánchez’s account of Christian participation in Christ’s Sonship by the Spirit and Bayer’s
theology of lament reflect Paul’s “description of present Christian existence, rooted in God’s past
action in Jesus Christ, assured of God’s future action for Christ’s people and for the whole world,
and sustained in the present by the Spirit.”78
For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. For you did not receive the
spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received the Spirit of adoption as
sons, by whom we cry, “Abba! Father!” The Spirit himself bears witness with our
spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs—heirs of God and
fellow heirs with Christ, provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be
glorified with him (Rom. 8:14–17).
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This has immediate impact on how Christians endure and lament the scandal of evil. Prayer, as
“groaning” in the Spirit, is not merely something that Christians are commanded to do. More
importantly, it is the Spirit-given response to God’s promise to adopt us, to redeem our bodies,
and to finally set the entire creation “free from its bondage to corruption.” Prayer follows from
and returns to the narrated promise that the God of Jesus made to Abraham. By the Spirit, we
petition, plead, lament, and above all confess our trust in the Father. “For in this hope we were
saved. Now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for
what we do not see, we wait for it with patience” (Rom. 8:18–25).
Summary
There is certainly more that could be said about Christian hope. However, I argue that this
sort of witness is particularly helpful for Christians attempting to offer the reason for their hope
in a post-Constantinian context. By helpful, I mean appropriate and fitting. I leave the matter of
effectiveness to the Holy Spirit. He leads the Church directly into the conflict of interpretations
to bear witness to the crucified and risen Jesus. Christians have received a definite strategy for
lamenting and struggling against evil. Staying with, anticipating, and proclaiming this narrative
theodicy is the source and distinction of Christian hope.
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CONCLUSION
There is a good reason why “Jesus” is almost always the right answer in Sunday school.
Plenty of stories of the world inspire hope for life after death. Many hope for a reunion with
loved ones. A few even look for a resurrection of the body and a new life in an age to come.
Almost all of them provide psychological stability in walking the all-too-human tension between
presumption and despair. But, the Christian difference is and always will be this peculiar
Palestinian construction worker who was crucified by order of a Roman procurator during the
first half of the first century. In spite of his ignominious demise, his disciples came to confess
him as Israel’s Messiah and the world’s Lord. They took up this outrageous stance because they
believed the God of Abraham had raised him bodily from the dead, being the first to rise in a
general resurrection God will accomplish on the Last Day. At that time, God will judge the living
and the dead and set the world right. Christian hope is distinct because it arises out of this story.
Not too long after these apostolic reports of Jesus’ resurrection started coming out of
Jerusalem, the name “Jesus” and the experience of “Christ” were lifted out of this story and
embedded into others. Such is still the case today. Jesus is claimed as an icon for stories of
personal prosperity. He is instrumental for quests for assurance of personal salvation. He is
admired for the way he resisted the securities of this passing world and faced death
courageously. He is applauded for his non-violent protest against tyranny. Jesus has been fit into
these stories and used to support these hopes. He has been made a means to serve something
conceived as a greater good: religious assurance, personal fulfillment, existential authenticity,
social justice.
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But, the story told in the New Testament resists all moves to instrumentalize Jesus. He is
the Word of Yahweh made flesh, who has come to call Abraham’s family to trust him
unconditionally. He is the maker and fulfiller of God’s promise to give the earth and all creation
as their inheritance. He called them by name, forgave their sins, and healed their diseases. They
rejected and killed him, but God raised him up so he could complete his mission. Their crucified
Messiah restored them to their proper calling as light to all nations. From the beginning of the
story, Abraham’s family was always to be a family for others. All the families of the earth are to
be blessed and favored through them. When Jesus comes again in glory, he will raise bodily all
the dead. He threatens to eternally condemn all who have corrupted themselves by trust in idols.
But to those who belong to him, he promises a permanent place among those who are sanctified
by faith in him (Acts 26:18).
The New Testament expands this account of Jesus: not only does he address Israel and the
nations as God in the flesh; he also stands with us as brother. He is the Son of Abraham, the
firstborn from the dead, the heir of all things (Col 1:15–20). “For all the promises of God find
their Yes in him. That is why it is through him that we utter our Amen to God for his glory.” God
has established us with him and in him. He has “given us his Spirit in our hearts as a guarantee”
(2 Cor. 1:20–22). As both the speaker and recipient of God’s promise to Abraham, Jesus is the
agent of emplotment in the Christian story. The conflict in this story—false trust in idols—is
overcome by his address to us and through our participation in him by the Holy Spirit.
The Christian story is a narrative theodicy because it establishes the righteousness of God.
It attests to the God who makes right and thereby demonstrates himself as trustworthy. But, like
its rivals, this story is still unfolding. As Christians, our continued participation in it is threatened
both by the evil we do and the evil we suffer. We confess the God and Father of Jesus as Author
of all things, but we cannot square this with either the origin or the final end of evil.
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The logic of our story compels us to assign blame for evil on the rebellious will of
creatures, both human and angelic. God’s threat to eternally condemn those who have corrupted
themselves by idolatry must be taken seriously. We cannot disregard his address to us in favor of
a self-proclaimed ideal of love. His threat of judgment is real and aims to elicit an active
response. It is given to turn all people from their idols and toward him in faith. But this storied
reasoning does not supply us with the conceptual structures to explain why God, as Author of all
things, permitted evil in the first place. An appeal to free will is appropriate, if by that we mean
we are made responsible to God when he confronts us and calls us to repent. But it is
inappropriate if it becomes part of a chain of reasoning used to theoretically demonstrate God’s
trustworthiness.
Such a theoretical explanation might begin by declaring an ideal of freedom as the highest
good. If God is to have creatures who freely love him, then having some who abuse their
freedom is part of the cost of doing business. Thus, all evil is necessary evil and therefore must
be seen to serve the greater good. This explanation works reasonably well in a theoretical
account, but it follows a logic of resolution (i.e., an eschatology) that is contrary to the Christian
account. It seeks to resolve the conflict by fitting one’s mind and words to match the world as it
is. At the same time, if someone wishes to actually become a part of God’s people, he or she
must carry out the directive of self-transformation to become a person who freely loves God.
These strategies for overcoming Christianity’s scandal of an electing God—that is, the God who
is Author of all things—achieve success only by abandoning the story in favor of some other
narrative theodicy. They exonerate God by removing from him the role of Author and assigning
it to someone else—either to the assertion-making or directive-fulfilling human being.
Eventually, this new story and new agent of emplotment will be accompanied by a new scandal
that can only be endured in hope. But it will no longer be Christian hope.
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If idealist solutions are rejected, those scandalized by the Christian story could opt for a
realist narrative theodicy. This is the story that begins by rejecting all ideals as idolatrous
illusions. The world “is what it is.” On the one hand, it can be re-described and perhaps
celebrated with a form of Stoic piety. On the other hand, it can be pragmatically manipulated to
ease our pain. These solutions become self-narrated accounts of growing up to face the world
with maturity. Again, the God of Jesus, who made a world-transforming promise to Abraham, is
displaced by the authority of assertion-making and directive-issuing human beings. Within these
realist narrative theodicies, a continuing scandal of evil must be endured with hope. But it’s not
Christian hope.
The God of Jesus continues to be God for us by calling us back into his story. There he
bears the full weight of evil and promises to establish himself as trustworthy. He vows to remove
all scandals to our faith when he brings the world to fit the word of his promise to Abraham. In
his Diatribe against Luther, Erasmus said that within this story “my mind encounters many a
stumbling block.”1 Luther said that the only way to defend God is to dethrone him. The only way
to let God be God is to trust him. We must refer “everything to God” and “the difficulties, if not
cured, can be endured.”2
Jesus, our brother, is our exemplar for enduring this scandal. This does not mean he is
merely an exemplum to imitate. He is that, but there is more. His life in the Spirit, his crucifixion,
and resurrection are the paradigm for participation in the Christian story. The Holy Spirit, whom
we have received by baptism into Christ, has brought us to share in Jesus’ unique identity. We
are adopted sons and daughters of God. The Spirit continues the work of conforming us into his
1
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image. Jesus was once crushed by the awful hiddenness of his God. He trusted his Father, who
answered his cry of lament by raising him from the dead. As we suffer God’s hiddenness, unlike
him, we do not suffer alone. His Spirit draws us forward to the Day when faith will give way to
sight. The light of glory in the Advent of Christ will demonstrate the justice and mercy of God.
“Until then,” Luther told Erasmus, “we can only believe this.”3 Christian hope, like all other
forms of life-organizing hope, is always exercised in spite of some form of unresolved
scandalous evil.
Accounting for Christian hope in this way has several implications for the Church’s
corporate struggle against storied and scandalous evil. To conclude, I will mention a few under
the headings of Christian discipleship and witness. These are enduring areas of reflection for the
Church in all times and all places. However, they are always practiced in concrete, historical
settings. In this essay, I have focused my appeal to the Church in a post-Constantinian setting.
The term post-Constantinian assumes the Christian faith once supplanted a previously dominant
way of accounting for the world and entered a long period of social establishment, which is now
past. Christianity lost social dominance to another account of the world, which, in turn, has
begun to lose its explanatory power to an array of conflicting accounts. This has given rise to
much confusion not only about what it means to hope as a Christian, but simply what it means to
be a Christian. I have argued that being a Christian means participating in the Christian story.
Thus, discipleship, witness, hope, and all Christian Theology arise out of this narrative theodicy.
In terms of discipleship, this account of Christian hope has implications for Christian
thinking and doing. I address the former here and the latter below. Thinking—reasoning,
explaining, and philosophizing—always arises out of a life-organizing story. Since the Church
3

Ibid., 332.
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confesses that her God is the Author of all things and that the setting of her story encompasses
the entire spatial-material world, she can always expect some overlap with other storied systems.
This insight encourages Christian thinkers to engage other accounts of the world critically, but
with a readiness to learn. I attempted to model this by adapting extra-ecclesial concepts to serve
thinking within the Christian story. For example, I used Kant’s notion of “internal” versus an
“external use of attributes” to more clearly express the difference in my approach to eschatology.
Also, I adapted Searle’s analysis and categorization of speech acts along with his concept of
“direction of fit” to explain key differences between rival life-organizing stories. Although I
classified both of these men as professing a rival to the storied hope of Christians, my thinking
and speaking was enhanced by engaging their stories.
Christian philosopher Boyd Blundell presented the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur as a model
for how such critical engagement might be done as “detour and return” to the “main road.”4
Christian thinkers should approach philosophies critically, realizing that systems are always
storied systems. They confess a rival eschatology, that is, a resolution to a particular problem of
evil that contests Christian eschatology. They imply and express trust in a rival author, that is, a
rival god. At the same time, Christian thinkers can engage these rival stories as exploratory
detours. By doing so, they will return to their story-of-the-world enriched with new insights. In
this project, I followed Ricoeur’s lead and attempted such a detour in chapters four, five and six.
This account of Christian hope also has implications for Christian action. Throughout, I
have focused on verbal action—on speech acts. But this approach also applies to non-verbal
communicative acts. This includes both the Church’s gathering for her weekly liturgy and
celebration of the Lord’s Supper along with the vocational practice of individual Christians. Both
4
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practices should be understood within the Christian story, which narrates one theodicy among
many rivals. Gathering for the liturgy becomes the central locus of the Christian struggle against
storied evil, which is trust in the authors of other life-organizing stories. In the liturgy, the
Church assembles bodily and publically to participate in the coming rule and reign of God. This
liturgy is in conflict with other liturgies, which incorporate their participants into rival stories.
The rivalry also extends into vocational practice. It is especially tempting for North
American Christians to locate their labor within the American, Free-Market Capitalist Dream.
This rags-to-riches myth offers a life-organizing hope. It rivals the story that centers on Jesus’
life in the Spirit, who led him to sacrificially give his life for the good of his neighbor in need.
Also tempting for North Americans and Western Christians in general is the “Myth of Religious
Violence” and the so-called triumph of liberal democracy. This unquestioned story can deceive
Christians into trusting liberal democracy as a savior, which requires unquestioned obedience in
exchange for peace and security. Telling the Christian story as an all-encompassing plot
subsumes liberal democracies and all forms and manifestations of government within the coming
reign of God. Such an account empowers Christians to serve as citizens, police officers, judges,
politicians, and military members in their peculiar, self-sacrificing, enemy-loving, Christian way.
From this perspective, the decrees of governmental office-holders can be appropriately
challenged and conscientiously objected when they set themselves up as idols. By staying in
their story, Christians may be judged as ineffective according to the storied values of others. Yet
Christians are distinguished not by their social, economic, and political effectiveness, but by the
way they defer all matters of vengeance and final judgment to Jesus.
With respect to mission, this approach enables an understanding of both the Gospel and the
hearers of the Gospel within the context of the story of Jesus-in-Israel-and-the-Church. In
theologically conservative circles, the Christian Gospel is often treated as theoretical, assertive
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discourse. The “good news” about Jesus is conveyed as an explanation about how God found a
way to both satisfy his wrath and save sinners without compromising his justice. This
presentation of the gospel can leave the hearer either to assent to a description of the world-as-is
or to seek out a better explanation. The problem with this account of the Gospel is not that it
under-emphasizes the narrative aspect of the Christian faith. The problem is much more urgent in
that it presumes a rival, idealist-theoretic narrative, which resolves only when our explanations
come to match the world as-is. This rivals the Christian Gospel, which is a narrated-promise that
will resolve only when the God of Jesus conforms the world to fit his word of promise to
Abraham. Within the context of the Christian story, the Gospel is heard as a commissive speech
act, not an assertive one. Likewise, the word of the Law is not primarily a description of an
unachievable moral standard, but a genuine threat of God’s continued wrath against all who trust
in idols—that is, in Authors of rival life-organizing stories.
With respect to the hearers of the Gospel, Christian witness should recognize that the story
of Jesus remains vulnerable to being subsumed within the hearer’s existing life-organizing story.
The Gospel is the proclamation of forgiveness of sins, but this proclamation occurs within the
larger narrated-promise. When the Gospel is reduced to “forgiveness” without being grounded in
the story of Jesus, it can be colonized by either the realist or idealist version of the pragmatic
story. In this case, the hearer enjoys a private assurance or a therapeutic consolation while
keeping his or her ultimate loyalties with the reigning public story. But, these would-be standard
stories are scandalized when the Gospel of forgiveness on account of Christ is proclaimed in
response to God’s threat to curse those who oppose his promise to give both his favor and his
creation to Abraham’s family (Gen. 12:3; Rom. 4:13). And when reconciliation is offered to
those crushed by this threat, the Gospel, through the work of the Spirit, is set to evoke faith and
hope in Jesus, the final speaker and paradigmatic recipient of God’s promise to Abraham.
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